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CHAPTER 1: 
INTRODUCTION: 
On 17 of July 1998, the Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted at the 
United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries.' Four years later it 
obtained the 60 ratifications required for its entry into force,^ and as a result, the first 
permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) now sits in The Hague. What was 
considered for so long to be a "dream of a few visionaries"^ has finally become a 
reality for all. 
The Court has jurisdiction over the "most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole". Whilst the crime of aggression is formally 
included within this category, the Court is currently prevented from initiating 
prosecutions involving this crime unless and until the parties to the Rome Statute 
agree upon a suitable definition and the conditions under which the Court may 
exercise jurisdiction. The fact that negotiations on the crime of aggression at the 
Rome Conference almost derailed the entire project demonstrates just how hard this 
task is.^ Although progress has been made through the work of both the Preparatory 
Committee (PrepCom) and the Preparatory Commission (PrepComm), there is still no 
firm agreement amongst States Parties on the fundamental aspects of the crime. 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U N Doc. A / C O N F . 183/9 (17 July 1998) 
(hereinafter Rome Statute). The Statute was adopted by 120 votes to 7 (US, Libya, Israel, Iraq, China, 
Syria & Sudan), with 21 abstentions. 
As of I January 2007, 104 countries have ratified this Statute, see: http://www.icc-
cpi.inl/statesparties.html (visited 1 June 2007). The Statute entered into force on the 1 July 2002. 
Editor's Preface, In: Politi & Nesi, The Crime of Aggression. Prof. Schabas professes a 'guardian 
angel' theory about the I C C , believing that something mysterious seems to be driving its rapid success. 
Schabas, W., 2001. International Criminal Court: The Secret of Its Success. C L F . Vol. 12, p417. 
Article 5(1) Rome Statute. 
Schuster, M. , 2003. The Rome Statute and the Crime of Aggression: A Gordian Knot in Search of a 
Sword. C L F . Vol. 14, p i , notes that the negotiations on the crime of aggression culminated in a 
"codified impasse" See also: Broomhall, B . , 1997. Looking Forward to the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court: Between State Consent and the Rule of Law. C L F . Vol.8, p325 
The intention of this thesis is to provide a detailed analysis of the problems that 
present themselves when trying to incorporate the crime of aggression within the 
jurisdiction of the Court. Chapter 2 begins by providing a thorough analysis of the 
history of the term aggression as well as the creation and development of the crime.As 
Carpenter notes, the simplicity of the term 'aggression' "disguises its long and sordid 
6 
past". Attention then turns to the specifics required for a definition of the crime, as 
well as the various proposals that have been submitted. Following detailed discussion 
of the aspects of the crime and the various options that have been put forward, a 
conclusion of the most suitable definition of the crime of aggression that should be 
incorporated into the Rome Statuteis given. Chapter 4 addresses the complex problem 
of the conditions under which the Court will exercise its jurisdiction over the crime 
and the necessary evaluation of the relationship between the ICC and the Security 
Council that this entails. Chapter 5 addresses some procedural issues that may affect 
the crime's implementation as well as the overall conclusions on the substantive 
arguments surrounding the likelihood of the ICC gaining Je/acto jurisdiction of the 
crime of aggression, both in the short-term and the long-term. 
From the outset, it is recognized that this is no easy task. As Meron stipulates, "the 
mission is more sensitive, the precedents fewer, the implications for the integrity of 
international law and the UN Charter deeper and broader, and national security 
interests more directly involved".' One thing that is essential is that the crime of 
aggression must be comprehensively defined in compliance with customary 
international law and must meet the highest standards of codification. Meeting such 
standards is necessary to protect the fundamental integrity of the ICC. 
^ Carpenter, A . C . , 1995. The International Criminal Court and the Crime of Aggression. NJIL. Vol.64, 
p223. 
' Meron, T. , 2001. Defining Aggression for the International Criminal Court. S T L R . Vol.25, No.l , p i . 
As a provisional note, it should be made clear that this thesis is up to date as of 1 June 
2007. This means that conclusions of the recent meeting of the Special Working 
Group of the Crime of Aggression are not taken into consideration. 
CHAPTER 2: 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: 
1. The League of Nations and the Inter-War Period; 
(a) The Development of the Limitations on the Right to Use Force: 
8 
The universal prohibition on the use of force that exists today is historically speaking, 
a relatively new phenomenon. For centuries moralistic and theological limitations 
have existed on a State's right to use force, but they have often been ineffective and 
9 
vague. One such limitation was the 'just war' or bellum justum doctrine. Although 
it's roots can be found in the foreign policy of the Roman Empire, it is predominately 
10 
a Christian and, in particular, a Catholic doctrine. The basic idea was that a State 
could only go to war when it was just or right to do so. However, the lack of any fixed 
criteria and the fact that such determinations were subjectively taken by the State 
intending to use the force, meant that almost every military campaign could be 
deemed as legitimate under bellum justum. 
By the late 19th century this doctrine had virtually disappeared from the international 
plane. The demise of religious influences and the creation of international law as we 
know it today led to the conviction that every State had a sovereign right to "embark 
upon war whenever it pleased"." Instead of needing religious justifications. States 
Article 2(4) U N Charter. 
9 
For a detailed history of the use of force see: Brownlie, I . , 1963. International Law and the Use of 
Force by States. Oxford; Clarendon Press; Dinstein, Y . , 1994. War, Aggression and Self-Defence. 2"'' 
ed, G B : Cambridge University Press; Gray, C , 2004. International Law and the Use of Force. 2""* ed, 
USA: Oxford University Press. For an excellent in-depth review of the historical developments with 
regard to aggression, see the paper that was prepared by the Secretariat for the Preparatory 
Commission's Working Group on the Crime of Aggression at its Ninth Session: "Historical Review of 
Developments Relating to Aggression ", UN Doc. P C N I C C / 2 0 0 2 A V G C A / L . 1, (Hereinafter Historical 
Review). 
10 
The Crusades of the Middle Ages were originally Roman Catholic Holy Wars to recapture Jerusalem 
and the Holy Land from the Muslims and as such, were sanctioned by the Papacy 
Dinstein, supra note9, p72. 
could now "resort to war for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all". The 
lack of any restrictions or regulations on the behavior of States' in this field and the 
rearmament that was taking place throughout Europe, led the Czar of Russia to 
convene the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907.Although the right to wage 
war was slightly curtailed at these conferences, their principle achievement was 
agreement on regulating certain methods and means of warfare. As Benjamin Ferencz 
stated in 1995; "What emerged ... was not a plan to prevent war but some rules on 
how the States could go about killing respective nationals in a more gentlemanly 
14 
manner". These attempts at disarmament however, were not enough to prevent the 
outbreak of the First World War in August 1914. 
(b) The Creation of the League of Nations; 
When conflict ceased in 1919, the horrors that had been witnessed led various nations 
to call for the creation of an international system capable of preventing such conflicts 
from ever reoccuning. American President Woodrow Wilson became the most 
articulate spokesman for such an organization, claiming that it would "guarantee 
peace and justice throughout the world". ^ In order to create such an establishment, as 
well as deal with the defeated nations, the Allied and Associated Powers gathered at 
the Paris Peace Conference in January 1919. It was at this conference that the first 
substantial steps were taken in establishing aggression as an international crime. 
During the conference it was concluded that the War had been declared "in pursuance 
16 
of a policy of aggression". This led to the inclusion of Article 227 in the Versailles 
Briggs, H.W., 1952. The Law of Nations. 2"'' ed. (quoted in Dinstein, ibid). 
The contracting parties to Article 2 of the Hague Convention for the Specific Settlement of 
International Disputes, (No. I of both 1899 and 1907) agreed that before making "an appeal to arms" 
they would first resort to the good offices and mediation of friendly States. 
14 
Ferencz, B . B . , The United Nations Consensus Definition of Aggression: Seive or Substance. From 
the Washington Conference on Law and the World, October 1995. Available at: 
http://members.aol.com/benferen/unconsen.htm. 
IS 
Ferencz, B . B . , 1975. Defining International Aggression: The Search for World Peace. A 
Documentary History and Analysis. Vol. I , New York; Oceana Publications, p6. 
16 
German White Book Concerning the Responsibility of the Authors of the War, 15-24. Carnegie 
Endow, (1924). 
Treaty, ^ which called for the prosecution of the German Kaiser, Wilhelm I I for "a 
18 
supreme offence against the international morality and the sanctity of treaties". This 
was the first time that a policy of aggression had entailed the criminal responsibility of 
an individual, and was certainly an action not free from controversy. Not only has the 
19 
clause attracted academic criticism, but it also clearly violated the criminal principle 
20 
of nullum crimen sine lege. The Netherlands, who had granted asylum to the Kaiser, 
believed that aggression had not been recognized as a crime for which an individual 
could be held responsible for prior to the outbreak of the War, and subsequently 
refused to hand custody of him over to the Allies for prosecution.^' Taking into 
account the valid criticisms made about the legitimacy of the charge contained in 
Article 227, the important point to note is that it is "it's existence, rather than it's 
content, [which] speaks volumes".^^ 
In respect of the development of the history of the use of force, the more significant 
act of the Paris Peace Conference was the creation of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations, adopted on 28 April 1919. The League of Nations was intended "to promote 
international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security" by 
accepting the obligation "not to resort to war".^'' Article 10 of the Covenant 
17 
Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty also explicitly linked the concept of aggression with a 
declaration of war. 
The word supreme was to reappear in connection with the crime of aggression in Justice Jackson's 
speeches at the Nuremberg tribunal, where he referred to the crime of aggression as the 'supreme 
international crime'. See: Chap2(2)(a)(iii). 
19 
Prof. Schabas refers to Article 227 as something which "lacks substantial judicial character"; 
Schabas, W., 2004. Origins of the Criminalisation of Aggression: How Crimes Against Peace Became 
tlie "Supreme International Crime". In: Politi & Nesi, The Crime of Aggression. p24. Richard Griffiths 
calls it a "meaningless statement", Griffiths, R., 2002. International Law, The Crime of Aggression and 
the Jus Ad Bellum. I C L R . Vol.3, p303. 
20 
This comes from the maxim ''Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali", which 
translates as; Wo crime (can be committed), no punishment (can be imposed) without a previous penal 
law'. Nullum crimen sine lege prohibits the creation of ex post facto laws, and prevents the prosecution 
of individuals under such laws. See Chapter 3(1 )(a). 
This line of argument was later adopted by German and Japanese defendants of the I M T and I M T r e , 
who claimed that the charge of 'crimes against peace' violated the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. 
See Chapter 2(2)(b)(iii)-(v). 
22 
Griffiths, supra note 19, p303. 
Preamble of the Covenant. 
represented the first real effort to qualify the right to go to war, declaring that: "The 
Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external 
aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members 
of the League." 
At first glance, Article 10 appears to be a general prohibition on the right to go to 
24 
war. However, it is essentially an abstract statement which must be read in 
conjunction with Articles 12, 13 and 15 of the Covenant. Although Article 12 requests 
Members to submit any dispute to arbitration or inquiry by the Council, this is 
qualified by the right to resort to war after three months. Furthermore, Article 15(7) 
provides that, in the absence of unanimity within the Council, the parties to the 
25 
dispute retain their freedom to engage in war. In reality, the Covenant only obligated 
Members to refrain from engaging in military action for a certain period of time, 
rather than prohibiting the right to resort to war altogether. 
Another "gap"^^ in the Covenant's provisions on the use of force was that it only 
bound Members of the League of Nations. Cmcially, and despite all the efforts of the 
passionate President Wilson, the American Congress voted to reject the Covenant, 
refusing to become a League Member. The failure of the world's richest and most 
powerful nation to accept the League played a significant role in its ineptitude and 
inaction. Moreover, the Soviet Union, Germany, Japan and Italy were only Members 
for a short time. 
In conclusion, the Covenant did not actually prohibit the right of states to resort to 
war. Instead, it subjected the right to specific limitations. The powers prescribed to 
Randelzhofer, A., 2002. Article 2(4). In: Simma, The Charter of the United Nation, pl55. 
" National interests and political considerations meant that unanimous decisions by the Council were a 
rare event. 
Dinstein, supra note9, p79. 
Randelzhofer, supra note24, pi 15. 
this new international institution were only nominal, and the lack of international 
consensus and acceptance of the League meant that it was fruitless in its efforts to 
maintain international peace and security. Although the Covenant recognised the 
concept and role of aggression in the developing system of international law, its lack 
of any definition or clarification as to its meaning meant that the Council of the 
League of Nations was unable to clearly determine when it had occurred, let alone act 
in the face of it. However, the establishment of the League of Nations did provide a 
platform for international debate and development, and almost immediately after the 
Covenant was signed, efforts began to strengthen and qualify the developing 
prohibition on the use of force. 
(c) Efforts to Strengthen the Developing Prohibition on the Use of Force: 
One theme that continued to dominate international debate during the inter-war period 
28 
was that of disarmament. Initially, disarmament efforts focused on the need for a 
specific definition of the act of aggression, in order to assist the Council in any 
decision it may have to make regarding its commission. The Temporary Mixed 
Commission for the Reduction of Armaments (TMC) was established by the League 
in 1922 to address and submit plans on the issues of disarmament and security. A 
Special Committee of the Commission was created to look at the feasibility of 
defining aggression. However, it concluded that "no simple definition of aggression 
can be drawn up, and that no simple test of when an act of aggression has actually 
29 
taken place can be devised". The result was that all matters concerning the 
commission and existence of aggression were left to the complete discretion of the 
Council. Work on a crime of aggression entailing individual criminal responsibility 
28 
Johnson notes that "in the days of the League, it was discovered that the question of Disarmament 
was inextricably bound up with the question of Security, whilst the latter was intimately connected 
with the specific settlement of disputes" arguing that the League would either "find a general solution 
or . . . if unresolved, [it] would overwhelm the League". Johnson, D.H.N. , 1955. The Draft Code of 
Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. I C L Q , Vol.4, p448. 
29 
Commentary on the Definition of a Case of Aggression by a Special Committee of the Temporary 
Mixed Commission, League of Nations, Official Journal, Spec. Supp. No 26. Records of the Fourth 
Assembly, Minutes of the Third Committee, ppl83-185. 
ceased. Furthermore, a proposal by the Committee of Jurists to establish an 
international criminal court capable of prosecuting individuals for international crimes 
was rejected, primarily because of the general view that there was not, as yet, an 
30 
international penal code to which individuals were bound. Instead disarmament 
efforts turned to strengthening the developing prohibition on the use of force, 
although this included references to the act of aggression. 
(i) The 1924 Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes: 
In 1923 a draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance (TMA), sponsored by the League of 
Nations and based upon the discussions and proposals of the TMC was drawn up. 
Article I of the draft Treaty declared "aggressive war is an international crime", 
without defining the concept of 'aggressive war'. However, disliked by the 
Committee of Jurists and rejected by national governments, this treaty was never 
adopted - one of the contentious points being its undefined reference to aggression.^' 
In 1924, an American group sought to amend the draft TMA, by drawing up a 
32 
protocol that declared aggressive war as an "international crime". Again, however, 
this proposal was never accepted. As a compromise, the French and the British 
decided to merge the aborted draft TMA with the American Proposal, drawing up The 
Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,^^ who's preamble 
declared that "a war of aggression ... is an international crime". Although the Protocol 
was unanimously adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations it did not receive 
the requisite number of ratifications and so never came into force. 
30 
Ferencz, supra note 15, p8. 
" Ibid, pplO-14. 
" Article 2. Draft Prepared by an American Group, League of Nations, Official Journal, Spec. Supp. 
No 26. Records of Fifth Assembly, Minutes of Third Committee, pp 169-172. 
Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, League of Nations, Official Journal, 
Spec. Supp. No. 26. Records of the Fifth Assembly, Minutes of the Third Committee, pp 189-194. 
34 
Although efforts at a regional level continued to limit the right to use force," the 
question of aggression fell silent within the League until 24 September 1927, when 
the Assembly unanimously adopted Resolution 14 declaring that "all wars of 
aggression are, and always shall be, prohibited", as well as denouncing wars of 
aggression as "an international crime"."'^  However, it must be remembered that 
Resolution 14, as well as the Protocol, possessed no binding authority within the 
international community as it existed in the inter-war period and can therefore really 
only be regarded as statements of aspiration. 
(ii) The 1928 General Treaty for Renunciation ofWar as an Instrument of 
NationalPolicy: 
"The decisive turning-point in the development away from the freedom to wage war 
36 
and towards a universal and general prohibition" came in the form of the General 
Treaty for the Renunciation of War or, as it is better known, the Kellogg-Briand Pact 
of 1928. Although the document was initially an agreement between the French and 
the Americans mutually outlawing war as an instrument of national policy, it quickly 
became one of the most prominent prohibitions on the use of force, ratified by almost 
38 
every member of the international community as it existed in 1928. The Kellogg-
Briand Pact consisted of only two brief articles. Article I condemned "recourse to war 
for the solution of international controversies", and renounced the use of force as "an 
instrument of national policy". Article I I stipulated that the peaceful resolution of 
disputes was the only avenue available to contracting parties. However, two major 
failings of the Pact meant that it had little impact on the actual behavior of States 
For example, Article 2 of the Locarno Treaty of 1925 between France, Germany and Belgium 
proscribed that any attack, invasion or war was not available to the parties as a method of settling 
disputes. 
Declaration Concerning Wars of Aggression, September 24, 1927. League of Nations, Official 
Journals, Spec. Supp. No. 53, p22. 
Randelzhofer, jupra note24, pi 16. 
37 
United Nations Treaty Series, No. 796. 
38 
Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, 63 States had ratified the Treaty. Randelzhofer, 
supra note24, pi 16. 
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during the inter-war period. Firstly, the Pact only referred to 'war', and not the 
broader notion of 'use of force'. This meant that certain States avoided the prohibition 
39 
by disguising their actions and not explicitly declaring 'war'. Furthermore, the Pact 
was qualified by the fact that war remained lawful i f it was a war of self-defence, a 
justification which many States used to explain their actions. Secondly, the 
prohibition was not supported by the possibility of sanctions against the State in 
breach, effectively being regarded as an empty threat. That being said, the Pact did 
represent a significant step forward in the collective consciousness of the States that 
adopted it, in restricting their right to wage war, and paved the way for the current 
universal prohibition. 
(Hi) The 1933 Soviet Definition of Aesression: 
The first real attempt to define aggression was made by the Soviets in 1933. On 6 
February, at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, the Soviet delegate Mr. Litvinoff 
submitted an enumerative definition of the act of aggression consisting of three brief 
articles. The definition was based on the four bilateral non-aggression treaties the 
USSR signed with Finland, Latvia, Estonia and Poland in 1932. The Soviets intended 
the definition to act as a guide to any international organ called upon to determine the 
commission of an act of aggression. As the only communist superpower, Mr. 
Litvinoff made it clear that the Soviets feared political bias in any consideration of 
questions relating to aggression by an international body composed of individuals 
40 
hostile to the communist system. In the Soviet's view, a pre-existing agreement on 
the elements of aggression was an essential aspect of receiving a fair and impartial 
review. 
This is exactly what China and Japan did in 1931 during the Manchuria conflict. 
40 
Ferencz, supra note 15, p68. 
41 
The Soviet definition was based on the "principle of priority", ' which stipulated that 
the aggressor in an international conflict was the first State to commit one or more of 
the five prohibited acts of aggression that were provided in Article 2. Furthermore, the 
draft Treaty provided that "no considerations whatsoever of a political, strategic or 
economic nature" could serve as a justification for the action taken. After some 
debate, the draft definition was given to the Disarmament Conference's Committee on 
Security Questions. Mr. Politis, Chairman of the Committee, produced a slightly 
42 
reworded version of the Soviet draft in May 1933, which, although it did not receive 
international acceptance, formed the basis of a multilateral non-aggression treaty the 
43 
USSR signed with its regional neighbors in July 1933. Again, the important point to 
note here is that although the draft definition received international consideration and 
debate, it had no legal impact on the actions of States. 
Despite all the efforts of the inter-war period to establish a general prohibition on the 
right to wage war, as well as the first attempt to define aggression, the 1930s saw the 
tide change from disarmament to rearmament. By 1939, Europe had once again 
descended into war, beginning the greatest and most horrific global conflict mankind 
has ever witnessed. 
2. The Aftermath of the Second World War: 
Following the collapse of Nazi Germany and the surrender of the Japanese in 1945, 
44 
the Allies took a "two-pronged approach to ensure lasting peace". On the one hand 
the international community created the United Nations (UN), a global institution 
41 
Gomaa, M. , 2004. The Definition of the Crime of Aggression and the ICC Jurisdiction over that 
Crime. In: Politi & Nesi, The Crime of Aggression, p68. 
42 
For a detailed analysis of the Politis Report and a copy of the draft definition see: Butler, W . E , 1973. 
Chapter IH: A G G R E S S I O N . Section 2. Soviet Concepts of Aggression. In: C . B A S S I O U N I & V.P. 
NANDA, ed. A Treatise on International Criminal Law. Vol. \, Ripo Fagnano Alto: Editrice il Sirente, 
pi 82-197. 
Romania, Poland, Afghanistan, Persia, Latvia, Estonia, Turkey and Finland. Ibih, pi 87. 44 
Ferencz, supra notel5, p37. 
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45 
designed to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" through the 
maintenance of international peace and security. On the other the Allies established 
46 
two International Military Tribunals in order to prosecute the leaders of the defeated 
nations. This included, for the very first time, prosecutions of certain individuals for 
the crime of aggression or, as it is referred to in the IMT and IMTFE Charters, 
47 
"Crimes against Peace". 
(a) The Creation of the United Nations and the Universal Prohibition on the Use 
of Force: 
The San Francisco Conference of 1945, beginning on April 25, was attended by 
delegates from over 50 nations and concluded on June 26 with the signing of the UN 
Charter. Like the League of Nations, the primary purpose of the UN is the 
48 
maintenance of international peace and security. One of the principle aims of the 
Conference was to rectify the shortcomings of the League and so the travaux 
preparatoir gave the Security Council the power and authority to enforce its own 
decisions through Chapter VI I of the Charter. There was serious debate at San 
Francisco as to whether or not an explicit definition of aggression should be included 
within the Charter. Whilst countries such as Egypt and Iran supported the idea of 
49 
incorporating a definition others, such as Bolivia actually presented a draft definition 
50 
for the Conference to consider. Although the proposals were given a degree of 
consideration, strong opposition led by the US and the UK forced the debate from the 
Preamble U N Charter. 
46 
One in Nuremberg (hereinafter the IMT) and one in Tokyo (hereinafter the I M T F E ) . 
47 
Article 6(a) & Article 5(a) respectively. 
' 'Vrticle 1(1) U N Charter. 
49 
Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organisation, (UNCIO) , San 
Francisco, 1945, Vol. IH, 538 
50 
Ibib, at 585. These proposals were supported by Colombia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Iran, Mexico and Uruguay. 
The principle reasons the US and the U K objected to a concrete definition of aggression being 
incorporated into the Charter was the fact that they did not want to see the powers of the Security 
Council restricted and they felt that an enumerative list of the acts of aggression could never be 
exhaustive. 
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table, resulting in no definition being incorporated into the Charter.^ The conclusion 
reached was that any determination of whether there had been a "threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace or act of aggression"^'' would be left to the sole discretion of the 
Security Council. As stated above, one of the primary aims at San Francisco was to 
rectify the flaws of the League. However, the composition of the Security Council, 
with its five permanent members being awarded the veto, has enabled some of these 
old flaws to creep into the new system, representing a significant weakness in the 
enforcement measures and collective security regime of the UN. It means that the 
permanent five and their allies some of the most powerful nations in the world are 
very often provided with the opportunity to escape condemnation by the Security 
Council for their actions. Ferencz clarified this problem when he stated that "the 
Council was composed primarily of those States which had the capacity, and therefore 
the temptation, to commit aggression ... it was like asking the fox to guard the chicken 
54 
coop". 
The Charter did, however, contribute to the criminalization of aggression in that it 
included a comprehensive and universal prohibition on the use of force by 
56 
States. Article 2(4) stipulates that: "Al l members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of 
Carpenter, supra note6, p227, notes that aggression was purposefully not defined by the delegates at 
San Francisco. See: Security Council Enforcetnent Arrangements, Doc. 881, U N C I O Vol . I l l , 505. The 
Committee charged with deliberating on the question of aggression rejected an a priori definition, 
stating as its reasons: 
That a preliminary definition of aggression went beyond the possibilities of this Conference 
and the purpose of the Charter. The progress of the technique of modern warfare renders very 
difficult the definition of all cases of aggression ... the Council would have a tendency to 
consider of less importance the acts not mentioned therein: these omissions would encourage 
the aggressor to distort the definition [and] delay action by the Council. 
• Article 39 U N Charter. 
54 
Ferencz, supra note 14. See also: Chapter 4. 
Griffiths, supra note 19, p308. 
56 
However, the Charter contains two explicit exceptions to the prohibition; firstly the right of self-
defence enshrined in Article 51 and secondly the notion of collective security found in Article 42. 
14 
the United Nations."" The prohibition encompassed in the Charter is much broader 
than that found in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, as it refers to 'the threat or use of force' 
whereas the focus beforehand had purely been on the notion of 'war'. Cherif 
58 
Bassiouni believes that this change from 'war' to 'use of force' was deliberate, as 
encompassing a broader notion of force under the prohibition would prevent states 
from justifying their actions by claiming that they were not 'at war'. 
(b) The Establishment of the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and 
Tokyo: 
The "second prong" in the Allies' approach to ensuring lasting peace was the creation 
of the IMT & IMTFE. These prosecutions represent the first and only time that senior 
political and military officials have been held accountable for the crime of aggression. 
The inclusion of a charge of crimes against peace within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunals was a highly controversial move, and as such, has received severe 
59 
criticism. That being said, the prosecutions represent the only international 
precedent available to the recently established ICC and therefore are of great 
importance to the present analysis of the crime of aggression. 
(i) The United Nations War Crimes Commission of 1943: 
Prior to the end of the War in 1945, a UN Diplomatic Conference was convened in 
London to address the issues surrounding the investigation and prosecution of various 
war crimes. To deal with these matters, a United Nations War Crimes Commission 
(UNWCC) was created on June 29 1943, with representatives from 17 Allied nations 
57 
This prohibition is now regarded as customary international law and arguably, a jus cogens principle. 
The ICJ recognised the customary nature of the prohibition in its Nicaragua decision when it held that 
the US had been in breach of its "obligation under customary international law not to use force against 
another State ". Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
{Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Merits), I C J Reports (1986), pl47, para.292(4),(6). 
Bassiouni, C , 1973. Chapter HI: A G G R E S S I O N . Section 1. The Definition of Aggression in 
International Law; The Crime Against Peace. In: C . B A S S I O U N I & V.P. N A N D A , ed. A Treatise on 
International Criminal Law. Vol. I. Ripo Fagnano Alto: Editrice il Sirente, pi63. 
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60 
participating in the deliberations and debates of the Commission. As well as being 
expected to assist in the preparation of indictments and the collection of evidence, 
UNWCC was also instructed to establish the substantive law which the planned IMT 
would apply. As the Commission's title suggests, the primary focus was the 
clarification of the law on war crimes. However, as deliberations progressed into 1944 
experts within the Commission began to turn their attention to the overarching war 
crime of 'waging aggressive war' and the question of whether it was within the remit 
61 
of the Commission's mandate. This question was passed to the Commission's Legal 
62 
Committee, which concluded that aggression was a crime in international law. 
Referred back to the Commission, the Legal Committee's conclusions were debated 
by the represented nations but no agreement was reached, as delegates feared that 
63 
"Governments would be reluctant to go so far". This lack of agreement meant that 
64 
the matter was then passed to a subcommittee for further deliberation. With the 
65 
Czechoslovakian representative Bohuslav Ecer dissenting, the subcommittee's 
majority concluded that "acts committed by individuals merely for the purpose of 
preparing for and launching aggressive war, are, lege lata, not 'war crimes'," although 
they felt that "it is desirable that (for the future) penal sanctions should be provided 
66 
for such grave outrages against the elementary principles of international law". This 
67 
clear statement shows that in 1944 two of the 'Big Four', America and the UK, did 
60 
The Commission was composed of representatives from the occupied nations as well as Australia, 
Canada, China, India, New Zealand, South Africa, the U K and the US. The U S S R did not join but co-
operated with the group in spirit. 
Documentation on the history of the U N W C C stipulates "the most important issue of substantive law 
to be studied by the Commission . . . was the question of whether aggressive war amounts to a criminal 
act". U N W C C , History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of the 
Laws of War, London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1948, pp. 107-118. 
Minear, R .H. , 1971. Victor's Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, p. 49. 
" U N W C C , supra note61, p 181. 
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The subcommittee was composed of representatives from the U K , the U S , Czechoslovakia and the 
Netherlands. 
65 
Ecer was a strong supporter of the existence of the crime of aggression. For a more detailed analysis 
of both his work and the work of U N W C C , see: Schabas, supra note 19. 
66 
U N W C C , supra note61, pl82. 
The Allied States (the U K , the US, the U S S R and France) were also known as the 'Big Four'. 
not believe that the crime of aggression was a war crime for which individuals could 
be held criminally responsible. This opinion was to experience a rapid u-tum within 
the 18 months that followed. Although UNWCC continued to assist with investigating 
war crimes until 1949, international focus shifted to the meeting of the 'Big Four' in 
London in the summer of 1945. 
(ii) The London Conference of 1945: 
During the July and August of 1945, delegates from the four Allied States met in 
London to discuss the intended prosecution of the leaders of the European Axis. The 
London Agreement, to which the Charter of the IMT was annexed, was adopted on 
68 
the 8th of August. A variety of opinions and intentions were expressed at this 
Conference. Whilst Churchill proposed that "enemy leaders should simply be 
69 
executed when they were caught", the Americans wanted a credible IMT capable of 
prosecuting the most serious offenders with a set of crimes reflecting the atrocities 
70 
that had been committed, including the waging of an aggressive war. The French, 
the only Ally to have been occupied by the Germans, were strong supporters of the 
proposed tribunal, but were unimpressed with the adoption of a common law system 
over the Roman principles of civil law. The Russians were also supportive of the idea 
of a trial, but for vastly different reasons. The 'show-trials' of the 1930s had taught 
them of the importance of being seen to administer justice. According to them, the 
true purpose of the Tribunal was not to determine the responsibility of the defendants, 
but rather to approve the appropriate punishment for them: "The fact that the Nazi 
leaders are criminals has already been established. The task of the tribunal is only to 
68 
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major Criminals of the European Axis, United 
Nations Treaty Series, Vol.82, p.279. 
Overy, R., 2003. The Nuremberg Trials: International Law in the Making. In: P. S A N D S , ed. From 
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Robert H. Jackson, the special representative of the US President to the London Conference, was 
America's most prolific supporter of an IMT. He later became the U S Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg. 
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determine the measure of guilt of each particular person and mete out the necessary 
punishment - the sentences" 
Once the delegates agreed that the most appropriate forum for dealing with the 
defeated leaders was an international Tribunal, they turned their attention to the 
substantive law that would be applied. However, when it came to the question of 
aggression, opinion was extremely divided. What emerged was a compromise 
between the two principle positions, forced by the pressures of time and politics. 
The French delegates saw the inclusion of a crime of waging aggressive war as an 
imposition of ex post facto law. They were adamant that prior to 1939, there had been 
no such crime, and moreover, they firmly believed that the London Conference was 
not a competent body capable of legislating such a crime. 
We do not consider as a criminal violation the launching of a war of 
aggression. If we declare war a criminal act of individuals, we are going 
farther than the actual law. We think that in the next years any state which will 
launch a war of aggression will bear criminal responsibility morally and 
politically; but on the basis of international law as it stands today, we do not 
believe these conclusion are right... We do not want criticism in later years of 
punishing something that was not actually criminal, such as launching a war of 
73 
aggression. 
71 
Report of Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative to the International Conference on 
Military' Trials, Department of State Publication No.3080. Washington; US Government Printing 
Office, 1949, p303 (hereinafter Jackson Report). This is not to say that the U S S R was the only nation 
whose primary intention was the successful prosecution of the Nazi leaders, it is Just that other nations 
ajjpeared to pay more attention to the criminal principles that guided their domestic systems. 
The French highlighted the fact that even the San Francisco Conference had felt that defining 
aggression was beyond its capabilities, leaving the decision to the competencies of the Security 
Council. 
Minear, supra note62, p61. 
Furthermore, the French concluded that there was no principle in international law 
74 
that allowed individuals to be held accountable for the acts of a State. 
The Russians were also weary about incorporating such a charge within the Tribunal's 
jurisdiction. For them, however, the objection was not out of respect for criminal 
principle or policy, but more for personal protection. They feared that the inclusion of 
such a crime would lead to the defense of tu quoque^ being raised. Guilty of its own 
76 
aggression against Finland and Poland, Russia was more concerned about the 
impunity of its own leaders, and only agreed to the proposal of including crimes 
against peace after receiving reassurances that the trials would take place before an ad 
hoc Tribunal with jurisdiction limited to the crimes committed by the European 
77 78 
Axis. Furthermore, it also rejected the definition of aggression tabled by the US. 
The Russian delegate. General Nikitchenko, felt that it was unnecessary, as the 
79 
purpose of the trials was not to determine guilt, but to administer sentence. In 
agreement with the French, the Russians also stated "that the conference was not a 
80 
competent body to prepare [a definition] in any event". 
The Americans held a contrasting view. They fully supported the inclusion of an 
overarching crime of aggressive war in the IMT Charter. Jackson, in his report to the 
US State Department, stressed the need for incorporating the crime of aggression, 
stating that it would "make war less attractive to those who have governments and the 
74 
"It may be a crime to launch a war of aggression on the part of a State that does so, but that does not 
imply the commission of criminal acts by individual people who have launched a war. ... [It may] be 
morally and politically desirable [for there to be such a crime) but... it is not international law." 
Jackson Report, supra note71, p297. 
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destinies of people in their power". In response to the French argument that the 
crime did not exist under international law, Jackson relied on "the common sense of 
mankind that a war of deliberate and unprovoked attack deserves universal 
82 
condemnation". Furthermore, Jackson strongly argued that the crime of aggression 
must be sufficiently and comprehensively defined. He believed that a precise 
definition would prevent defence arguments questioning the applicability of a crime 
that lacked precise elements, by claiming that it breached the criminal principle of 
83 
nullum crimen sine lege. Jackson further argued that i f the IMT was to have any 
legitimate judicial authority, the definition must be a general principle that applied 
equally to all nations.^^ For him, restricting the definition to the leaders of the Axis 
countries would deprive the Tribunal "of all standing and fairness as a judicial 
85 
principle". 
After much negotiation, a compromise was reached: Crimes against Peace would be 
included within the substantive law of the Charter, but it would contain no explicit 
definition of the notion of aggression, nor would the Tribunal's jurisdiction extend 
beyond the crimes of the Axis countries. Instead, Article 6(a) referred to the conduct 
of the individual in the crime of aggression: 
Jackson Report, supra note? 1. 
82 
Quoted in Ferencz, B., 1972. Defining Aggression: Where it Stands and Where it's Going. AJIL. 
Vol.66, No.3, p492. 
Jackson's dismay at being unable to incorporate an explicit definition was evident in his opening 
speech to the Nuremberg Tribunal: 
It is perhaps a weakness of this Charter that it fails itself to define a war of aggression. 
Abstractly, the subject is full of difficulty, and all kinds of troublesome hypothetical cases can 
be conjured up. It is a subject that if the defence should be permitted to go a-field beyond the 
very narrow charge in the indictment, would prolong the trial and involve the Tribunal in 
insoluble political issues. 
Opening Speeches, 21 Nov. 1945, p40. 
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A R T I C L E 6: The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within 
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual 
responsibility: 
(a)CRIMES AGAINST P E A C E : namely, planning, preparation, initiation or 
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, 
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for 
the accomplishment of any of the foregoing. 
The inclusion of crimes against peace within the IMT Charter clearly established that 
86 
aggression was not just "morally ... but also legally wrong". Furthermore, the 
Charter also represented a significant step forward in the development of international 
law because for the first time an individual could be held criminally responsible for 
his or her actions at the international level. This was viewed by some as a highly 
controversial move, in particular with regards to crimes against peace, as Article 6(a) 
declared that individuals could be held criminally accountable for what is essentially a 
State act, {i.e. the waging of a war of aggression). As a result, a significant amount of 
the Tribunal's focus was spent on establishing the charge of crimes against peace and 
the principle of individual criminal responsibility. 
(Hi) The Trial of the Major German War Criminals at the Nuremberg 
Tribunal. 1945 - 1946: 
The trial of the senior military and political officials of the Nazi regime that took 
87 
place at Nuremberg sat from 14 November 1945 to 1 October 1946. Of the 24 
88 
defendants charged with Count One and/or Count Two of the Indictment, 8 were 
89 
convicted on both counts; 4 were acquitted of count one and convicted of count 
36 
Ferencz, supra note 14. 
87 
For a detailed analysis of the Nuremberg Trials see: Historical Review, supra note9. 
Two defendants did not stand trial; Ley committed suicide in prison on 25 October 1945 and Gustav 
could not be tried because of his physical and mental condition, by decision of the Tribunal dated 15 
November 1945. 
89 
Goring, Hess, von Ribbentrop, Keitel, Rosenberg, Raeder, JodI and von Neurath. 
21 
90 91 
two; 4 were acquitted of both counts; and 6 were acquitted of count one and not 
92 
charged with count two. Al l the defendants entered a plea of not guilty. Count One 
contained charges regarding the 'common plan or conspiracy', and Count Two related 
to committing specific crimes against peace by planning, preparing, initiating or 
93 
waging wars of aggression against 12 identified countries. The defendants were 
charged with using their positions in the Nazi party, government, military and 
industry, as well as in several instances, their relationship with the Furhrer, to commit 
94 
the crimes. 
The Judgment of the IMT began with a review of the pre-war law relating to 
aggression, in order to determine exactly what it meant to initiate and/or wage a war 
95 
of aggression. In rejecting the argument that the provisions of Article 6(a) amounted 
to an ex post facto criminalization of the acts of the defendants, and therefore in 
96 
breach of the principle nullum crimen sine lege, the Tribunal asserted that Article 
6(a) was declaratory of modem international law, proclaiming that the Charter did 
97 
nothing more than codify the law up to that point in history. To support this 
90 
Fl ick, Funk, Donitz and Seyss-Inquart. 
91 
Schacht, Sauckel, von Papen and Speer. 
92 
Kaltnbrunner, Frank, Streicher, von Schirach, Fritzsche and Bormann. 
" Poland (1939); The UK & France (1939); Denmark & Norway (1940); Belgium, The Netherlands & 
Luxembourg (1940); Yugoslavia & Greece (1941); Soviet Union (1941); and The US (1941). 
Historical Review, supra note9, p l4 . 
For a detailed account of the charges laid against each of the 24 defendants see: Historical Review, 
supra note9, pi5. 
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For a detailed overview of Tribunals judgment, see: ibid, pp29-44. Schabas, supra notel9, p29, 
questions the attention the Tribunal gave to the charge of crimes against peace, claiming that it was not 
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conclusion the Tribunal cited various declarations as evidence of the existence of 
98 
crimes against peace. The Tribunal paid particular attention to the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact of 1928 stating that: " A l l these expressions of opinion, and others that could be 
cited, so solemnly made, reinforce the construction which the Tribunal placed upon 
the Pact of Paris, that resort to a war of aggression is not merely illegal, but is 
99 
criminal." 
In other words, the Tribunal concluded that prior to 1939, resort to a war of 
aggression had been deemed to be against the law of nations, and if a State acted in 
such a manner, it committed an internationally wrongful act entailing State 
responsibility. It was at this point that the Tribunal uttered its now infamous 
characterization of the notion of a war of aggression: 
The charges in the Indictment that the defendants planned and waged 
aggressive wars are charges of the utmost gravity. War is essentially an evil 
thing. Its consequences are not confined to the belligerent States alone, but 
affect the whole world. To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only 
an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only 
from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of 
the whole.'^'^ 
The conclusion by the Tribunal that aggression was "the supreme international crime" 
has attracted some academic criticism. Detailed as such because of the fact that crimes 
against peace required a State act - an act committed by the collective rather than by 
98 
Article 1 of the Draft TMA; the Preamble of the 1924 Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes; Preamble to Resolution 14, 1927; and the Resolution adopted unanimously by 
21 nations at the Pan-American Conference in 1928, declaring that "war of aggression constitutes an 
international crime against the human species". Ibid, pp221 -222. 
99 
Ibid, p41. 
100 
United States of America et al v. Goering et al, IMT Judgment (1946), reprinted in (1947) AJIL, 
Vol.41, pl72. 
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101 
an individual - i t was argued by some that international law had not yet reached the 
stage where the principle of individual criminal liability could be attributed to 
participation in a State act. Although Schabas agrees with the Tribunal's conclusion 
that aggression as a prohibited act of State existed prior to 1939, he questions the 
motives of the IMT, pointing to the final Judgment in which the IMT essentially 
conceded the fact that punishing crimes against peace amounted to retroactive 
prosecution: 
To assert that it is unjust to punish those who in defiance of treaties and 
assurances have attacked neighboring states without warning is obviously 
untrue, for in such circumstances the attacker must know that he is doing 
wrong, and so far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his 
102 
wrong were allowed to go unpunished. 
By way of an explanation Schabas offers the suggestion that "at the time, it appeared 
the criminal principle of nullum crimen did not have the sacred, non-derogable status 
103 
that it would come to take on". This is a valid argument and one that has, post 
Nuremberg, influenced the codification of other crimes and criminal principles. That 
being said, the Judge's at Nuremberg proceeded with the prosecutions on the basis 
that aggression was a crime that could attract individual criminal responsibility. 
104 
Having established that Nazi Germany had initiated and waged wars of aggression 
prime facie, the Judges felt that it was "unnecessary to consider in detail whether the 
wars also violated international treaties, agreements or assurances", as stipulated in 
101 
As demonstrated by the discussions of UNWCC and the London Conference. 
102 
Schabas, supra note 19, p30. 
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Ibid. See also: Article 4(2) ICCPR (1976), 
In explaining the element of 'initiation', the Tribunal stated that Germany's initiation of aggression 
was an act that was "premeditated, deliberate, planned, carefully prepared and limed as part of a 
preordained plan and as a deliberate and essential part of Nazi foreign policy". Historical Review, 
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105 Article 6(a). This meant that the Judge's had to then turn their attention to the 
culpability of the 22 defendants on trial, which involved addressing the controversial 
principle of individual criminal responsibility. The Tribunal, again relying heavily on 
the Kellogg-Briand Pact as an instrument establishing the illegality of war, inferred 
from it that "those who plan and wage such a war, with its inevitable and terrible 
106 
consequences, are committing a crime in doing so". This conclusion was 
strengthened by the now infamous characterization of the principle of individual 
criminal responsibility in international law: "Crimes against international law are 
committed by men, not abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who 
107 
commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced." 
In cementing this principle, the Judges drew an analogous inference from Hague 
108 
Convention (IV) of 1907. In conceding that the Kellogg-Briand Pact did not 
109 
expressly stipulate war as an international crime, the Tribunal argued that Hague 
110 
Convention (IV), in which certain practices of warfare are prohibited, also did not 
specify that these acts amounted to war crimes, but that the international community 
had viewed them as such since 1907. The Tribunal considered "the criminality of 
war as analogous and even more compelling"."^ The Tribunal cited evidence such as 
the 1923 draft TMA, and the Protocol for the Specific Settlement of International 
105 
Nuremberg Judgment, supra note96, p26. 
106 
Ibid, p220. The Tribunal went on to state that: 
... the solemn renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy necessarily involves the 
proposition that such a war is illegal in international law; and that those who plan an wage 
such a war, with its inevitable and terrible consequences, are committing a crime in so doing. 
War for the solution of international controversies undertaken as an instrument of national 
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Disputes,"^ as proof that aggression had been recognized as an international 
crime;"finding in them evidence of the dynamic development of customary 
international law". 
Furthermore, the Tribunal rejected defence counsel arguments that the accused were 
immune from prosecution under the 'Act of State' doctrine. The traditional 
understanding of this doctrine stipulates that senior State officials cannot be held 
accountable for acts performed in the discharge of their official duties. "^With regard 
to an individuals involvement in the commission of war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and crimes against peace,this traditional understanding became obsolete at 
Nuremberg. The Tribunal held that: 
The principle of international law, which under certain circumstances protects 
the representatives of a State, cannot be applied to acts which are condemned 
as criminal by international law. The authors of these acts cannot shelter 
themselves behind their official position in order to be freed from punishment 
116 
The Tribunal did however, severely restrict the scope of crimes against peace to the 
leadership of the aggressive State. Although the wording of the IMT Charter would 
have allowed for far-reaching prosecutions with regards to the circle of responsible 
persons, the Judges explicitly restricted the scope to individuals at a policy-making 
level. Furthermore, the Tribunal stipulated that those at the policy-making level had to 
have played an active role in the construction, development and implementation of the 
policy. The Tribunal identified as crucial to the issue of planning the wars of 
aggression, a defendants attendance and participation in the 4 secret, high-level 
meetings held on 5 November 1937 as well as 23 May, 22 August and 23 November 
Both of which were non-binding documents that never came into force. 
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1939, at which Hitler outlined his aggressive plans for the future and reviewed the 
progress already achieved. Absence from these meetings led the Tribunal to 
conclude that the identified individual would not have been in a position to influence 
the policy of aggressive war. Finally, with regards to the 'Common Plan or 
Conspiracy' charge contained in Count 1, the Tribunal rejected the defence argument 
that common planning cannot exist where there is a complete dictatorship: "Hitler, 
could not make aggressive war by himself. He had to have the cooperation of 
statesmen, military leaders, diplomats and businessmen". 
In conclusion, it is clear that the IMT proceedings form the principle source of 
reference for any future prosecution of the crime of aggression. The inclusion of the 
Article 6(a) within the IMT Charter was the first time that such a crime had actually 
been qualified, and the resulting prosecutions dramatically developed the law relating 
to international crimes of war and the criminal responsibility of the individuals at the 
senior military and political level. That said, valid criticisms made of the methodology 
used by the Tribunal in its prosecution of this 'supreme crime' flag up the particular 
difficulties such a prosecution will necessarily entail. The lessons learnt in 1945 must 
be recognized in the construction of the crime that is to be included within the Rome 
Statute. 
(iv) Tribunals established Pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10: 
Utilizing the momentum created by the IMT, the Control Council for Germany 
119 
adopted Law No. 10 on 20 December 1945. This law gave effect to the Moscow 
Ibid, pp 188-192. 
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Ibid, p226. 
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Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes against Peace 
and against Humanity, reproduced in Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military 
Tribunals, United States Government Printing Office, 1951, Vol . I l l , p i 8, (Hereinafter Trials of War 
Criminals). 
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120 Declaration of 1943, and the London Agreement of 1945. It also provided "a 
uniform legal basis in Germany for the prosecution of criminals other than the major 
121 
criminals dealt with by the Nuremberg Tribunal". Pursuant to Control Council Law 
(CCL) No. 10, the Americans established several military Tribunals as part of its 
administration of the American Zone of Occupation in Germany. Between 1946 and 
1949, these tribunals conducted 12 trials, 4 of which included charges of crimes 
122 123 
against peace; namely, the /. G. Farben case, the Krupp case, the High Command 
case,'"^ and the Ministries case.'^ ^ France also established the General Tribunal of the 
Military Government for the French Zone of Occupation. This Tribunal conducted the 
Roechling trial,'^^ which involved charges of crimes against peace. 
The IMT Charter and Judgment played an integral part in the CCL trials. CCL No. 10 
contained a definition of crimes against peace very similar, although slightly more 
expansive, to the definition contained in Article 6(a). Firstly, Article 11(1 )(a) of CCL 
120 
The Declaration on German Atrocities {Moscow Declaration) of 1943 was an agreement between 
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Nazi Germany would be punished for their crimes. 
Historical Review, supra note9, p44. For a detailed analysis of the trials conducted under CCL No. 
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United States of America v. Alfried Felix, Alwyn Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, et al. (the Krupp 
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level management positions within the Krupp firm. The charges were dismissed because of insufficient 
evidence. 
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United States of America v. Wilhelm von Leeb et al. (the High Command case). This case involved 
14 officers who held high-level positions in the German Military. The Tribunal acquitted all the 
accused of the charges of crimes against peace after finding that they "were not of the policy level", 
(Judgment, 27, 28 October 1948, Trials of War Criminals, supra note 128, 1951, Vol.XL p49l). 
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United States of America v. Ernst von Weizsacker et al. (the Ministries case). The 21 defendants 
were high-level officials in the Government and the Nazi Party. They were charged with crimes against 
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127 
No. 10 expressly included 'invasion' as well as 'war' in the definition, and 
secondly, it highlighted the non-exhaustive nature of the definition by using the 
128 
phrase "including but not limited to". 
The principle problem the CCL Tribunal's experienced when it came to prosecuting 
crimes against peace was the fact that the IMT Judgment had explicitly restricted the 
ratione persona of the crime to senior State officials capable of influencing Hitler's 
policies of aggressive war. Whilst the IMT had been intended for the prosecution of 
the major war criminals, the Tribunals established pursuant to CCL were designed for 
other, less senior war criminals. In the I.G. Farben case, the Tribunal began by 
addressing this particular problem. The Judgment noted that the IMT had exercised 
great caution in approaching the charges of crimes against peace, requiring conclusive 
evidence of active participation by individuals in the planning and leading of a nation 
in a war of aggression for a conviction, and concluded that criminal responsibility 
129 
should not extend to followers: 
Strive as we may, we are unable to find, once we have passed below those 
who have lead a country into a war of aggression, a rational mark in dividing 
the guilty from the innocent... We leave the mark where we find it, well 
127 
By including the notion of 'invasion' within the definition, the trials conducted under CCL No. 10 
were able to include Germany's conduct towards Austria and Czechoslovakia, which had been 
considered outside the jurisdiction of the IMT. The IMT Charter made it necessary for the Tribunal to 
distinguish between 'aggressive acts' and 'aggressive war', (Nuremberg Judgment, supra note96, 
pi 86). Only aggressive war constituted a crime under the Charter. Prosecutions of individuals relating 
to aggression against the 12 identified countries were allowed because it was determined that their 
respective governments had resisted Hitler's demands. However, the annexation of Austria and the 
imposition of German administration on parts of Czecholsovakia were considered as steps "in 
furthering the plan to wage aggressive wars against other countries", [Ibid, pp 192-196] because the 
respective governments had submitted to Hitler's demands 
Article I I provided as follows: 
1. Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime: 
( d j Crimes a g a i n s t peace; Initiation or invasions of other countries and wars of 
aggression in violation of international laws and treaties, including but not limited 
to planning, preparation, initiation or waging of wars of aggression, or a war in 
violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a 
common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing. 
Judgment, 29, 30 July 1948, Trials of War Criminals, supra notel 19, 1952, Vol .VIII , ppl 126-1127. 
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129 
satisfied that individuals who plan and lead a nation into and in an aggressive 
war should be held guilty of crimes against peace, but not those who merely 
130 
follow the leaders ... 
In the Ministries case, the Tribunal found that even though Ernst von Weizsaecker had 
been diplomatically active in 'aiding and abetting' Germany's war plans, he had not 
been part of the actual policy planning and was therefore acquitted. Likewise, in the 
High Command Case the Tribunal formulated that a person could only be held 
responsible i f he had "actual power to shape and influence the policy of the nation".'^' 
Although the primary focus of the CCL trials was the prosecutions of lesser war 
criminals primarily for the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity 
and as such, can have only a limited application to the precedent for prosecuting 
crimes against peace, there is one key point that these trials highlighted; that the CCL 
trials strongly endorsed the specific ratione persona limitations which the IMT had 
placed on crimes against peace, emphasizing the special and unique characteristic of 
this crime as a leadership crime. 
( y ) The Trial of the Major Japanese War Criminals at the Tokyo Tribunal, 
1946-1948: 
The Potsdam Declaration, announcing the Allies intention to prosecute leading 
Japanese officials for crimes perpetrated during Japan's wartime occupation of large 
parts of South-East Asia, was issued on the July 26 1945, with the IMTFE Charter' 
being approved on January 19 1946.'"'^  With the trial lasting over two years, the 
IMTFE's Judgment was finally delivered between 4-12 November 1948. The 
"° /. G. Farben Case, supra note 122. See also: The Roechling Case, supra note 126. 
Supra note 124, p380. 
For a detailed analysis of the IMTFE, see: Historical Review, supra note9, pp85-l 15. 
Special Proclamation: Establishment of an International Militar}' Tribunal for the Far East, 
annexed to the Judgment of the IMTFE, 4-12 November 1948, (Hereinafter Tokyo Judgment). 
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Indictment contained three groups of charges consisting of 55 counts against 28 
134 
accused, with 52 of the counts relating to crimes against peace. With regards to the 
definition of crimes against peace the IMTFE Charter was effectively the same as the 
IMT Charter, with only a few terminological differences. In particular Article 5(a) 
added the word's "declared or undeclared" before "wars of aggression" to prevent 
arguments that Japan had not technically been at war. ^  
In passing Judgment on the 25 standing trial, the IMTFE upheld the Nuremberg 
136 
criminalization of aggressive war and rejected defence councel arguments that the 
waging of aggressive war was not a crime under international law to which individual 
criminal responsibility could be attached.'^^ Unlike Nuremberg however, the IMTFE 
bench was not universal in its endorsement of crimes against peace. In particular. 
Justice Pal of India and Justice Roling of the Netherlands provided stinging criticisms 
on both the criminality of aggressive war and the concept of individual responsibility 
for crimes against peace. Justice Pal categorically denied that aggressive war was a 
crime under international law in 1939: 
No category of war became a crime in international life up to the date of 
commencement of the world war under our consideration. The Pact of Paris 
did not affect the character of war and failed to introduce any criminal 
responsibility in respect of any category of war in international life ... No 
138 
customary law developed so as to make any war a crime. 
The Tribunal did no render a verdict against 3 of the 28 accused. Matsuoka and Nagano died during 
proceedings and Okawa was declared unfit to stand U-ial. Ibid, pl2. 
UNWCC concluded that the differences in the definitions contained in the two charters were "purely 
verbal and that they did not affect the substance of the law governing the jurisdiction of the Far Eastern 
Tribunal over crimes against peace in comparison with the Nuremberg Charter". UNWCC, supra 
note61, p259. 
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Furthermore, he felt that individuals constituting the government and functioning as 
its agents could not be held criminally responsible under international law for their 
139 
acts. Although Justice Roling did not provide the same explicit criticisms as Justice 
Pal in his Dissenting Opinion, Minear suggests that his phraseology indicated his 
140 
personal antipathy to the charge of aggression. Roling concluded that, although 
aggressive war was perhaps the subject of moral condemnation at the time, it was: 
"not considered a true crime before and in the begirming of ... [the] war and could not 
be considered as such for lack of those conditions in international relations on which 
141 
such a view could be based". 
(vi) Criticisms of the Tribunals and Conclusions on the Prosecutions: 
One of the primary criticisms of the IMT and IMTFE prosecutions has been that they 
142 
were an act of 'victor's justice'; being essentially politically motivated rather than 
143 
fair and impartial trials. Not only has the drafting process of the two Charters been 
144 145 
criticized, but the decisions and orchestration of the Tribunals have also suffered 
146 
heavy scrutiny by both professionals and academics alike. However, the dilemma 
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Cassese: "[I]n may view, aggressive war was not a crime under international law at the beginning of 
the war". 
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Overy, supra note69, p?, notes "the preparation of the tribunal exposed the extent to which the trial 
was in effect a 'political act' rather than an exercise in law". 
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For example, the fact that Allied Parties were immune from prosecution, even though acts such as 
the fire-bombing of Dresden by British Forces, the use of the atomic bomb by the Americans and the 
aggression by the USSR against Poland and Hungary clearly violated the laws and customs of war. 
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Justice Pal, who summoned the nullum crimen sine lege principle to the aid of the IMTFE defendants, 
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Victory does not invest the victor with ... unlimited and undefined power ... International 
laws of war define and regulate the rights and duties of the victor over the individuals of the 
vanquished nationality. In my judgment, therefore, it is beyond the rules of international law, 
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147 
of prosecuting the vanquished by the victors was not lost on the participants. In his 
opening speech. Justice Jackson argued that "[u]nfortunately, the nature of these 
crimes is such that both prosecution and judgment must be by victor nations over 
vanquished foe ... Either the victors must judge the vanquished or we must leave the 
148 
defeated to judge themselves". Furthermore, Ferencz argues that "contrary to 
popular misconceptions, war-crimes trials were never intended as victor's vengeance 
149 
over a vanquished foe". Jackson reaffirmed this in his opening speech, when he 
made the case that: "Four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury, 
stay the hand on vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the 
judgment of the law is one of the most significant tributes that Power has ever paid to 
150 
Reason". 
Despite the criticisms leveled at both the procedure of the Tribunals and their 
interpretation of the existing law, the Second World War prosecutions are very 
important in many respects. For the first time they took criminal prosecution out of 
the domestic sphere and onto the international arena. Furthermore, the Charter and 
Judgments significantly advanced the fledgling notion of international criminal law, 
giving the idea of a permanent international penal code some real teeth. Thirdly, the 
various cases developed "new legal norms and standards of responsibility which 
advanced the international rule of law, for example the elimination of the defence of 
152 
'obedience to superior orders', and the accountability of Heads of State". 
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Regarding the crime of aggression, the IMT and IMTFE case-law represent the only 
153 
precedent available to any future prosecutions of this most serious of offences. 
Although the critics are right in arguing that prior to 1939 the crime of aggression did 
not exist under international law and therefore the subsequent prosecutions were an 
application of retroactive law disregarding the criminal principle of nullum crimen 
154 
sine lege, it is also fair to argue that in the 60 years that have passed, the crime has 
been established as a crime under customary international law.'^^ As a result, it can 
comprehensively be concluded that under current international law, the Nuremberg 
precedent of waging a war of aggression constitutes a crime against international 
peace and means that the leaders and organizers of such wars can be held criminally 
responsible for their actions. 
Although the law, in theory, is clear, its application (or lack thereof) by States post 
1945 tells a different story. Even though the world has consistently been plagued by a 
multitude of armed conflicts, not one single prosecution of a military or political 
leader for the crime of aggression has occurred. One of the many reasons for this 
blanket of impunity is the fact that for many years States could not agree on the 
definition that was to be applied to the act of aggression committed by the State, 
despite the efforts of, in particular, the UN. 
3. The United Nations Era; 
153 
Carpenter supra note6, p225, notes that "the IMT Trials present the most significant historical nexus 
between the crime of aggression and the drive to hold individuals accountable for the commission of 
this international crime". 
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Dinstein, supra note9, p 109, notes that "it seems only fair to state that when the London Charter was 
concluded. Article 6(a) was not really declaratory of pre-existing customary international law". 
Although Werle agrees with this conclusion, he offers an explanation to the IMTs actions: "The 
Nuremberg Tribunal justified the critical step from prohibiting aggressive war to criminalizing it with 
substantive arguments. The Tribunal thus concluded, from the fact that waging an aggressive war 
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(a) Post-war Efforts to Codify the Developing Notion of International Criminal 
Law: 
In order to build on the dynamic steps taken at Nuremberg and Tokyo in developing 
the field of international criminal law, the UN initiated a "quest to establish more 
156 
permanent and impartial mechanisms for dispensing international criminal justice" 
by mandating various organizations to codify a set of international crimes and develop 
a Statute for a permanent ICC. Although some suggest that it was the criticisms of the 
IMT and IMTFE as little more than expressions of victor's justice ^ that spurred the 
UN to act so quickly and with such vigor, the impetus with which it did reflected the 
wider community's desire to never again witness such horrific atrocities. However, it 
would be a serious understatement to suggest that the road to consensus and 
agreement was a smooth one. It is not the intention of this thesis to give a complete 
account of the attempts to codify the crime of aggression from 1946 to the present 
day, but rather to provide an overview of the steps taken within the UN, accompanied 
by reference to certain global events that shaped the development of this path, in an 
attempt to provide a basic understanding of how we got to the situation we are in 
158 
today regarding the crime of aggression. 
(i] General Assembly Action: 
It was the General Assembly, the largest and most representative body of the UN that 
initiated efforts to codify certain international crimes and draft a statute for an ICC. At 
its first session on December 11 1946, it passed a unanimous resolution affirming "the 
principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremburg Tribunal 
and the Judgment of the Tribunal".'^^ In paying lip service to the results of the I M T ' ^ ° 
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the General Assembly accepted the Tribunal's Judgment prima facie, without 
acknowledging the criticisms made or the dissenting opinions of the IMTFE. That 
being said, it is generally acknowledged that this affirmation crystallized the 
Nuremberg precedent as authoritative principles of international criminal law. The 
General Assembly also directed the newly established International Law Commission 
(ILC) to "formulate the principles of international law" recognized by the Charter and 
Judgment of the IMT and to "prepare a draft code of offences against the peace and 
161 
security of mankind". 
Other notable steps taken by the General Assembly included the codification of the 
162 
crime of genocide and the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), which confirmed the principle of nullum crimen sine lege that had been so 
controversially ignored by the constructors of the London Charter and the Judgments 
163 
of the IMT and IMTFE. Furthermore, the General Assembly also adopted 
Resolution 377(A) - the 'Uniting for Peace' Resolution in 1950, in response to a 
stalemate in the Security Council concerning the Korean War as a result of tensions 
164 
between the Americans and the Russians. Fearing that the Security Council was 
being prevented from fulfilling its role, the General Assembly assumed a greater role 
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S C , where the situation was declared to be a 'breach of the peace'. However the Russians, who were 
boycotting the U N at the time, have never accepted the U N S C resolution; "the U S S R has consistently 
maintained that the Korean Resolution [was] invalid because of its absence." Harris, D. , 2004. Cases 
and Materials on International Law. 6"' ed., London: Sweet&Maxwell, p987. 
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in the maintenance of international peace and security than originally envisaged by the 
UN Charter.'" The Resolution provided that: 
If the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent 
members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat 
to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, the General Assembly 
shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate 
recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of 
a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when 
necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. 
166 
This resolution has been regarded by some as a de facto revision of the Charter. In 
the words of Ferencz, its adoption gave the General Assembly the "power to make 
recommendations regarding an act of aggression and thereby became involved in the 
167 
problem of trying to clarify what was meant by that elusive term". Furthermore, 
growing tensions between the Americans and the Russians meant that a lack of 
unanimity between the permanent members was not only a possibility, but rather a 
reality that prevented the Security Council from taking any meaningful action. 
(ii) Definition ofAeeression before the General Assembly and a Draft Code of 
Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind: 
155 
Under Article 11(2) of the Charter, the G A may discuss questions relating to the maintenance of 
international peace and security, as well as make recommendations. However when action is necessary 
discussion has to be referred to the S C . Article 12, designed to prevent a clash between the two bodies, 
states that whilst the S C is exercising its functions with regard to a particular dispute or situation the 
G A shall not make any recommendations unless the S C so requests. Gray, supra note9, pi96, notes 
that when the S C has made a determination under Chapter V I I , it has rarely specified the Article under 
which it is making its determination. 
166 
Carpenter, supra note6, p227. 167 
Ferencz, supra note 15, p493. 
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Both the events of 1950 and the de facto expansion of the General Assembly's powers 
168 
led the Russians, on the impetus of Yugoslavia's initial efforts, to present the First 
Committee of the General Assembly'^^ with a draft definition of aggression based on 
its 1933 proposal.American, France and Canada rejected the idea of a fixed 
definition however, maintaining that a determination of aggression should be left to 
the sole discretion of the Security Council. Syria provided a temporary compromise 
by suggesting that the issue be handed to the ILC, to be considered in conjunction 
with the other issues on its mandate. On November 17 1950 the Russian draft was 
passed to the ILC, with a request by the General Assembly that some conclusions be 
drawn on the problem of defining aggression. 
However, the ILC already had its hands full . Beyond formulating the Nuremberg 
Principles,'^^ it was also trying to construe the nature and content of a Draft Code of 
Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (Draft Code) as well as 
reconciling the many conflicting views on the possibility and desirability of an 
173 
international criminal jurisdiction. It would do well to note here the difference 
between the notion of aggressive war within the context of the Draft Code and the 
168 
Yugoslavia initially attempted to direct the OA's attention towards the question of a definition of 
aggression under the Agenda Item entitled "Duties of Slates in the Event of Outbreak of Hostilities". 
The Political and Security Committee. 
170 
UN Doc Aye. 1/608, (November 6 1950). 
G A Res. 378(V)B, (November 17 1950). On the day this subject was passed to the E^C, the G A 
solemnly reaffirmed that: 
"Whatever the weapons used, any aggression, whether committed openly, or by fomenting 
civil strife in the interest of a foreign Power, or otherwise, is the gravest of all crimes against 
peace and security throughout the world." 
GA Res. 380(V), (November 17 1950). 
" At its 2"'^ Session in 1950, the E . C completed its formulation of the Nuremburg principles, which 
were subsequently adopted by the GA. Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of 
the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, Report of the ILC, Yearbook of the I L C , 
1950, Vol.11, p364, p374, p376. The text of the Draft Code effectively mirrored the text used in Article 
6(a) of the I M T Charter. 
Principle V I : The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under international law: 
Crimes against peace: 
(i) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a 
war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances; 
(ii) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of 
any of the acts mentioned under (i). 
'" Report of the ILC, 5-29 June 1950, pp 11 -17. U N Doc. A^ 1316. 
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question of a definition of the act of aggression referred to the ILC separately by the 
General Assembly. Like Nuremberg, the crime of aggressive war referred to the 
criminal acts of the individual whereas the question of a definition of aggression 
represented the State act. Although the two issues are clearly inter-related, they did 
and still do, require independent assessment. 
After considering the referral regarding the act of aggression, the ILC reported back to 
the General Assembly that no enumeration could be completely comprehensive and 
advised that it was undesirable to try to catalogue a list of the illustrative cases of 
174 
aggression. As a result, the issue was passed back to the General Assembly and 
attention within the ILC re-focused on completing the Draft Code. At its 3'^ '' Session in 
1951 the ILC adopted a provisional text of the Draft Code, with a second, not 
substantially different text, being adopted in 1954.'^ ^ Whilst Article 1 stipulated that 
the offences incorporated within the Draft Code "are crimes under international law, 
176 
for which the responsible individuals shall be punished". Article 2(1) characterized 
as an offence "any act of aggression".'^^ The Draft Code did not however, qualify 
178 
what it meant by "any act of aggression". 
174 
Leanze notes that the ELC sought the opinion of the Special Rapporteur of the Draft Code, Mr 
Spiropoulos, when considering the feasibility of defining aggression. He concluded that "a judicial 
definition of aggression would be an artificial device, which could never be complete enough to 
include all possible cases of aggression." Leanze, U . , 2004. The Historical Background. In: Polili & 
Nesi, The Crime of Aggression. p5. 
Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Yearbook of the I L C , 1954, 
pi49. UN Doc. A/CN.4/72. For a substantial review of both drafts, see Johnson, supra note37. 
Ibid^\50. 
J 77 
Ibid pl51. Whilst Article 2(1) stipulated that "Any act of aggression, including the employment by 
authorities of a State of armed force against another State for any purpose other than national or 
collective self-defence or in pursuance of a decision or recommendation by a competent organ of the 
United Nations", Article 2(2) criminalized "any threat" to resort to an act of aggression. This is a much 
broader interpretation of the notion of crimes against peace than that applied at Nuremberg. 
178 
This poses a problem if the Draft Code was ever intended to form part of the substance of the 
developing body of international criminal law. By not defining the act of aggression, the Draft Code 
cannot be reconciled with the fundamental criminal principle of nullum crimen sine lege, which the G A 
affirmed in such express terms when it adopted Article 11(2) UDHR. 
39 
In tandem with the work on the Draft Code, the ILC also formulated a provisional 
Statute for a future ICC (Draft Statute). In 1953, the Committee on the Creation of an 
International Criminal Jurisdiction that had been established by the ILC to consider 
the feasibility of a permanent ICC tabled a Draft Statute for an International Criminal 
179 
Court. However, it was at this point that the apparent progress that was being made 
stalled. Central to the problem was the definition of aggression. It was constantly 
argued that without a clear definition of the crime of aggression, no criminal code 
would be complete and as long as there was no code, there was no need for a court to 
180 
enforce it. In recognizing this situation the General Assembly decided "to postpone 
further consideration of the draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind until the Special Committee on the question of defining aggression has 
181 
submitted its report". Furthermore, the connection between the Draft Code and the 
question of an international criminal jurisdiction meant that the General Assembly 
182 
decided to defer any further consideration of the Draft Statute as well. 
Cassese concludes that "the 1940s and 1950s were characterized by work by a variety 
of international bodies on tasks that, while designed to be complementary and 
183 
interlocking, were nevertheless poorly co-ordinated". He argues that this made it 
easy for the General Assembly to postpone discussion of these important texts, aided 
by the lack of political will and the frequent risk of war. The political stagnation that 
was being caused by the Cold War and the impact it was having on the functioning of 
the UN, meant that agreement was rare and action impossible. As Paulis notes, ".. .the 
Cold War ended all attempts to establish a workable international criminal justice 
179 
Report of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, U N Doc. A/2645 (1954). 
I SO 
Ferencz, B . , 1981. The Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. AJIL . 
Vol.75, p675. 
G A Res. 245 (1954). 
G A Res. 898(IX), (December 14 1954). 
183 
Cassese, supra notel 15, p334. 
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system".'^" This included work on the Draft Code, the Draft Statute and a Definition 
of Aggression. 
(b) United Nations Efforts to Define the Act of Aggression. 1952-1974; 
After the ILC declared that a judicial definition of aggression would be an "artificial 
185 
device", the matter came back to the General Assembly. From that date on 
successive Special Committees on the Question of Defining Aggression were 
established, with regular input from debates held within the Sixth Committee of the 
186 
General Assembly. However, it took 22 years before until a definition suitable to 
Member States was able to be adopted. 
The 1950 ILC Report was deliberated on by the Sixth Committee in January 1952. In 
contrast to the ILC's conclusions, the Committee decided that it was " . . . possible and 
187 
desirable ... to define aggression by reference to the elements which constitute it" 
and subsequently requested that the General Assembly gage the opinions of Member 
188 
States on the matter, which it did. The General Assembly was overwhelmed with 
189 
the various proposals and draft resolutions that it received back and decided that the 
only course of action available to it was to establish a Special Committee on the 
Question of Defining Aggression to study the proposals and submit "draft definitions 
of aggression or draft statements of the notion of aggression ... on the assumption of a 
190 
definition being adopted by a resolution of the General Assembly". 
184 
Paulis, supra notel95, pi4. 
'^ ^ UN Doc.A/2645 
186 
There were certain delegates within the Sixth Committee, in particular Bolivia, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, 
Lebanon, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Syria & Yemen and the U S S R , who were determined to 
construct a definition and were the driving force in keeping the whole project going, even in the face of 
constant opposition by the U S and its allies, including the U K . In 1956 the US urged the G A to 
postpone its work on the definition of aggression indefinitely. Report of the Special Committee on the 
Question of Defining Aggression (hereinafter Report), U N Doc. A / C . 6 / L , p402, (1956). The U K 
made the same suggestion in 1965. SC Report, U N Doc. A/AC.91/5 (April 16 1965) 
'^ ^ G A Res. 599(VI) (January 31 1952) 
188 
Ibid. 
189 
SC Report. U N Doc. A/2211, pp 17-81, pp81 -86. 
G A Res. 688 (VII ) (December 20 1952) 
(i) The Four Special Committees on the Question of Defining ARsression: 
The first Three Committees on the Question of Defining Aggression, meeting between 
1952-1967, made very little progress on a definition of aggression largely due to an 
191 
inability to reach agreement on key issues. In addition, several states considered 
192 
that the time was not right to address the question. As a result, a decision on a 
193 
definition was deferred on several occasions. When the Third Special Committee 
finally met againin 1967, there had been little improvement in international relations. 
India and Pakistan had accused each other of aggression in 1965, whilst the Russians 
accused the Americans of aggressive acts in both the Dominican Republic and 
Vietnam. In June, Israel launched what it called a defensive strike, seizing large areas 
of the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan and the 'Six-Day War' ensued. 
Moreover, the political stalemate of the Cold War meant that the UN, and in particular 
the Security Council, was unable to take any meaningful action to attempt to maintain 
international peace and security. As Ferencz comments, "the word 'aggression' was 
194 
on everyone's lips, but there was no agreement on what it meant". Against this 
195 
background some debate, although superficial, occurred. The discussion however, 
196 
was again deferred to a fourth and final Committee. 
In particular, opinion was split on whether a definition should include the notions of 'economic' and 
'ideological' aggression or whether it should just refer to 'armed aggression'. Furthermore, debate on 
the format and substance of the definition, as well as whether it was "possible and desirable" also took 
place. For a further in depth discussion, see: Ferencz, supra notelS. 
192 
Supporters, led by Bolivia, France, Iran, Mexico, Poland, the Dominican Republic, Syria & the 
Soviet Union, argued that a definition was essential to furthering international peace and security. 
Strong opposition, led by the U K and Greece, argued that not only was a definition impossible, but that 
it would actually be a danger to maintaining international harmony. SC Report, U N Doc. A/3576. 
Furthermore, opposition to the establishment of a third special committee was led by the U S , the U K , 
Japan, China and Canada. 
Yearbook of the U N 1953, p681. SC Report, U N Doc. A/2638, (August 24 - September 21 1953) 
SC Report, U N Doc. A/3574. Stone, supra note 158, p62, states that "the 1956 Committee is 
remembered for its deadlock on the major theoretical and political issues, rather than its developments 
with regards to aggression". See also: SC Report, U N Doc. A/AC.91/2, (April 24 1959); SC Report, 
U N Doc. A/AC.91/3 , (April 9 1962); SC Report, U N Doc. /VAC.91/5 , (April 16 1965). 
194 
Ferencz, supra note 15, Vol.11, p8. 
195 
Report, U N Doc. A/6988. 
G A Res. 2330 ( X X I I ) (December 18 1967) 
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The Fourth Special Committee sat between 1968-1972. During its first session, the 
197 
debates produced four distinct proposals, which were formulated into three the 
198 
following year. The first draft was prepared by Russia, who introduced a very wide 
definition of aggression together with an overt statement that it would not be possible 
to recognize the sovereignty of territories that had been acquired and/or were occupied 
199 
through the use of force. The second draft was prepared by the 'Thirteen Power' 
200 
coalition. The third draft, submitted by a group that had previously been 
exceedingly skeptical about the whole initiative, reflected the specific interests of that 
201 
group and in particular their desire to protect the 'inherent right to individual and 
collective self-defence' As the drafts were compared and debated the major areas 
of contention began to emerge, such as the acts to be listed as well as the 
203 
consequences that an act of aggression would entail. Although progress had been 
made, it took a further four years of debate before the Special Committee was able to 
pass a definition of aggression to the Sixth Committee, who in turn had to review it 
before recommending its adoption to the General Assembly. 
f c ) The Definition of Aggression - General Assembly Resolution 3134 of 1974: 
On 14 December 1974 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 3314, to which the 
204 
Definition of Aggression was annexed. This is an important document for any 
analysis of aggression although it does possess certain limitations in its application to 
the crime of aggression. For the purpose of this thesis, analysis is only required of the 
definition's major provisions, the attention that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
197 
SC Report, U N Doc. A/7185/ Rev. 1, 
198 
SC Report, U N Doc. (A/7620). For a detailed analysis of these proposals, see Bassioum, supra 
note58, pi76-7. 
199 
Leanze, supra note 174, p4. 
200 
Columbia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Ghana, Guyana, Haiti, Iran, Madagascar, Mexico, Spain, Uganda, 
Uruguay and Yugoslavia. The wide diversity of this group meant that agreement was hard to 
accomplish, resulting in a rather broad and vague proposal. 
201 
Australia, France, Italy, Japan, the U K and the US. 
202 
SC Report, U N Doc. A/7620. 
20.1 
Ferencz, supra note 15, Vol.11, pp9-13. 204 See Annex I 
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has given to Article 3(g) and the academic criticisms that have been leveled at the 
Resolution. 
205 
Coined a "Concensus Definition" Resolution 3314 is ful l of compromise on almost 
206 
every point that it includes. The consensus process began with the most basic issue 
of the definition - the format it should take. Whether it should be a generic statement 
of the concept of aggression or an enumeration of certain, specific acts that could be 
classified as aggression was a principle issue of disagreement that plagued the various 
Special Committees. The result was a compromise - a combination of the two 
207 208 
techniques. Whilst Article 1 contains an abstract definition, (essentially repeating 
209 
the core wording of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, with a few minor alterations). 
Article 3 contains seven specific cases where the use of armed force qualifies as 
210 
aggression. 
However, like the UN Charter, the Resolution leaves the final authority on 
determining acts of aggression in the hands of the Security Council. This is clearly 
211 212 
reflected in both Article 2 and Article 4." The priority principle set forth in Article 
205 
Stone, J . , 1977. Hopes and Loopholes of the 1974 Definition of Aggression. A J I L , Vol.71, No.2, 
p224. 
206 
Ibid. 
207 
Termed a 'mixed' definition, this is essentially a combination of the previous two proposals, in that 
it is an abstract definition accompanied by a list of concrete situations to assist in the understanding of 
the general formula. Stone, supra note 158, p80, however, has criticised this module arguing that: 
If the abstract definition in the general clause could be self-applying, the list of acts or 
situations would be unnecessary; and it is not, in any case, really a part of the definition. Its 
inclusion manifest doubt as to the adequacy of the definition in the general clause and seeks to 
ensure that it will at least extend to the list of acts or situations. 
208 
In an explanatory note to this Article, the framers of the Definition note that the term 'State' is used 
"without prejudice to questions of recognition or to whether a State is a member of the U N " and that it 
can also refer to "groups of States" where appropriate. 
209 
Dinstein, supra note9, pi27, identifies certain differences, noting that "the cardinal divergence from 
Article 2(4) is . . . [that] the threat of force per se does not qualify as aggression" since the actual use of 
armed force is required. 
210 
Article 4 however, makes it clear that this list is by no means exhaustive. 
Under Article 4 the S C has the prerogative to determine that other acts may also be tantamount to 
aggression. Furthermore, it is made clear in the preamble that Resolution 3314 was intended to act only 
as a guide to the S C in any decisions it may have to make regarding the commission of aggression 
(emphasis added). Carpenter, supra note6, p231, concludes that because the Security Council is not 
44 
2 is qualified by a wide margin of appreciation that enables the Security Council to 
"conclude that a determination that an act of aggression has been committed would 
not be justified in light of other relevant consequences". This apparently includes both 
213 
the intent and purpose of the acting State. 
Article 5 is of particular interest to the crime of aggression. As previously noted, 
Resolution 3314 possess certain limitations in its application to the criminal 
prosecution of individuals. The principle limitation is the fact that the Definition 
214 
solely focuses on the role of the State in the commission of the act of aggression. 
Article 5(2) provides a statement however, which some argue represents a clear 
distinction between the international responsibility of the State and an individual's 
criminal responsibility: "A war of aggression is a crime against international peace. 
Aggression gives rise to international responsibility." 
For example, Wilmshurst believes that Article 5(2) clearly differentiates between 
'aggression' that gives rise solely to the international responsibility of States and a 
'war of aggression', which constitutes a crime against peace and thus entails 
215 
individual criminal responsibility. Furthermore, she argues that this distinction was 
bound to apply the Resolution, the designation of acts of aggression are "rendered purely a function of 
procedure and politics". 
See: Chapter2(l )(c)(iii). As well as being qualified by the role of the Security Council, the priority 
principle is also restricted by the insertion of the maxim de minimis nan curat lex, (which literally 
translates as 'the law does not concern itself with trifles', and is generally referred to as the threshold 
condition). Article 2 states that one of the reasons the Security Council may reject the presumption that 
an act of aggression has been committed, is that the act is "not of sufficient gravit}'", and as Dinstein 
supra note9, pl28, notes, the de minimis clause clarifies that "a few stray bullets across a boundary' 
cannot be invoked as an act of aggression". 
Ferencz, supra note 15, Vol.11, p3l . Stone, supra note 158, p68, noting that from the earliest UN and 
League of Nations discussions the question of the relevance of intention and purpose to the 
commission of aggression was a main obstacle to an agreed definition, criticises the fact that Article 2 
is qualified by such an ambiguous statement. 
214 
As a result, Carpenter, supra note6, p232 argues that this resolution can offer no, or only limited 
assistance to the prosecutions of individuals under the Rome Statute. 
Wilmshurst, E . , 2004. Definition of the Crime of Aggression: State Responsibility or Individual 
Criminal Responsibility? In: Politi & Nesi, The Crime of Aggression. pp93-96. Furthermore, G A Res. 
2625(XXV) (1970), entitled Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
45 
also clearly recognized by a number of delegates in the statements they made when 
216 
the Resolution was adopted. This interpretation of Article 5(2) is supported by other 
academics, who hold the belief that this distinction between simple 'aggression' and 
the graver notion of a 'war of aggression' reflects the customary international law 
status of crimes against peace. This is the view that I also subscribe to, and as 
Chapter 3 demonstrates, this approach is of particular significance to the current 
debate of the construction of the definition of the crime of aggression under the Rome 
Statute. 
Following its adoption, Resolution 3314 received a considerable amount of 
218 
international attention and in particular from the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case. For the 
purpose of this thesis, the principle point to note regarding the ICJ's review of this 
Resolution is that it explicitly clarified the status of the Definition in international law. 
In 1986 the ICJ declared that certain provisions of Resolution 3314 reflected 
customary international law. Firstly, the ICJ held that Article 2 of the Definition 
reflected custom. This was rather an uncontroversial statement to make as much of 
Article 2 reflects Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which the ICJ had already explicitly 
219 
declared as a provision of customary international law. The Court then singled out 
Article 3(g) for comment, declaring it also to be reflective of customary international 
proclaimed that a 'war of aggression constitutes a crime against peace, for which there is responsibility 
under international law'. 
216 
Ibid, p94. 
See: Muller-Schieke, I , , 2001. Defining the Crime of Aggression Under the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. L J I L . Vol.97, No. I , ppl32-147; Dinstein, supra note9; Brownlie, supra 
note9. However, Paula Escarameia argues that Article 5(2) was not addressing individual criminal 
responsibility, but was instead solely addressing state criminal responsibility. She draws this 
conclusion from the fact that Resolution 3314 was intended to be a guide to the S C , as the organ which 
reviews States' actions, as well as the fact that no where in the Resolution is the notion of individual 
criminal responsibility alluded to, Escarameia, P., 2004. The ICC and the Security Council on 
Aggression: Overlapping Competencies? In: Politi & Nesi, The Crime of Aggression, pl 38. This 
interpretation is supported by Randelzhofer, supra note24, pl27. Wilmshurst, supra note215, p94 
rejects this conclusion, arguing that the concept of State crimes was extremely controversial and "the 
Resolution would not have been adopted by consensus if there had been a reference in it to State 
crimes". 
218 
Supra note57, pl4. 
219 
Ibid. 
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220 
law. The ICJ concluded that "the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, 
groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another 
State" amounted to an act of aggression under customary international law. The 
argument has been made that because paragraph (g) was pronounced as declaratory of 
customary international law, it is then also possible to infer that the other 
subparagraphs of Article 3 are of an equal status. Gomaa, in identifying Article 3(g) as 
221 
an example of indirect aggression, stresses the fact that this clause happened to be 
one of the most problematic provisions debated in the Special Committee. This only 
adds to the argument that it would be illogical to conclude that whilst one of the most 
problematic provisions of Article 3 is representative of customary international law, 
others, which are universally accepted and far less controversial, are not. As Gomaa 
concludes, "the Court, by referring to that particular paragraph, wanted to say that it 
222 
had the same status as the others which were already reflective of custom". 
However, the suggestion that the Definition of Aggression is reflective of customary 
international law has not been universally accepted. Certain States, and in particular 
permanent members of the Security Council, maintain that the sole purpose of 
Resolution 3314 is to act as a guide to the Security Council. This is wishful thinking. 
The General Assembly Definition of Aggression is clearly reflected in customary 
international law and is the only definition of the act of the State in the commission of 
aggression that currently exists. 
That being said, the Definition annexed to Resolution 3314 has also received some 
severe criticism. The most prominent critic has been Julius Stone, who argues that 
220 
Ibid, pl04. The facts of the case lead the Court to examine this particular provision, see: Harris, 
supra note 164, pp893-916. 
Leanze, supra notel74, p8, notes that this is still a highly controversial aspect of aggression, along 
with the idea of economic aggression. 
222 
Gomaa, supra note44, p74. Shukri, M. , 2004. Will Aggressors Ever he Tried Before the ICC? In: 
Politi & Nesi, The Crime of Aggression, p37, notes that "to divide it into parts, some with customary 
value and some with not, is an unacceptable intellectual exercise." 
47 
instead of narrowing them, the resolution codified all the major judicial loopholes 
available to potential aggressors: "Ambitions of delegates to narrow some major 
loopholes were usually balanced by the inclusion of provisions demanded by the other 
states which efficiently neutralized the clarification proposed and often produced new 
obscurations to boot". 
Stone has also reviewed the work of Benjamin Ferencz, who is a strong supporter of 
the Definition. Stone comments that "they have been notable for their important 
224 
insights, as well as for an optimism which verges sometimes on wishfulness". 
Furthermore, the majority of his criticism focuses on the 3 points that Ferencz 
concedes as potential failings of the Definition. Firstly, "consensus" does not signify 
"agreement", but merely that States "have refrained from voicing their doubts and 
their objections". Secondly, "the ambiguities, omissions, and internal inconsistencies 
of the definition make it subject to conflicting interpretations on very critical matters", 
and finally "any guidance which it might provide has, in any case, no binding effect 
225 
on the Security Council". 
In conclusion, there are some important factors regarding the Definition of Aggression 
that need addressing. Firstly, the Definition is the only universally agreed definition of 
the act of aggression. Furthermore, the recognition that certain provisions received 
from the ICJ support the argument that the Definition is also a provision of customary 
international law. That being said, there are factors that limit the impact this 
Definition can have on the constnaction of the crime of aggression, not least the fact 
that the resolution only refers to the act of the State. Because of this, it can only have a 
limited application to the criminal prosecution of individuals and therefore its 
223 
Stone, supra note205, p231. 
224 
Ibid, p242. 
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Ibid. 
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226 
usefulness to the ICC is questionable. Secondly, it must be remembered that this 
document takes the form of a General Assembly Resolution and according to the UN 
227 
Charter such a document has no binding authority over Member States or other UN 
bodies. In the same vein, a third point of interest is the fact that the General Assembly 
adopted Resolution 3314 so that it could serve as a guidance tool to the Security 
Council in any determination that it might have to make under Article 39 of the 
Charter. This limitation has severely curtailed the effectiveness and impact this 
228 
Definition may have had. Finally, it is important to note that this Resolution is over 
30 years old, and is by no means an exhaustive definition of every act of aggression. 
Therefore, one has to advise a cautious approach considering the impact that this 
Definition has on the construction of the crime of aggression. 
(d) The Road To Rome; 
The end of the Cold War in 1989 was instrumental in enabling the UN to finally 
exercise the full range of powers and responsibilities afforded to it by the Charter. As 
Cassese notes, "the animosity that had dominated international relations for almost 
229 
half a century dissipated - in its wake, a new spirit of relative optimism emerged". 
Such optimism enabled projects such as the Draft Code and the Draft Statute to be re-
230 
ignited, with the Draft Code being completed in 1996. Article 16 of the Draft Code 
"was drawn from the relevant provision of the Nuremberg Charter as interpreted and 
applied by the Nuremberg Tribunal", and detailed the crime of aggression as: 
An individual who, as leader or organizer, actively participated in or orders the 
planning, preparation, initiation or waging of aggression committed by a State 
shall be responsible for a crime of aggression. 
Paulis, supra note95, ppl5-16, concludes that "without the appropriate cross-reference to the act of 
the individual it is of no use whatsoever for the purposes of criminal law". 
227 
Article 10 UN Charter. 
228 
Dinstein, si4pra note9, pl29, states that "in actuality, after existing for three decades, the Definition 
of Aggression has had 'no visible impact' on the deliberations of the Security Council". 
229 
Cassese, supra note 115, p335. 
230 ,1, 
Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of the ILC, 48 Session, 
(1996). Yearbook of the ILC, Vol.II(2), pl7. 
1996 Draft Code, U N Doc. /V51/10 (1996), Article 16 commentary, para(4). 
49 
In its commentary on Article 16, the Commission recognized the fact that Draft Code 
related to individual criminal responsibility rather than State responsibility and, 
therefore felt that it was unnecessary to attempt to define aggression, as this had been 
sufficiently dealt with by the General Assembly.^^^ 
Although their material jurisdiction does not include the crime of aggression, the 
creation of the two ad hoc Tribunals by the Security Council in the aftermath of the 
massive human rights violations in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda provided a 
further incentive to such projects. Although the two ad hoc Tribunals were limited 
both temporally and geographically, their overall successes provided a final spur to 
the emergence of the ICC. 
(i) The 1994 Draft Statute for a permanent ICC: 
233 
Whilst efforts began in 1981 on the Draft Code, work on an international penal 
code was not revived until 1989 when the General Assembly requested the ILC "to 
234 
address the question of establishing an international criminal court". By 1993 the 
Commission had prepared a Draft Statute, under the direction of Special Rapporteur 
235 
James Crawford, which was modified in 1994 before it went before the General 
236 237 
Assembly. Although aggression was included within the Draft Statute it was not 
comprehensively defined. Furthermore, a separate procedure for acquiring jurisdiction 
meant that the crime of aggression was set apart from the other crimes under the 
Statute. 
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See: Hogan-Doran, J . , & Van Ginkel, B. , 1996. Aggression as a Crime under International Law 
and the Prosecution of Individuals by the Proposed International Criminal Court. N I L R Vol.43, p335. 
" ^ G A R e s . 36/106(1981). 
234 
G A Res. 44/89 (Dec. 4 1989). This Resolution was initatied by Trinidad and Tobago who, plagued 
by narcotics problems and trans-national crime issues, desired the establishment of a permanent I C C . 
Schabas, W., 2004. An Introduction to the International Criminal Court. 2"'' ed., G B : Cambridge 
University Press, p9. 
235 
See: Crawford, J . , 1994. The ILC's Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal. A J I L . 
Vol.88, No.l ,ppl40-152. 
236 
Report of the ILC to the GA on the Work of its Fort}'-Sixth Session, U N Doc. A/49/355 (1994). 
Ibid, p72, para.6, the I L C concluded that: 
"It would . . . seem retrogressive to exclude individual criminal responsibility for aggression 
(in particular, acts directly associated with the waging of a war of aggression) 50 years after 
Nuremberg". 
50 
Article 23 of the Draft Statute imposed the precondition that before the Court could 
prosecute an individual for aggression, die Security Council must have determined 
"that a State has committed the act of aggression which is the subject of the 
238 
complaint". In other words, the Security Council became the exclusive initiator for 
prosecutions of alleged aggression by an individual. In so doing, the Draft Statute 
echoed the failings of both the UN Charter and Resolution 3314 to separate 
'aggression' from the political determinations of the Security Council: "Whether to 
gain acceptance by the permanent members, or to impose a legitimate limit on the 
types of cases to be brought before the Court, the Security Council hoop is a reflection 
239 
of political reality." 
Even though aggression was tentatively included in the Draft Statute, disagreement on 
the crime's format, the jurisdictional trigger mechanisms to be applied and even 
whether it should be included at all, meant that the matter was by no means settled as 
subsequent negotiations demonstrated. What is clear however, is the fact that both the 
Draft Code and the Draft Statute played a pivotal role in the construction of the Rome 
Statute. At its 49* session in 1994, the General Assembly decided to establish an 'Ad 
240 
Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an ICC, to review the Draft Statute. As a 
241 
result of the Report submitted by this Committee the General Assembly convened 
the PrepCom, comprised of representatives from Member States, Non-Governmental 
242 
Organizations (NGO) and various international organizations. The PrepCom met 
from 1995 to 1998, submitting its substantially reworked draft to the Rome 
243 
Conference that convened in the summer of 1998. 
238 
Draft Article 23(2). For a detailed analysis of Draft Article 23, see Gowlland-Debbas, V. , 1998. The 
Relationship between the Security Council and the Projected International Criminal Court. J A C L . 
Vol.3, pp97-l 19. 
239 
Carpenter, supra note6, p233. 
240 
The Committee met twice during 1994. For the drafting process generally, see: Bos, A., 2002. From 
the International L a w Commission to the Rome Conference (1994-1998). In: A . C A S S E S E . P . G A E T E 
& J .JONES, ed.. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, US: Oxford 
University Press, pp35-64. 
241 
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U N Doc. 
A/50/22. 
242 
Schabas, supra note234, pl4. 
243 
Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court. 
Addendum', UN Doc. A / C O N F . 183/2/Add. 1. Article 5 of the 1998 Draft provided 3 options for a 
definition of aggression. Cassese, supra notel 15, p342, notes that this mammoth document consisted 
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(ii) The Rome Conference, the Assembly of State Parties and the Various Bodies 
Established to Codify the Crime ofAesression: 
244 
Even though 160 States and numerous NGO's attended the Rome Conference, the 
negotiations on the crime of aggression could not result in agreement on a provision 
suitable for the Court. Whilst America argued that the inclusion of the crime of 
245 
aggression "could fatally compromise the ICC's future credibility", the two new 
nuclear powers of India and Pakistan were not inclined to subject themselves to 
possible charges of aggression. Strong support from the EU and about 30 nations 
united in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) insisted however, that without the 
inclusion of aggression as a crime they would be unable to support the new court. The 
eventual compromise was only adopted in order to secure the conclusion of the 
Conference in the successful adoption of the Statute, and is regarded as being the 
246 
"main defect" of the Statute. 
Whist Article 5(1) lists the crime of aggression as one of the four core crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Court, Article 5(2) states that: 
The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is 
adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the 
conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. 
Such a provision shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations. 
of "116 articles contained in 173 pages of text with some 1,300 words in square brackets". For a 
general analysis of the Rome Conference, see: Kirsch, P., & Holmes, J .T . , 1999. The Rome Conference 
on an International Criminal Court: The Negotiating Process. A J I L . Vol.93, No. I , pp2-12 
244 
17 IGO's and 124 NGO's attended the conference, Gomaa, supra note44, p55. 
245 
Peirce, R., 2001. Which of the Preparatory Commission's Latest Proposals for the Definition of the 
Crime of Aggression and the Exercise of Jurisdiction Should Be Adopted into the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. B Y U J P L , Vol.15, p282 
Gomaa, supra note44, p56. Upon realising that the issue of aggression had the potential to sink the 
entire project, the Bureau for the Committee of the Whole, {see: Kirsch, P., & Holmes, supra note243, 
p2) set a deadline for delegations to produce a broadly acceptable solution, failing which the crime 
would be addressed at a later time by way of a protocol or review conference. Bureau Proposal, UN. 
Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.59 (1998), Articles. 
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247 
The Final Act of the Rome Conference established the PrepComm and gave this 
newly formed body the task of preparing "proposals for a provision on aggression, 
including the definition and Elements of Crimes of aggression" as well as "the 
conditions under which the International Criminal Court shall exercise its jurisdiction 
248 
with regard to this crime". In the course of the 10 sessions that were held between 
1999 and 2002, the PrepComm agreed to establish the Working Group on the Crime 
249 
of Aggression (WGCA). Although the debates held by the WGCA yielded valuable 
work on the crime of aggression, it was unable to complete its mandate by the time 
250 
the Assembly of State Parties (ASP) was established. Upon its demise however, it 
did recommended that the ASP establish a Special Working Group on the Crime of 
251 
Aggression (SWGCA). This group has been meeting regularly for the past five 
years. Although it has managed to forge consensus on certain aspects of the crime, it 
is still a long way from completing its mandate. 
CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS: 
This chapter has substantially reviewed the history and development of the notion of 
aggression, the codification of the crime of aggression and the relationship this has to 
the current international penal code. It is argued here that as the law currently stands, 
criminality for an act of aggression can only be attributed to an individual when he or 
she has participated in the leading and/or organizing of a war of aggression. This is 
the necessary threshold condition that customary international law and the precedents 
247 
See generally: Clark, R., 2002. Rethinking Aggression as a Crime and Formulating lis Elements: 
The Final Work-Product of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court. L J I L . 
Vol.15, No.4, pp859-890; Fernandez de Gurmendi, S., 2002. The Working Group on Aggression at the 
Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court. F I L J . Vol.25, pp589-605; Pierce, supra 
note245; Trahan, J . , 2002. Defining "Aggression": Why the Preparatory' Commission for the 
International Criminal Court Has Faced Such a Conundrum. L L A I C L R . Vol.24, pp439-474. 
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Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of 
an International Criminal Court. Resolution F. para. 7, UN Doc. A / C O N F . 183/10* (1998) 
249 
Proceedings of the Preparatory Commission at its Second Session (26 July-13 August 1999), 
PCNICC/1999/L.4/Rev. 1 (1999), at paraS. 
250 
Stancu, I . , 2004. Defining the Crime of Aggression or Redefining Aggression? In: Politi & Nesi, 
The Crime of Aggression. p88. 
U N Doc. PCNICC/2002AVGCA/L.2 /Rev . 1. The suggestion was also made that the S W G C A should 
be open to all nations and not just State Parties to the Statute, so as to facilitate maximum debate on the 
proposals formulated. 
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set by the IMT and IMTFE dictate as the appropriate level of gravity required. This is 
not a universally held opinion however.as the following Chapter indicates. 
The challenge that the SWGCA faces is great. Political considerations and personal 
preferences mean that respecting customary international law when codifying the 
crime of aggression may not, in the end, occur. The next Chapter intends to provide an 
insight into the particular elements required to construct a provision suitable for the 
ICC and provides a suggestion as to what the final proposal should contain. 
There are two principle documents that have been complied following the recent 
debates on the crime of aggression. The first was put together in the closing days of 
the WGCA. The Coordinator's Discussion Paper of 2002^^^ is a consolidated text of 
the various proposals that had been made and has formed the basis of the discussions 
of the SWGCA. Following the fif th session of the ASP in January 2007, the Chairman 
of the SWGCA published a revised version of the 2002 Discussion Paper, which took 
into account the developments of the past five years of debate and updated the 
253 
relevant provisions accordingly. These two documents are invaluable to any 
analysis of the crime of aggression and are the main focus of the following 
discussions. 
U N Doc. P C N I C C A V G C A / R T . l / R e v . 2 (July 11"^  2002). See: Annex II . Clark, supra note247 
provides a thorough analysis of this Discussion Paper. 
" ICC-ASP/5 /SWGCAy2, Fifth Session of the ASP, 29"^  Jan - l " Feb 2007. See: Annex III 
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CHAPTER 3: 
T H E DEFINITION OF T H E C R I M E OF 
AGGRESSION: 
1. Introduction of the Issues: 
By including the crime of aggression within the Rome Statute, the Diplomatic 
Conference firmly entrenched the idea of criminal responsibility for waging 
aggressive war in contemporary international law. However, by not completing it's 
254 
mandate the Conference left the de facto jurisdiction of the crime suspended until 
State parties (and those non-State parties to the Statute participating in the debates of 
the SWGCA) agree upon a suitable and acceptable formula for the crime of 
aggression. Although the SWGCA has imposed upon itself the condition of preparing 
255 
a proposal in time for the intended Review Conference in 2009, there is no 
guarantee that such a deadline will be met. The task before the SWGCA is not an easy 
one and although much progress has been made over the past decade with regards to 
formulating the crime of aggression, the project is by no means near reaching a 
conclusion suitable to all parties. Kress, who respectfully disagrees with suggestions 
256 
that the crime of aggression will not materialize in the foreseeable future claims 
that: 
The ICC Statute will suffer from a serious legitimacy gap as long as it fails to 
incorporate what the IMT at Nuremberg termed the 'supreme crime under 
international law'. This gap must be filled sooner rather than later by a 
254 
Muller-Schieke supra note2l7, p410, questions how the 'supreme international crime' could be 
included in the Rome Statute de jure, but not de facto. 
According to the 'roadmap', the S W G C A intends to complete its work 12 months prior to the 
Review Conference to allow time for domestic consultation. Informal inter-sessional meeting of the 
Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, held at the Liechtenstien Institute on Self-
Determination, Woodrow Wilson School, at Princeton University, New Jersey, United States, from 13 
to 15 June 2005, I C C - A S P / 4 / S W G C A / I N F . 1 (hereinafter 2005 Princeton Report), para(90). 
256 
See: Schuster supra noteS, and Boeving, J.N., 2005. Aggression, International Law and the ICC: An 
Argument for the Withdrawal of Aggression from the Rome Statute. C J T L . Vol.43, pp557-61 I, who 
advocate for the removal of the crime from the Court's jurisdiction. 
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definition which is both conceptually sound and solidly grounded in customary 
international law.^ ^^ 
This Chapter intends to assess the work that has recently occurred within the various 
bodies that have been established to formulate a proposal on the definition of the 
crime of aggression, whilst the following Chapter will address the equally challenging 
problem of the circumstances in which the Court will acquire jurisdiction over the 
crime. Even though each element of this incredibly complex and political question 
deserves its own lengthy discussion, space limitations accommodate only an overall 
assessment of the factors involved and the role they play in establishing the crime 
within the working jurisdiction of the Court. Prior to beginning this analysis, there are 
two important factors - as identified by Kress above - that must be initially addressed: 
firstly, respect for the fundamental criminal principle of legality and secondly, 
acknowledgment of the customary international law that exists regarding this crime. 
Adherence to these basic principles will ensure the credibility and success of the 
crime of aggression in the Rome Statute. 
(a) The Principle of Legality; 
Any definition of the crime of aggression must be in accordance with the fundamental 
criminal principle of legality, derived from the maxim nullum crimen sine lege and 
258 
enshrined in Article 22 of the Rome Statute. The principle of legality determines 
that no one is to be accused, tried or convicted on the basis of conduct which did not 
constitute a criminal offence at the time of its commission. In order to satisfy this 
principle, the definition of a crime must be specific enough to inform potential 
259 
perpetrators as to which particular conduct is prohibited. This means that the 
260 
identification of the prohibited conduct must be clear and unambiguous. To ensure 
Kress, C , 2004. The German Chief Federal Prosecutor's Decision Not to Investigate the Alleged 
Crime of Preparing Aggression against Iraq. J ICJ Vol.2, p264. 
258 
Article 22(1) states that: 
A person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question 
constitutes, at the times it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
See: Catenacci, M. , 1998. Nullem Crimen Sine Lege. In: F . L A T T A N Z I , ed. The International 
Criminal Court: Comments on the Draft Statute. Naples: Editoriale Scientifica, pp 159-170. 
259 
Bassiouni, supra note58, p33. 
260 
Ibid. 
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that possible ambiguities do not facilitate extensive interpretation, the Rome Statute 
states that: 
The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended 
by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favor of 
261 
the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted. 
This is particularly important when addressing the crime of aggression, as the unique 
nature of this offence and its intrinsic relationship with the foreign policy conduct of 
States means that agreement as to its constitutive elements will not be easily 
ascertained. As Kaul states, the definition of the crime of aggression "must be as 
clear, precise and as well-defined as possible" in order to ensure its successful 
262 
adoption into the Rome Statute. This requirement applies both to the illegal conduct 
of the State as well as the role of the individual in that act. 
(b) The Need for the Definition of the Crime to be based in Customary 
International Law; 
Unlike the other crimes under the Court's jurisdiction, there is no international treaty 
263 
that defines the crime of aggression or dictates it's principal elements. The scope of 
264 
the offence must be determined on the basis of the only precedents available to date 
261 
Article 22(2) Rome Statute. 
262 
Kaul, H-P., 2004. The Crime of Aggression: Definitional Options for the Way Forward. In: Politi & 
Nesi, The Crime of Aggression. pl03 
263 
Whilst the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) codified 
the crime of genocide, the Geneva Conventions I - I V (1949) are the primary sources of reference for 
War Crimes legislation. Although there is scope to suggest that the I C C Statute is the first instrument to 
codify Crimes Against Humanity, they were included in both the I C T Y and I C T R Statutes. 
264 
Informal inter-sessional meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, held in 
the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton Universit}', 
United States of America, from 8 to II June 2006, ICC-ASP/5/32, Annex II (hereinafter 2006 
Princeton Report), para(l3), suggested that a comprehensive definition would only be achieved by 
reference to all the relevant precedents: "The Nuremberg Charter, as affirmed by G A Res. 95(1); 
Principle V I of the Nuremberg Principles adopted by the I L C in 1950; G A Res. 3314; and the 1996 
Draft Code of Crimes." Whilst all these sources clearly play a role in the construction of the crime, it is 
argued here that the only precedent for attributing criminal responsibility to individuals is the 
proceedings of the I M T , the I M T F E and under C C L , No. 10. 
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- the IMT, the IMTFE and the CCL. No. 10 trials - which are clearly established 
265 
principles of customary international law. 
There are two principal components of customary international law- state practice and 
266 
opinio juris. However, there has been little relevant State practice since the Second 
267 
World War and only a minority of States have adopted national legislation in 
268 
respect of the crime of aggression. Whilst Werle concludes that the tough 
269 
negotiations on the Rome Statute indicated no general opinio juris in this area, 
Kress views the proceedings in a more positive light: 
265 
See: Chapter 2(2)(b)(iii)-(v). Furthermore, commentary on Article 16 of the 1996 Draft Code states 
that "(5) . . . The Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal are the main sources of authority 
with regards to individual criminal responsibility for acts of aggression". 
266 
Article 38(1 )(b) I C J Statute. See: North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, I C J Reports 1969, p3. 
267 
Recently, the U K ' s House of Lords ruled that the crime of aggression was an established crime 
under customary international law (R. v. Jones [2006] U K H L 16). Vil la writes that the House of Lords 
decision makes three significant points regarding the crime of aggression in international law; "(i) it 
constitutes the most straightforward endorsement of the crime of aggression by a judicial organ outside 
the context of World War I I ; (ii) it explicitly upholds that the customary definition of this crime 
complies with the principle of legality, and; (iii) it comes from the highest judicial instance of one of 
the States that forged the very concept of crimes against peace". Vil la, C , 2006. The Crime of 
Aggression before the House of Lords - Chronicle of a Death Foretold. J ICJ Vol.4, p874. For a 
comprehensive review of recent incidents at a national level involving the crime of aggression, see: 
Paulis, supra note95, pp25-32. 
268 
The most notable provision is Sec.80 of the German Criminal Code, which states that it is a criminal 
offence to "prepare a war of aggression". Sec.80 recognizes the distinction made in Nuremberg that 
only wars of aggression are criminal, not mere acts of aggression. However, it does not require that a 
war actually takes place, nor does it limit the ratione persona to persons of a policy-making level. For 
an account of the particularities of the crime of aggression under German law, see Kress, supra 
note257 & Schultz, N., 2005. Was the War on Iraq Illegal? - The German Federal Administrative 
Court's Judgment of 21" June 2005. G U . Vol.7, No. 1, pp25-44. Similar provisions can also be found 
in the legislation of Russia and certain eastern European countries, see Villa, ibid, p876 at noteS I . 
Although the crime of aggression was not included prima facie in the Statute of the Supreme Iraqi 
Criminal Tribunal, Article 14(c), which refers to violations of stipulated Iraqi law, includes "[t]he 
abuse of position and the pursuit of policies that may lead to the threat of war or the use of force of the 
armed forces of Iraq against an Arab country, in accordance with Article I of L a w Number 7 of 1958, 
as amended". See: Kress, C , 2004. The Iraqi Special Tribunal and the Crime of Aggression. J ICJ . 
Vol.2, pp347-352; Zolo, D. , 2004. The Iraqi Special Tribunal: Back to the Nuremberg Paradigm? 
JICJ . Vol.2, pp313-318; Alvarez, J . , 2004. Trying Hussein: Between Hubris and Hegemony. J ICJ . 
Vol.2, pp319-329. 
269 
In /? V Jones at al., 4 Al l England Law Reports (2004), p. 956, the Court of Appeal held that the 
international definition of the crime of aggression lacked the requisite precision and certainty to be 
translated into a criminal offence under U K domestic law, because of the fact that as yet no consensus 
has been reached on both the definition of aggression and the conditions under which the I C C will 
eventually exercise its jurisdiction over this crime. The Court's finding as to this second point is 
questionable as the debate over the role of the Security Council relates to the exercise of jurisdiction by 
the I C C and not the question of whether aggressive war is a crime under current international law. See: 
Cryer, R., 2005. Aggression at the Court of Appeal. J C S L . Vol. 10, No.2, pp209-230. 
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While they have yet to reach agreement on its definition, no State questioned 
the existence of the crime of aggression under international law during the 
270 
negotiations of the ICC Statute. 
There are two primary conclusions that can be drawn here: firstly, the crime of 
aggression is an accepted international crime, and secondly, its components are found 
in the judgments of the IMT and IMTFE, which are clearly recognized principles of 
customary international law.^'" 
There is also strong academic support for grounding the definition of the crime of 
aggression in customary international law. Zimmermann notes that it was a generally 
accepted principle during the Rome Conference to focus on codification of mles of 
customary international law, rather than venture into the uncertain world of creating 
new criminal offences.^''^ The same approach should be adopted when defining the 
substantive aspects of the crime of aggression. Griffiths believes that the attempt by 
some delegates in the WGCA to legislate rather than codify the crime is 
273 
fundamentally wrong and "is an attempt to re-invent the wheel". He argues that 
"the crime of aggression is a child of customary international law" and therefore the 
ICC definition should be a"codification of existing law rather than a negotiated 
274 
creation". Meron puts forward the argument that if customary international law is 
not followed, the definition will not meet the requirements demanded by criminal 
justice: 
270 
Kress, supra note257, p348, argues that the inclusion of the crime in the Rome Statute "can be seen 
as confirmation of aggression as a crime under international law". See also: Gaja, G . , 2002. The Long 
Journey Towards Repressing Aggression. In: A. C A S S E S E , P. G A E T E & J .R.W.D. J O N E S , ed. The 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary. Vol. I, USA: Oxford University 
Press, p431. 
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G A Res. 95(1). 
272 
Zimmermann in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: Observers' Notes, Article by Article, 1999, p99. 
273 
Griffiths, supra note 19, p302. Meron, supra note?, p8, who also supports the need for the definition 
to be grounded in customary international law, notes that questions have been raised about the 
argument that the W G C A should be bound to apply customary international law. Some delegates have 
suggested that because Articles 7 & 8 of the Rome Statute went beyond customary law, the W G C A 
could therefore legislate rather than codify the definition of the crime of aggression. 
274 
Ibid. 
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To create a new crime by treaty and follow a legislative approach would open 
the door to governments and individuals contesting the ICC's legitimacy in the 
future - this can and should be avoided by basing our work on the firm 
275 
foundations of customary law. 
2. The Act of Aggression - Defining the Conduct of the State for 
The Purposes of the Rome Statute; 
(a) The Act of Aggression and the Crime of Aggression: 
Unlike the other crimes under the Rome Statute, the crime of aggression "has the 
collective act by a State as the point of reference for any description of what the 
individual perpetrator does".^ ^^ This is the conduct element^ ^^ of aggression and is the 
conduct by which the individual concerned is linked to the State's act of aggression -
278 
Otherwise known as the collective act. The starting point for any analysis of the 
crime of aggression is the necessary distinction between the act of aggression as 
committed by the State, and the crime of aggression as perpetrated by the 
279 
individual. Although these two factors are intrinsically and inextricably linked, 
maintaining a clear distinction between them makes the enormous task of codifying 
275 
Meron, supra note7, pi2 . In addition, it is also important for the crime of aggression to be based in 
customary international law with regards to the fact that its inclusion in the Rome Statute would mean 
that the provision on aggression would not only be applicable against parties that have explicitly 
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, but also non-state parties who may be subject to a referral from 
the Secuirty. If the definition does not reflect customary international law, it will ulitmatiely be harder 
to argue that such states should be bound by the provisions of the Court. (For a discussion of the 
procedure of implementation, see: Chapter 5.) 
276 
Cryer, R., Friman, H . , Robinson, D. , & Wilmshurst, E . , 2007. An Introduction to International 
Criminal Law and Procedure. U K : Cambridge University Press, p272, 
277 
This term is found in Article 30(2)(a) Rome Statute. 
278 
Discussion Paper J - The Crime of Aggression and Article 25, paragraph 3, of the Statute. I C C -
ASP/4/32, Annex I I .B (hereinafter, Discussion Paper 1) 
279 
The need for this distinction was recognised by certain delegates of the W G C A (Proposal submitted 
by Bosnia, Herzegovina, New Zealand and Romania, U N Doc. P C N I C C / 2 0 0 1 / W G C A / D P . 2 ) and was 
central to the 2002 Coordinator's Discussion Paper. See also: 1996 Draft Code, Article 16 
commentary, para(4): 
The rule of international law, which prohibits aggression, applies to the conduct of a State in 
relation to another State. Therefore, only a State is capable of committing aggression by 
violating this rule of international law which prohibits such conduct. At the same time, a State 
is an abstract entity which is incapable of acting on its own. A State can commit aggression 
only with the active participation of the individuals who have the necessary authority or power 
to plan, prepare, initiate or wage aggression. 
60 
the crime of aggression more straightforward. There is also strong academic support 
for theoretically separating these two aspects of the offence. Antonopoulos states that 
they "are two different acts by different actors, with the act committed by the State 
280 
Standing as a pre-requisite for the criminal responsibility of individuals", and 
Griffiths makes it explicitly clear that this distinction must be maintained in order to 
effectively qualify the crime of aggression: 
The definition of the Crime of Aggression is the enumeration of the 
circumstances in which an individual will be held criminally responsible for 
the commission of an Act of Aggression by a State; the definition of the Act of 
Aggression is the enumeration of those acts which, when committed by a 
281 
State, constitutes an Act of Aggression in international law. 
Although I do not intend to explore in any great detail the notion oi State criminal 
responsibility, which is a highly controversial proposition and one that has been 
282 
explicitly rejected by States, reference should be made to the recent attention that 
the ICJ gave the relationship between individual and State responsibility in the context 
28.T 
of international crimes in its 2007 Bosnia Genocide Case decision. 
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The idea of a State being held criminally responsible for the commission of certain international 
crimes was first introduced by Robert Ago, Special Rapporteur to the I L C on the question of State 
Responsibility. {Yearbook of the ILC, 1976, Vol . II ( l ) , 24 at paras.72-155.) Draft Article 19 of the 
I L C ' s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongfid Acts was drafted in 1976, 
and stated at paragraph (3)(a) that "a serious breach of an international obligation of essential 
importance for the maintenance of international peace and security, such as that prohibiting 
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criminally responsible. However, the idea of international crimes as expressed in Draft Article 19 was 
extremely controversial and highly divisive amongst Member States. As a result. Draft Article 19 was 
deleted from the I L C ' s Draft Articles in 2001. For a comprehensive analysis of the work of the I L C in 
this area see: Crawford, J . , 2002. The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: 
Introduction, Te.xt and Commentaries. U K : Cambridge University Press. For particular discussion of 
Draft Article 19, see: Bowett, D.W., 1998. Crimes of State and the 1996 Report of the International 
Law Commission on State Responsibility. E J I L . Vol.9, No. l , ppl63-173. For a general discussion of 
the notion of State responsibility for international crimes see: Jorgensen, N., 2000. The Responsibility 
of States for International Crimes. US: Oxford University Press. 
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Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro). Judgment delivered on 26"^  February 2007, available at 
http://www.ici-cii.org/docket/files/91/13685.Ddf 
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Asked to determine whether the Respondents were responsible for violations of the 
Genocide Convention,^^^ the Court looked at the notion of the State criminal and civil 
responsibility and the obligations of States under the Genocide Convention. Whilst 
both the Court and the Applicant agreed with the Respondent's argument that "as a 
matter of principle, international law does not recognize the criminal responsibility of 
285 
the State", the Court disagreed with the Respondents suggestion that the Genocide 
Convention dealt exclusively with individual criminal responsibility, instead 
emphasizing the existence of what it called "the duality of responsibility... [as]... a 
286 
constant feature of international law". Furthermore, the Court rejected the 
Respondent's argument that the ICJ could not make a finding of genocide by the State 
in the absence of a prior conviction of an individual for genocide by a competent 
court. Instead, it declared that "State responsibility can arise under the Convention for 
287 
genocide... without an individual being convicted of the crime". Furthermore, the 
Court, in controversially interpreting a State's obligations under the Genocide 
Convention, held that the Convention did not deny that international responsibility of 
a State - even though different in nature from criminal responsibility - could be 
engaged though the act of genocide or the others enumerated in Article I I I . 
Article IX stipulates that the ICJ is the appropriate organ to deal with disputes 
concerning the "interpretation, application or fulfillment of the present Convention, 
including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide . . ." Although the 
operative articles of the Convention reference the actions and responsibilities of 
284 
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Ibid, p65, para. 173. In support of its proposition, the Court cited both Article 25(4) of the Rome 
Statute as well as Ar ticle 58 of the I L C ' s Draft Articles. Furthermore, the Court directly quoted the 
I L C ' s commentary on Article 58: 
Where crimes against international law are committed by State officials, it will often be the 
case that the State itself is responsible for the acts in question or for failure to prevent or 
punish them. In certain cases, in particular aggression, the State will by definition be involved. 
Even so, the question of individual responsibility is in principle distinct from the question of 
State responsibility. The State is not exempted from its own responsibility for internationally 
wrongful conduct by the prosecution and punishment of the State officials who carried it out. 
It should be noted that whilst Article 25(1) of the Rome Statute states that "the Court shall have 
jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to the State", Article 25(4) makes it clear that "no provision 
of this Statute relating to individual criminal responsibility shall affect the responsibility of States 
under international law". 
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individuals, the Court concluded that the obligation on States to prevent and punish 
genocide under Article I also incorporates the implicit and unstated obligation to 
refrain from committing genocide itself. This controversial interpretation of Article I 
drew strong criticism from a number of Judges, as it was generally felt that it went 
beyond the scope of the Court's powers, beyond the scope of applicable international 
law and in particular beyond the scope of the provisions of the Convention itself. 
Those dissenting felt that the Convention did not afford the ICJ the power to 
determine that a State had committed the crime of genocide: 
We entertain more than serious doubts regarding the interpretation given to the 
Genocide Convention in the Judgment to the effect that a State can be held 
directly to have committed the crime of genocide. This interpretation is not 
only highly questionable but also inconsistent with the object and purpose of 
the Convention, as well as its wording and plain meaning. As an international 
criminal instrument, the Convention envisages the trail and punishment of 
individuals for the crime of genocide. It does not impose criminal 
responsibility on the State as a State. Indeed, it could not have done so at the 
time it was adopted given that the notion of crime of State was not part of 
international law and even today general international law does not recognize 
289 
the notion of the criminal responsibility of the State. 
Moreover, by determining that it had the competence to conclude as to whether a 
State had committed a crime of genocide or not, and coupled with its rejection of the 
Respondent's argument that a previous determination of an individual's guilt by a 
competent tribunal was not required for the Court to consider the question of State 
responsibility, the Court effectively awarded itself the authority to determine the 
288 
See: Articles 4, 5 and 6 Genocide Convention 
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Joint Declaration of Judges Shi and Koroma, p 1, para. 1. See also: Separate Opinion of Judge 
Tomka and Separate Opinion of Judge Owada. Furthermore, in the Declaration by Judge Skotnikov, he 
explicitly stated (at p4) that "a State's responsibility is engaged when a crime of genocide is committed 
by an individuals whose acts are legally attributable to it. No "unstated obligation" for States not to 
themselves commit genocide is needed for this responsibility to be incurred through attribution", 
whereas Judge Ad Hoc Kreca declared in his Separate Opinion (at p73) that "it appears that none of the 
substantive provisions of the Convention provides for any form of responsibility in legal terms for 
genocide except the criminal responsibility of the individual". Please note however, that the Separate 
Opinion of Judge Ranjeva, the Declaration of Judge Bennouna and the Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Ad Hoc Mahiou are only available in French and as a result have not been analysed by this author. 
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existence and commission of a crime of genocide in any context. This extension of the 
Court's competence came under fire in the Separate Opinion of Judge Tomka when he 
stated that: 
The Court has no criminal jurisdiction. One may wonder how a Court 
conceived as a judicial organ for the adjudication of inter-State disputes, with 
no criminal jurisdiction, whose procedure (Rules of Court) is not tailored to 
the requirements (or needs) or a criminal case, and which has no Rules of 
Evidence, could determine that a crime (i.e., genocide, requiring specific intent 
(dolus specialis)) has been committed. Is it possible for the commission of a 
crime to be established within a procedure which provides for no appeal? 
These are, in my view, important considerations which militate against 
construing Article IX of the Convention so as to enable charges by one State 
that another has committed genocide to be brought within the Court's 
290 
jurisdiction. 
The conclusions of the Court coupled with the numerous dissenting and separate 
opinions demonstrate just how divisive and controversial the notion of State criminal 
responsibility still is today. Whilst the debate is extremely interesting, it is this authors 
understanding that the ICJ's ruling does not confuse the current approach to the 
relationship between a State's responsibility for the act of aggression and the 
individual's responsibility for the crime. The ICJ declared that it was not bound by the 
need for a finding of guilt of an individual for the crime of genocide to be given 
before it could rule on the responsibility of a State under the Genocide Convention. 
Although viewed as controversial, this determination does not directly impact upon 
the findings of State and individual responsibility with regards to aggression. As 
Antonopolous recognizes, a determination that the State is responsible for an act of 
aggression is a pre-requisite to an individual being judged upon his or her alleged 
criminal responsibility for the crime. There is no similar statutory provision in 
international law declaring that a State can be held criminally responsible for 
breaching the prohibition on committing the crime of aggression, and until the 
290 
Separate Opinion of Judge Tomka, p25, para.60 
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international community dramatically reverses its currently held opinion on the 
existence of State criminal responsibility, such a provision is unlikely to ever exist. 
Turning to the next section of this thesis, there are a variety of elements that make up 
the formula for the collective act of the State. It is the aim of the following analysis to 
detail what these elements are. Firstly, what an act of aggression actually encompasses 
must be clearly ascertained. Secondly, and more importantly, it has to be established 
at what point individual criminal responsibility is triggered. In other words, one must 
ascertain whether participation by an individual in every act of aggression committed 
by a State constitutes a crime against peace by that individual? To answer these 
questions, and to successfully establish the crime within the Court's jurisdiction, one 
must turn to customary international law. 
(b) A Generic versus an Enumerative Definition: 
Prior to an analysis of the substantive aspects of the offence, attention must be given 
to the debate that has occurred on the format the definition should adopt. Whilst most 
of the discussion within the SWGCA has focused on whether the definition should be 
generic or enumerative, suggestions have been made that support a mixed format like 
291 
that found in Resolution 3314. Although the generic approach to defining the 
collective act has various advantages and disadvantages, the emerging majority view 
292 
seems to believe that the latter outweighs the former. The generic approach is 
beneficial because it will not restrict or limit determinations to any specific instances, 
but will provide an overall framework that will be applicable to varying 
293 
circumstances. This is particularly important for the ICC. Unlike the previous 
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2006 Princeton Report, para(11) states that "reference was made in this context to the example of 
article 7 of the Rome Statute dealing with crimes against humanity which combines a generic chapeau 
with a specific but open-ended list", ("other inhumane acts". Article 7(l)(k)). 
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Discussion Paper 3 - Definition of Aggression in the context of the Statute of the ICC. I C C -
ASP/4/32, Annex I I .D (hereinafter Discussion Paper 3). Part 1 of this paper questions the format that 
the definition should take, assessing the various arguments that have been put forward. It concludes by 
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Griffiths, supra notel9, p313, concludes that a declaratory definition is the most appropriate: "It 
follows that an autonomous determination of the existence of the Act of Aggression could legitimately 
be made without a written enumeration of Acts of Aggression merely by reference to the accepted 
law". See: Article 7(2) E C H R & Article 15(2) I C C P R . 
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international criminal Tribunals that have been created, the ICC is designed to 
punish those acts that have not yet occurred, and therefore must be flexible enough to 
295 
incorporate new, and as yet undetermined, methods of warfare. The argument 
against adopting a generic format is that any definition it formulates would not 
provide the defendant with sufficient notice of the acts covered by the crime, and 
therefore fails to satisfy the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. Not only can the 
296 
same argument be leveled at an enumerative definition, but even the SWGCA has 
recognized that a generic definition can be specific enough to satisfy the principle of 
nullum crimen sine lege. 
Although the enumerative approach has its supporters, adopting such a format would 
severely hamper the chances of achieving consensus on a definition suitable for the 
ICC. So as not to invoke the principle of in dubio pro reo, the enumerative list would 
298 
have to include all acts of aggression that could achieve the threshold of war. Those 
supporting this approach take the list contained in Article 3 of Resolution 3314 as the 
starting point. As already noted, not every act referred to in Article 3 amounts to a war 
of aggression, even though they have been recognized as principles of customary 
international law. By adopting this formula, one is entering a debate that is not one the 
WGCA, and by default the SWGCA, is specifically mandated to have - in that they 
were asked to define the crime of aggression, not debate what examples classify as 
acts of aggression. 
294 
Both the I C T Y and the I C T R were created after the atrocities they covered had been committed and 
as a consequence they were able to be specific to the types of crimes committed in the particular 
conflicts. 
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Dascalopoulou-Livada believes that a generic approach is the most appropriate, for the very 
practical reason that it would present better chances to succeed in rallying consensus: "A generic 
definition would simply spare us the rancour's of having to decide on each one of the specific cases 
mentioned". Dascalopoulou-Livada, P., 2004. Aggression and the I C C : Views on Certain Ideas and 
their Potential for a Solution. //;.• M. P O L I T I & G. N E S I , ed. The Rome Statute of the ICC - A 
Challenge to Impunity. Great Britain: Ashgate, p80. 
Muller-Schieke, supra note217, p415, who favours a general definition, argues that "an enumeration 
could never take into account all possible ways in which the crime could occur and would therefore 
^rove to be too vague and lack the necessary rigour and precision". 
2006 Princeton Report, para(12). In this context it was pointed out that the principle of legality 
allows for some flexibility according to Article 15(2) I C C P R , "which was drafted with the Nuremberg 
crimes, including the crime of aggression, in mind". 
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Griffiths, supra note 19, p313 states that "no enumeration will ever be conclusive and will quickly 
be outdated". 
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In conclusion, and despite suggestions that in the face of such seemingly 
irreconcilable differences, "a case-by-case approach [is] preferable over an 'all-
299 
sweeping and pre-existing' formulation", it is submitted here that the emerging 
majority opinion of the SWGCA is correct. For the purposes of Rome Statute, the 
definition of the crime of aggression should take a generic, and not an enumerative, 
format. 
Furthermore, by adopting a generic definition the Court will not be prevented from 
referring to the acts listed in Article S.^'^^ Article 21 of the Rome Statute provides that 
the court may, under certain circumstances, refer to "applicable treaties and the 
principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the 
international law of armed conflict". Although it is disputed as to whether this would 
301 
include Resolution 3314 or not, it seems likely that the Court will make use of the 
principles and scenarios that are referred to in that Definition. Having determined the 
principles of law that are to be applied and the format that the definition is to take, the 
following sections address the substantive issues of the collective act of the definition. 
Firstly, it must be clarified as to what actually constitutes an act of aggression. Then 
attention will be given to the specific instances of aggression that give rise to a war of 
aggression, and consequently, individual criminal responsibility. 
(c) Does Every Violation of the UN Charter Amount to an Act of Aggression? 
As detailed in Chapter 2, the prohibition on the use of force that is contained in 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is considered to be a principle of customary 
302 
international law. However, Article 2(4) does not use 'aggression' in its 
303 
terminology, but instead the broader notion of 'use of force'. Furthermore, the 
Charter does not answer the question of whether every violation of Article 2(4) 
constitutes an act of aggression as referred to in Article 39. Instead, this question is 
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Antonopolous, supra note 157, p40. 
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Dascalopoulou-Livada, supra note295. 
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MuUer-Schieke, supra note217, p416, argues that it cannot be sufficiently established that 
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See: Chapter 2(2)(a). 
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Griffiths, supra notel9, p317, provides a detailed commentary to the term 'force' in article 2(4), 
arguing that it actually refers to the concept of 'armed force', (see also: Randelzhofer, supra note24, at 
ppl 17-118) which is a phrase that appears elsewhere in the Charter, (Preamble; Article 41 & 46). 
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304 
left to the competences of the Security Council. In an attempt to clarify the term 
305 
'aggression', the General Assembly adopted Resolution 3314. As previously 
established, Article 2 of that resolution defines an act of aggression in very much the 
same terminology as the prohibition contained in Article 2(4), save for the reference 
to the 'threat' of aggression, which is absent from the former but present in the latter. 
From this, the following conclusion can be drawn: to constitute an act of aggression 
under international law, a particular instance of inter-State force must actually violate 
the prohibition contained in Article 2(4) (in that a threat to use force does not 
constitute an act of aggression). 
That being said, to fully answer the above question one also needs to take account of 
the certain exceptions to the general prohibition, which exists under contemporary 
international law. The UN Charter contains two explicit exceptions: the use of force in 
self-defence (as specified by Article 51), and the notion of collective security 
authorized by the UN under Chapter VII . Recently however, arguments have been put 
forward to justify the use of force in other situations as well, such as the notion of 
306 
humanitarian intervention or intervention for the protection of nationals abroad. 
Whilst I do not intend to give a full account of the history or role of these methods of 
using force, there are a few points of interest that need to be addressed. 
307 
(/) Self-Defence: 
Article 51 of the UN Charter states that: 
Nothing in this present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nation ... 
Disagreement has arisen over whether State's are justified in using force by way of 
308 
anticipatory self-defence. Whilst some commentators believe in a literal 
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Griffiths, ibid, is critical of this fact, fearing "competence of a political organisation [to determine] 
an essentially legal question". 
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See: Chapter 2(3)(c). 
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See: Gray, supra note9, pp75-78. 
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See generally: Dinstein, supra note9, Chap.7-9; Gray, ibid, Chap.4-5. 
68 
interpretation of Article 51, in that the right to self-defence applies only once an 
309 
armed attack has begun, others take the view that States have a right to act in order 
to avert the threat of an imminent attack. The latter argument is not only supported by 
310 
customary international law, but also the fact that Article 2(4) incorporates the 
notion of 'threat' to use force in its prohibition on the conduct of States. This view is 
further supported by the practical argument that it is "unrealistic in all cases, for 
311 
example with respect to nuclear weapons, to await an actual attack". 
Recently however, arguments have been put forward that attempt to assert the right to 
312 
act in 'pre-emptive self-defence' in the face of an emerging threat. This 
interpretation stretches the limits of recognized international law too far. This is not a 
legal extension of the right to self-defence. Any use of force in such a manner 
constitutes a violation of the prohibition contained in Article 2(4) and consequently, is 
an act of aggression. With regards to criminal prosecutions for the crime of 
aggression, restricting the interpretation of Article 51 to what customary international 
law stipulates will also prevent controversial defences of complicated questions 
concerning public international law from being raised before the ICC. 
( a ) Authorization under Chapter V7/.-^ '^  
Under Article 42 of the Charter, the Security Council is allowed to take such action 
"as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security". The 
regime under Chapter VII for collective security measures is generally regarded as 
308 
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generally: Greenwood, C , 2003. International Law and Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-
Qaida, and Iraq. S D I U . Vol.4, No.7, pp7-37; Sapiro, M., 2003. Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Pre-
emptive Self-defence. A J I L . Vol.97, No.3, pp599-607. 
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relatively uncontroversial, with the UN playing a highly active and very vital role in 
peace-keeping and peace enforcement throughout the world. Such actions are clearly 
beyond the scope of criminal punishment for the crime of aggression. 
(Hi) Humanitarian Intervention: 
The notion of legitimate military intervention with the objective of preventing a 
humanitarian disaster without the authorization of the Security Council is today still a 
controversial one. Whilst the conservative view believes such actions violate Article 
316 
2(4) and are not supported by international law, more liberal-minded thinkers argue 
that there is an emerging norm of customary international law implementing a 
responsibility to protect upon States. This began with the justifications offered by the 
UK, along with France and America, for its operations in Iraq to protect the Kurds and 
Shi'ites after the 1991 Iraq/Kuwait conflict.^ Further expansion came in 1999 when 
NATO decided to take action in Kosovo in response to the mass repression of ethnic 
318 
Albanians by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Although it is clear that it is by 
no means a settled aspect of public international law, there is one important point that 
it addresses. It raises the issue of whether the objective or intention of the military 
action assists in the determination of the (il)legality of the use of force, a point which 
319 
is given greater consideration in due course. An initial observation would argue 
314 
There is an argument to be made that recent legal justifications put forward by the U K and the US 
concerning their intervention in Iraq in 2003 push the boundaries of this power beyond what they truly 
are. The argument put forward in favour of intervention interpreted S C Resolution 1441(2002) as 
reviving the authorization given in S C Resolution 978(1991) (which authorised military action to 
counter Iraq's invasion of Kuwait) without the need for a further decision by the Security Council. See: 
Lowe, v., 2003. The Iraq Crisis: What Now? I C L Q . Vol.52, p859. 
315 
See generally: Higgins, supra note308, pp245-248; Gray, supra note9, Chap.2. 
316 
Commentators point to G A Resolution 2625(1970), which excludes the right to intervene and makes 
no provision for humanitarian intervention, as well as Article 5(1) of G A Resolution 3314(1974), 
which includes the provision that "no consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic, 
military or otherwise, may serve as a justification for aggression". 
Gray, supra note9, p33. 
318 
See: Simma,B. , 1990. NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects. EJTL. Vol.10, p i . 
Yugoslavia tried to challenge the legality of the action taken by N A T O at the I C J in the Legality of Use 
of Force Case (Yugoslavia v. US et al.) (Provisional Measures). I C J Reports 1999, p916. The case 
never made it to the merits stage of proceedings, and although the I C J did not pronounce on the legality 
of N A T O ' s action, it did indicate that it had some concerns. Whilst the Court declared that it was 
"deeply concerned with the human tragedy, the loss of life and the enormous suffering in Kosovo", it 
felt that it was also necessary to emphasis that "all parties appearing before it must act in conformity 
with their obligations under the UN Charter", (p950). 
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however that, from a humanitarian perspective, if such actions were to be 
criminalized. States would cease to undertake such missions, at the expense of the 
suffering and oppressed peoples of this world. 
The fact that the use of force is not a settled area of public international law will prove 
320 
troublesome for the ICC. With respect to the principle in dubio pro reo such 
ambiguity will mainly serve the alleged offenders. Furthermore, it cannot be the 
objective of a criminal statute to resolve these issues, nor is it the function of the ICC 
to promulgate rules of public international law. This is something that States have to 
address themselves. Until such time as there is agreement on these principles 
however, the ICC may well have to pass judgment on controversial instances of the 
use of force by States. 
For the purposes of this thesis it is my conclusion that an act of aggression constitutes 
the following: 
A use of armed force by a State against another or other States, which violates 
the prohibition contained in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and cannot be 
justified as an act of self-defence under Article 51 or customary international 
law, or as something authorized by the UN under Chapter VI I . Furthermore, 
instances of controversial uses of force, such as humanitarian intervention, 
whilst strictly speaking constitute an act of aggression, cannot be made the 
subject of criminal proceedings because they lack the requisite aggressive aim. 
(d) Does Every Act of Aggression Result in the Crime of Aggression Being 
Committed? 
Having concluded as to what constitutes an act of aggression; the second question to 
address is whether every act results in the commission of the crime of aggression. The 
precedents set at the IMT and IMTFE and the opinio juris of member states - as 
demonstrated by the adoption of Resolution 3314 - clearly demonstrates that this is 
320 
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not the case.^ '^ The question that actually needs to be asked therefore, is at what point 
does an act of aggression trigger the crime of aggression? Where does the threshold 
lie for criminal responsibility? This is the crux of the matter, and is pivotal to the 
322 
definition that is to be adopted. It is one that still clearly divides opinion within the 
323 
SWGCA however. The following discussion provides an assessment of both what 
the law is as well as the various proposals and suggestions that have been made in the 
WGCA and the SWGCA. 
(/) The Crime ofAssression: Limiting Jurisdiction to Acts Amounting to a 'War 
of Aggression': 
As previously stated, effective prosecution of the crime of aggression can only be 
guaranteed if the scope of the offence is firmly grounded in customary international 
law. The only precedents available for attributing criminal responsibility to 
individuals are the criminal proceedings that took place subsequent to the Second 
World War. There the applicable law spoke of a "war of aggression" as the criteria 
324 
that needed to be satisfied. The Tribunals also thoroughly discussed the crime of 
aggressive war, making it perfectly clear that lesser forms of violence would not be 
325 
enough to satisfy the threshold criteria for this 'supreme' crime. Furthermore, there 
has been no subsequent prosecutions post 1945 to suggest that the criteria for the 
crime of aggression is anything less. 
It is my belief therefore that the law is this: under customary international law only 
wars of aggression acquire the requisite international criminal responsibility 
.121 
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notel 15, pi 13, holds a different, much broader view. 
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attributable to an individual. The IMT case of Kaltenbrunner, who was leader of 
the SS in Austria and State Secretary for Security after the Anschlu/3, clearly 
329 
illustrates this fact. Although he had been involved in the seizure of Austria, the 
Tribunal found him not guilty as there was no evidence of his involvement in plans to 
wage aggressive war on any other front. 
This is not a universally accepted interpretation of what the law is however, as 
demonstrated by the debates that have occurred in the WGCA and the SWGCA. 
Those favoring the more restrictive definition^'" argue that the Nuremberg precedent 
was based on a 'war of aggression', something which was clearly accepted by 
Member States in General Assembly Resolution 95(1). Furthermore, the Declaration 
on Friendly Relations stipulates that "a war of aggression constitutes a crime against 
the peace".The argument concludes that to use a broader definition would take the 
scope of the offence beyond that which is stipulated by customary international law. 
Dinstein (amongst others) supports this interpretation. He argues that acts of 
aggression 'short of war' do not result in individual criminal responsibility, although 
they would bring about the application of general rules of State responsibility.^^^ 
However, Dinstein does make note of what he calls the tendency in international law 
to expand the scope of this crime beyond the notion of a war of aggression. In 
particular, he points to the work of the ILC on the Draft Code, and the fact that Article 
334 
16 of the 1996 Draft defines crimes against peace as "any act of aggression". This 
is clearly a dramatic departure from the Nuremberg precedent. 
327 
Muller-Schieke, supra note217, p417, who argues that all other forms of coercive interference, 
although deplorable, must be left to the field of political condemnation. 
328 
The 'accession' of Austria to the Third Reich 
329 
See: Historical Overview, supra note9, pp41-42. 
330 
Nuremberg Judgment, supra note96, p291. The Court held that the Anschuip, "although it was an 
aggressive act, is not charged as an aggressive war, and the evidence against Kaltenbrunner under 
Count One does not, in the opinion of the Tribunal, show his direct participation in any plan to wage 
such a war". 
331 
Cryer et al., supra note276; Kress, supra note257, p249; Werle, p391, argues that "only aggressive 
war, as a particularly grave and obvious form of aggression, is criminalized under customary 
international law". See also: Griffiths, supra notel9, p308; Muller-Schieke, supra note217, p4l4. 
Article 1(3) G A Resolution 2625(1970). 
Dinstein, supra note9, pl09. See: Horgan-Doran and Ginkel, supra note232, p335. 
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Whilst Dinstein, ibid, notes that the I L C , in its commentary on Article 16 of the 1996 Draft Code, 
admittedly held that individual criminal responsibility for the crime of aggression is contingent on 'a 
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The alternative argument favors a broader definition of the crime of aggression. Those 
supporting this view,^^^ whilst recognizing the importance of the Nuremberg 
precedent, argue that it fails to take into account subsequent developments. In 
particular, proponents of the broader definition point to the trials under CCL No. 10, 
and in particular the Ministries Case where the Court held that the invasions of 
Austria and Czechoslovakia gave rise to individual criminal responsibility even 
336 
though the IMT had declared that they did not. The argument continues by relying 
on the provision of crimes against peace in the Draft Code and the enumerative list in 
Article 3 of Resolution 3314, both of which refer to acts of aggression that do not 
reach the threshold of 'war',"'^^ but have been recognized as principles of customary 
338 
international law. As mentioned before, however, caution has to be advised when 
one attempts to make a criminal law argument using Resolution 3314. The Definition 
was adopted as a guide to the Security Council, a political body responsible for 
339 
passing judgment on acts committed by States. It has already been established that 
the act of aggression is an act of State. The General Assembly Definition was only 
ever intended to be a definition of a State act for the purpose of determining State 
responsibility. It was not designed to be applicable to criminal institutions determining 
the criminal responsibility of individuals. It is therefore an incorrect assumption to 
argue that because Resolution 3314 incorporates acts of aggression 'short of war', the 
threshold of the individual crime has also, in someway, been lowered so as to 
incorporate similar acts. Finally, supporters of the broader definition argue that whilst 
the WGCA, and now the SWGCA, are obliged to take customary international law 
into account, they are not bound to apply it. They argue that the SWGCA is also in the 
position to codify the law, and that therefore aggressive acts previously not within the 
scope of war could be included in the definition. Whilst this approach may be 
sufficiently serious violation of the prohibition contained in Article 2(4) of the Charter of the UN' , he 
argues that even a serious violation of the Charter's prohibition may still constitute an act of aggression 
'short of war'. 
Griffiths, supra ntoel9, pp303-4; Cassese, supra notel 15, pi 14. 
336 
Supra note 125. 
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Wilmshurst, supra note215, p94 notes that "not all acts listed in Article 3 can be classified as 
necessarily constituting a war". See: Werle, supra note 154, p394. 
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See: Chapter2(3)(c). 
339 
Schuster, supra note5, p30, notes that it was not designed for criminal purposes. See also: 
Carpenter, supra note6, p228. 
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acceptable for procedural issues concerning the crime of aggression, it cannot be so 
for the substantive provisions. 
Although some of the arguments for broadening the crime are interesting and merit 
debate, there are clearly serious problems with expanding the scope of the offence. 
The definition of the crime of aggression has to reflect what established law stipulates 
it to be. Therefore, the conduct element of the collective act for the crime of 
aggression has to be a war of aggression. Werle makes the point that whilst "one may 
deplore this narrow limitation of the offense from the standpoint of international legal 
policy ... the international community lacks both the opinio juris and the State 
practice necessary for a broader criminalization under customary international 
340 
law". Moreover, such a high threshold will also meet the requirement of Article 5(1) 
of the Rome Statute, in that the jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the "most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole". Having 
established what the collective act is, the next question to address is what qualifies a 
use of force as a 'war of aggression' and what are the elements of such behavior? 
(//) The Meanine and Elements of a War ofAssression: 
It is generally acknowledged that a war of aggression must be something greater than 
341 
an act of aggression. The Nuremberg Judgment characterized a war of aggression 
as "an essentially evil thing". This is not a helpful characterization as this abstract 
statement does not meet the modem standards of legal clarity and certainty. For the 
Rome Statute, something more concrete than "an evil thing" must be described. 
Firstly, the gravity and scale of the action must reach a certain degree of intensity in 
342 
order to qualify as a war of aggression. Werle argues that the offense of aggressive 
war requires the use of force to be of a similar degree as that witnessed by the German 
attacks on neighboring States, which "were generally waged by large armies on broad 
343 
fronts". Secondly, the action must be committed with an aggressive aim, intention 
340 
Werle, supra note 154, 401. He does however, allude to the fact that criminal liability may well be 
expanded in the course of the negotiations. 
341 
Cryer et al., supra note276, p273, states that "mere citation of Article 2(4) is not enough". 
Griffiths, supra note 19, p319. 343 
Werle, supra note 154, p319. 
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or objective in mind. Werle suggests that, based on the Nuremberg precedent, there 
must be an aggressive aim to the conduct, such as total or partial annexation and/or 
occupation of the victimized State or a desire to "use its resources for the benefit of 
344 
the attacking State". As previously noted actions such as humanitarian intervention, 
by virtue of their very aims, would not come within the scope of the crime of 
345 
aggression. 
Although hostilities of a certain intensity are required for war to be present, an express 
346 
declaration of war is not. Wilmshurst highlights the fact that formal 'wars' are 
347 
rarely declared in modern times. This is important. Those favoring a broader 
definition make the argument that because modern warfare rarely occurs in a manner 
recognized by the traditional understanding of war, maintaining such a criterion would 
disconnect the crime from what actual occurs in contemporary international relations. 
This justification for the abandonment of a 'war' threshold is flawed though. Just 
because formal wars are no longer declared by States, it does not mean that the 
contemporary acts of violence no longer achieve the severity or gravity of a war. This 
is not stable ground upon which to make the argument that the crime of aggression 
has in any way changed or expanded to include lesser forms of violence. If explicit 
344 
Ibid, p395. He goes on to argue that the aggressive aims of the State can usually be proven though 
statements of the political leadership - the Nuremberg I M T held that Hitler's "Mein K a m p f contained 
an "unmistakable attitude of aggression", (Nuremberg Judgment, supra note96, p422). There is, 
however, considerable debate about whether the intention and objective of the use of force is part of the 
conduct element of the collective act, (2006 Princeton Report, para(25)-(31)). See: Kress, supra 
note257, p256; Cassese, supra notel 15, ppl 15-6. However, Clark, supra note247, p878 argues that by 
including the intention or aim of the act as part of the criteria, the definition would exclude acts which 
might be regarded as properly coming within the criminal category, such as aggressive wars to extract 
economic or political advantages. 
345 
Although Werle, ibid, believes it is doubtful that the actions of the US and the U K in Iraq in 2003 
could be justified under international law as interventions to eliminate a regime that violated human 
rights, he does conclude that it was not a criminal war of aggression, even if one views the action as 
contrary to international law: 
The war lacked the specific aggressive element necessary under customary international law 
for a war to be one of aggression. 
The Tokyo Charter expressly provided that a declaration of war was irrelevant, thus abandoning the 
traditional concept of war. 
347 
Wilmshurst, supra note215. As a supporter of the restrictive view, she argues that if the new 
definition of aggression is to keep to international law as it stands, "it should be confined to 
participation in wars of aggression whether the term 'war' is used expressly or whether an attempt is 
made to describe the essential elements of a war". (p95) 
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348 
reference to the term 'war' is considered to be unhelpful, then the definition 
adopted should refer to the elements of aggressive war that are found in customary 
international law. 
Recent discussions on whether the definition of the collective act should incorporate 
the phrase 'war of aggression' indicate that there is still no consensus over this 
349 
issue. Whilst support has been shown for the concept of limiting jurisdiction to acts 
amounting to a 'war of aggression', there appears to be a predominant view that the 
350 
inclusion of such a high threshold would make the definition too restrictive. In 
addition, when the view was expressed that the acts in question should be tantamount 
to a 'war of aggression' in order not to deviate from customary international law, 
dispute ensued as to what exactly amounted to this under customary international 
law. 
It is my conclusion, and in spite of a lack of consensus in the SWGCA, the law is 
clear in this area. As stipulated by customary international law, the threshold for the 
crime of aggression is a war of aggression. The evidence suggests that a war manifests 
itself when the use of force is of a severe intensity, and when the intention behind the 
act is aggressive in nature. This is a high threshold that produces a restrictive 
definition, but one cannot ignore the law for the sake of international policy. 
That being said, I am acutely aware of the fact that incorporating such a high 
threshold will not be acceptable to many members of the SWGCA. As seems to be the 
way with provisions relating to aggression, a consensus might have to be forged to 
ensure that the crime becomes operational under the Court's jurisdiction. Any 
consensus will have to begin with the one thing that is agreed by all members of the 
SWGCA - that a qualifier of some sort is required for the definition of the crime of 
348 
Clark, supra note247 believes that 'wars of aggression' are an unhelpful concept, but recognizes 
that it has a following amongst Member States. 
349 
2006 Princeton Report, para(21)-(24). 
"° Ibid, para(23). 
Ibid, para(24). 
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aggression.The following discussion provides an overview of the suggestions that 
have been made in the WGCA and the SWGCA regarding the definition of the 
collective act, as well as the most suitable formula from the current proposals that 
should be adopted. 
(e) The Threshold Condition - Proposals from the PrepComm and Debate 
Within the SWGCA; 
Although there is general agreement that a qualifier needs to be incorporated into the 
definition, the various suggestions made demonstrate that where the threshold should 
be placed is a matter still up for debate. 
In 1997, a proposal submitted by Egypt and Italy suggested that acts of a "sufficient 
354 
gravity" could suffice for the imposition of criminal responsibility. This is an 
abstract and unqualified statement that would have caused serious difficulties had it 
been adopted. The proposal went on to suggest that a rather vague generic definition 
accompanied by a non-exhaustive enumeration of acts constituting aggression, taken 
from Resolution 3314, should be adopted.For reasons already explained, such as 
proposal would not be acceptable. 
The latter stages of the WGCA saw more workable proposals put forward. Greece and 
Portugalsuggested that the definition of the collective act should reflect the 
prohibition found in Article 2(4) of the UN Char ter .The principle difficulty with 
352 
Dascalopoulou-Livada, supra note295, p82, argues that despite the fact that the application of the 
notion of 'war of aggression' seems to be neither workable nor desirable, "we have to admit that there 
is a need for some qualifier so as to criminalize acts which are of a certain importance". 
Trahan, supra note247, p449 states that the greatest problem that the debates faced was the 
"conceptual difference concerning the extent to which the State's act of aggression would be 
addressed". 
354 
UN Doc. A/AC.249/1997/WG. 1/DP.6. This idea was taken up by the revised Greek-Portuguese 
proposal. U N Doc. PCNICC/1999/DP. 13. See also: UN Doc. PCNICC/2000 /WGCA/DP.5 , which 
contains the same proposal as well as an Explanatory Note prepared by the Greek delegate. 
A proposal submitted by a group of Arab States added to this, suggesting a reference to the "right to 
self-determination, freedom and independence" alongside the State's sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence. This proposal reflects the long-held, although controversial view that 
colonialism implies permanent aggression. 
356 
UN Doc. P C N I C C / 1 9 9 9 / W G C A / D P . 1. This was revised in November 2000 to include the qualifier 
'manifest' before "violation of the Charter of the United Nations". U N Doc. 
PCNICC/2000 /WGCA/DP.5 . See also: Proposal submitted by Colombia at the fourth session of the 
W G C A , UN Doc. P C N I C C / 2 0 0 0 / W G C A / D P . 1. 
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this suggestion is that it would make almost every use of force severe enough to 
instigate criminal proceedings. Not only does this not reflect customary international 
law, but it ignores the principle aim of the Court, which is to prosecute the most 
serious crimes of international concem.^ ^^ A revised proposal based on this format 
358 
was submitted by Bosnia and Herzegovina, New Zealand and Romania in 2001, 
which suggested that by including the notion of 'attacking', the definition would only 
cover conduct sufficiently serious enough so as to require accountability in a criminal 
court. This was a positive improvement, although it still did not meet the standards 
required by customary international law. 
359 
Two proposals of particular interest are those submitted by the Russian Federation 
360 
and Germany. The Russian proposal, based on suggestions advanced by the UK, 
limited jurisdiction to that required by customary international law - a war of 
aggression. However, the terminology employed reflected that found in Article 6(a) of 
361 
the IMT Charter, which has been heavily criticized for not explicitly stipulating 
what a war of aggression entails. The proposal submitted by Germany made more of 
an attempt to search for the essential element of aggressive war. The proposal 
puiported to restrict the definition to acts that had the aim of military occupation or 
362 
annexation of the territory of an invaded State, thereby making the intention of the 
363 
aggressor State one of the conditions of the collective act. 
The 2002 Coordinator's Discussion Paper attempted to make a clear separation 
between the 'act' and the 'crime' of aggression. Paragraph 1 set out how and by 
357 
Meron, supra note7, pi 1, states that this proposal "devalues the crime of aggression". 
358 
U N Doc. PCNICC/2001AVGCA/DP.2 
UN Doc. PCNICC/I999 /DP.12 . 
UN Doc. PCNICC/I999 .DP.13 . 
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The Russian proposal states that". . . the crime of aggression means any of the following acts: 
planning, preparing, initiating, carrying out a war of aggression" 
According to the German proposal, aggression would consist of: 
(a) initiating, or (b) carrying out an armed attack directed by a State against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of another State when this armed attack was undertaken in 
manifest contravention of the Charter of the United Nations with the object or result of 
establishing a military occupation of, or annexing, the territory of such other State or part 
thereof by armed forces of the attacking State. 
One point of interest to note about this proposal is that included the qualifier "manifest" in an attempt 
to implement a threshold for the collective act. 
363 
As suggested by Werle, supra note 157. 
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whom the crime is committed, whilst paragraph 2 sought to define what actually 
constitutes an act of aggression. Using terminology found in the various suggested 
proposals, paragraph 1 stipulated that an act of aggression "by its character, gravity 
and scale, constitutes a flagrant violation" of the UN Charter. This was then followed 
by three options, the first of which suggested as an example, but did not limit it to, "a 
war of aggression or an act which has the object or result of establishing a military 
occupation of, or annexing, the territory of another State or part thereof, whereas the 
second option detailed the same examples, but declared that the action had to amount 
to them. The third option provided for neither of the above suggestions. Debate within 
the SWGCA has focused on the phrase "character, gravity and scale", as well as the 
364 
use of the word "flagrant" for the threshold condition. Whilst reiterating support for 
the existence of a threshold condition, discussions have revolved around whether 
'flagrant' is the correct term to use, or whether 'manifest', which had been used in 
various WGCA proposals, is more appropriate. Even though it has been stressed that 
365 
both terms are "uncertain and difficult to distinguish in substance", there appears to 
be a general tendency to prefer the term 'manifest' over 'flagrant'.^^^ 
Whilst the Chairman's updated paper of 2007 attempts to follow the structure of the 
2002 version, new options for the definition of the crime and reference to the 
collective act are of some note. Paragraph 1 now contains two options, although this 
reflects developments with regards to the role of the individual rather than the act of 
367 
the collective. This is then followed by two alternative ways of describing the 
collective act: 
which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of 
the Charter of the United Nations 
OR 
364 
2006 Princeton Report, para(18)-(20). 
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See: Chapter 3(3)(l)(c)(ii). 
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such as, in particular, a war of aggression or an act which has the object or 
result of establishing a military occupation of, or annexing, the territory of 
another State or part thereof. 
It is the opinion of this author that the second alternative is the more appropriate 
formulation for the collective act of the crime of aggression. It clearly respects the 
precedents established in customary international law, and prevents the Court from 
being asked to investigate controversial instances of the use of force by States. That 
being said, this author is fully aware that this formulation is not acceptable to some 
States, and may never be so. If the first option is the formula chosen, it is better than 
some of the proposals that have been submitted to the WGCA. In my opinion 
however, it is still not good enough to satisfy the requirements of the Court. It is 
arguably an abstract definition that does not sufficiently satisfy the requirement of 
nullum crimen sine lege. 
(i)Reference to General Assembly Resolution 3314 in the Court's Definition of 
the Crime: 
Paragraph 2 of both the 2002 Discussion Paper and the revised 2007 version 
stipulated that Resolution 3314 is the source of reference for determining what 'acts 
of aggression' are. In the 2002 Paper, paragraph 1 used the term 'act of aggression' in 
its terminology describing the collective act, but the revised paper provided an option 
between either 'act of aggression' or 'armed attack'. This is a result of discussions 
that have taken place at the Inter-sessional meetings as to how the notion of use of 
368 
force should be referred to in the definition. Unaided by the fact that even the UN 
369 
Charter uses a variety of terms, no agreement or conclusion has, as yet, been 
reached. It is the suggestion here that the phrase 'act of aggression' should be 
retained. This would coincide with the reference to the General Assembly resolution 
in paragraph 2, which speaks of an 'act of aggression' rather than 'use of force'. 
As previously mentioned, one has to be careful when using Resolution 3314 in the 
context of a criminal prosecution of an individual. By including a generic reference to 
368 
2006 Princeton Report, para(14)-(17). 
369 
See: Articles 2(4), 39 and 51. 
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Resolution 3314,^^° the definition of the crime of aggression is acknowledging the 
only universally accepted definition of the State act that exists in international law, to 
support the reference made to the notion in paragraph 1. This in no way alters the 
threshold of criminality nor supports the argument that lesser forms of violence may 
result in criminal prosecutions.^^' 
(f) Additional points about the Definition of the Collective Act: 
There are two additional points that should be clarified before the attention of this 
thesis turns to the provisions detailing the role of the individual in the crime of 
aggression. 
(/) The Role of Non-State Actors in Aggression: 
Criticism has been made of the provisions detailing the crime of aggression because 
of the fact that they are not applicable to non-State actors. Schuster believes it is 
surprising that this class of potential criminals has been excluded from the Court's 
jurisdiction, "considering that aggressive actions of non-State forces possess the 
potential to threaten the political stability, if not the independence, of States just as 
372 
much as those of traditional 'State actors' do". He argues that even though 
international law traditionally deals with relations between States, the Court is a body 
that prosecutes individuals regardless of their official position. Although he views it 
as a potential shortcoming of the Statute, Dawson makes the point that actors such as 
terrorists, non-State parties and individuals that act contrary to the beliefs of the State 
373 
itself, will be immune from prosecution because the crime of aggression only 
370 
The 2006 Inter-sessional meeting saw discussion over whether the reference to Resolution 3314 
should be of a generic nature, including whether there should be reference to all or just parts of the 
Resolution, or whether an enumerative reproduction of certain parts should be included in the 
definition. The majority expressed a preference for the generic formulation, although the matter of 
whether it should refer to the entire Resolution or just parts of it still requires further debate. It is the 
opinion of this author that selecting only certain sections of the Resolution would not only go against 
the explicit sentiments of the Resolution (Article 8), but would also cause lengthy and complicated 
debates that are avoidable within the S W G C A . 
Stancu, supra note250 argues that for determining the existence of aggression, Resolution 3314 is 
the most appropriate tool. 
Schuster, supra note5, p23. 
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Peirce, supra note245, p289. 
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374 
accommodates the prosecution of the 'political and military' leaders of a State. 
Schuster concludes that: 
The "State" approach to the definitions is therefore extremely deplorable, 
especially when taking into account that a majority of the conflicts after the 
Second World War were not fought between States but were of an internal 
375 
nature. 
Whilst these criticisms do make an interesting point, they ignore the fact that 
international law does not recognize the commission of aggression by non-State actors 
as a punishable aspect of the crime of aggression. The crime of aggression only 
constitutes participation in an act by one State against another State. 
There is no evidence in customary law for extending the crime to acts 
committed by individual mercenaries not sponsored by a State, or committed 
by a State against minorities within its own territory, even though the 
devastation caused by such acts may be comparable to inter-State military 
376 
intervention. 
(ii) An Attempt to Commit Aggression by the State: 
The second point that has been the focus of some international debate is the question 
of whether an attempt to commit aggression by the State can be classified as a 
criminal act or not.^ The notion is rejected out of hand by the majority of 
commentators because of the common assumption that the crime of aggression 
374 
Dawson, supra note76, p444. He concludes that by not including this group of potential 
perpetrators, any potential 'deterrent threat' the definition might have had will be severely curtailed. 
Schuster, supra note5, p23. 
376 
Cryer et al., supra note276, p273. It is worth noting that Just because the crime of aggression does 
not include non-State actors in its definition, it does not mean that such individuals will be afforded 
immunity for their actions. There is a high probability that the crimes they commit will be covered by 
other provisions of the Rome Statute. 
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The question of 'attempt' was not reflected in the 2002 Discussion Paper because it only arose out 
of the 2005 inter-sessional meeting's discussions on whether an individual could attempt to commit the 
crime of aggression. See: Chapter3(3)(l)(c)(i). 
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378 
requires the completed act of aggression. That being said, arguments have been put 
379 
forward in the SWGCA in support of the proposal. It is advised here that to include 
attempts to commit an act of aggression would not only broaden the crime beyond that 
which is found in customary international law, but it could also potentially cause 
380 
serious evidential problems for the Court - bar explicit evidence or a statement to 
381 
the fact, it would be exceptionally hard to prove that the 'attempted' aggression was 
exactly that, and not an attempted act of self-defence or other form of legitimate inter-
State force. 
3. The Crime of Aggression - Defining the Conduct of the Individual; 
This next section focuses on the provisions of the definition that relate to the role the 
individual plays in the commission of the crime. Firstly, attention is given to the 
material or actus reus elements of the offence. This involves a review of the relevant 
provisions of the Rome Statute concerned with participation in a crime as well as 
provisions that are not compatible with the crime of aggression. Secondly, the 
question of the mens rea is addressed. Finally, attention is given to the proposed 
'Elements of Crimes' provisions. 
1. Material Elements of the Crime: 
(a) The Nexus between the State act and the Criminal Responsibility of the 
Individual; 
It has already been clearly established that the crime of aggression involves both an 
act of State and an act committed by an individual. However, the actus reus of the 
crime of aggression is not the act of aggression as committed by the State but rather 
382 
the conduct of the individual in the unlawful use of force by the State. Under the 
378 
Cryer et al., supra note276, p263. Furthermore, attempted aggression was not included in the I M T 
or I M T F E Charters, and Resolution 3314 does not contemplate an 'attempted aggression'. 
379 
2006 Princeton Report, para(37). 
380 
Clark, supra note247, p884, provides the example of "troops [...] massed at the border but bombed 
into oblivion before they can move". 
381 
Such as Hitler's 'Mein K a m p f . 
382 
Antonopolous, supra note 157, p61. He also provides an interesting discussion about exactly where 
criminality lies, whether it is the initial act of the State and therefore making the individual's action just 
84 
IMT and IMTFE Charters, criminal liability was incurred through 'planning, 
383 
preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression'. Apart from replacing the 
word 'waging' with 'executing', the same formula has been adopted by the 2002 
384 
Coordinator's Paper, as well as the 2007 Chairman's Paper. 
The proscribed acts of the offence are essentially orientated towards the development 
stages of the crime (as required by the ratione personae limitations of the offence), 
from the planning to preparation to initiating and finally waging a war of aggression. 
The precedent established at Nuremberg makes it clear that participation after the war 
of aggression has begun suffices to establish criminal liability, under the notion of 
385 
waging." Aldnough Donitz's conviction was criticized for the fact that the defendant 
had no opportunity to stop the war, the conviction was correct due to the fact that the 
defendant "was part of the overall plan of aggressive war at the highest levels and 
386 
worsened the existing wrong". Furthermore, because the crime of aggression 
requires the completed act, the 'planning, preparation or ordering' of an act of 
aggression should be criminalized only when the attack actually takes place. 
(b) The Perpetrators of the Crime of Aggression: 
A further unique characteristic of the crime of aggression is that it has a limited 
ratione personae. It was made explicitly clear at Nuremberg that the crime of 
aggression is a leadership crime, capable of being perpetrated only by the leaders and 
387 
the high-level policy makers of the aggressive State.' This is one of the most 
uncontroversial aspects of this crime and has been unanimously accepted by the 
388 
delegates of the WGCA and SWGCA. The provisions relating to this aspect of the 
complicity in what is already a criminal act, or whether the act of the State is a precondition to the 
individual committing a separate, albeit simultaneous, crime, pp36-40. 
383 
In addition, conspiracy to wage a war of aggression was criminalized but it was treated in very 
much the same way as 'planning and preparation' by the I M T , and has "gained no independent 
significance", (Werle, supra notel54, p391). Brownlie, supra note9, p201, is highly critical of the 
charge and even more so of the unsatisfactory manner in which the I M T F E handled it, (p203). 
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The conviction of Donitz for crimes against peace was based on his participation in the waging of 
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note96, p507. See Historical Overview, supra note9, pp36-37. 
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See: Chapter 2(2)(b)(iii) 
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crime do not have to detail the exact positions that are to be held by the defendant 
within the State, but rather the actual role that he or she played in the direction and 
389 
control of the relevant acts. This is clearly reflected in both the various proposals 
390 
that were submitted to the WGCA as well as in paragraph 1 of the 2002 
Coordinator's Paper, which criminalizes a person's behavior only if he or she was "in 
a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military 
action of a State". The same criterion is used in both Variant A and Variant B of the 
2007 Chairman's Paper. The insertion of the word 'effectively' was a positive 
addition by the Coordinator, as it clarified that only those individuals who played an 
active role in the State act will be liable for criminal punishment, excluding those 
people who have no influence over the actual events, but who hold positions the come 
within the remit of the ratione personae, such as figureheads of State. Whether this 
phrase wil l incorporate the sorts of defendants that were tried under CCL No. 10 will 
391 
be a matter for the discretion of the judiciary at the ICC. 
The above two conclusions are relatively uncontroversial and clearly supported by 
customary international law. For an individual to be held accountable for the crime of 
aggression, he or she must be a military or political leader, or someone in a position to 
influence the policy of the State, who actively takes part in the direction of that policy 
through planning, preparing, initiating or executing the collective act. 
(c) Making the Crime of Aggression Compatible with the Provisions of the Rome 
Statute: 
In departing from the Statutes of ICTY and ICTR as well as the 1994 Draft Statute, 
the Rome Statute contains a separate part dedicated to 'General Principles of Criminal 
389 
Gaja, supra note270, p437. Critical of this approach, Schuster, supra noteS, p33, states that 
"unfortunately, this does not help in determining (in clear legal terms) who would fall under this 
category". 
390 
Based on the proposal submitted by Egypt and Italy in 1997, (UN Doc. 
A/AC.249/1997AVG.1/DP.6), the proposals made by Germany, (UN Doc. PCNICC/ i999 /DP.13) and 
Bahrain and others, (UN Doc. PCNICC/1999/DP. 11) considered as criminally liable only individuals 
"in a position of exercising control or capable of directing the political or military action of a State". 
The I L C Draft Code of Crimes used the phrase "leaders or organisers", see: Chapter2(3)(a)(ii). 
See: Chapter 2(2)(b)(iv) 
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Law'. Part 3 was an attempt by the delegates at the Rome Conference to delimit the 
393 
possible exercise of judicial discretion, as it directs the Court on issues such as 
criminal participation, the requisite mental elements and the availability of various 
defences. To maintain consistency throughout the Statute, the provisions relating to 
the crime of aggression have to be 'fitted into' the ICC regime with as little 
394 
disturbance as possible to the overall working of the Statute. That being said, there 
are certain provisions that are not compatible with the crime of aggression. Paragraph 
3 of the 2002 Coordinator's Paper suggested excluding "the provisions of Articles 25, 
paragraph 3, 28 and 33 of the Statute" from being applicable, since they were not 
deemed to fi t with the preliminary definition contained in paragraph 1. Whilst the 
395 
exclusion of Article 28 and 33 has caused little controversy, the exclusion of Article 
25(3) has resulted in lengthy debates within the SWGCA and resulted in the majority 
of the amendments seen in the 2007 Chairman's Paper. They wil l now each be 
addressed in turn. 
(i) Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute: 
Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute states that: 
In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and 
liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that 
person: 
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another 
or through another person, regardless of whether that person is criminally 
responsible; 
(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in 
fact occurs or is attempted; 
392 
The general principles of law contained in Part 3 of the Statute are default rules that apply unless 
expressly or impliedly excluded. See: Clark, supra note247, pp864-865. 
393 
Schabas, supra note234. 
394 
Clark, supra note247, p883 
395 
It was made clear at the 2004 inter-sessional meeting that Articles 28 & 33 are excluded because of 
the fact that the crime of aggression is a leadership crime and they do not fit with this material element 
of the crime. Informal inter-sessional meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of 
Aggression, held at the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Woodrow Wilson School, 
Princeton University, New Jersey, United States, from 21 to 23 June 2004. I C C - A S P / 3 / S W G C A / I N F . 1, 
p9, (hereinafter 2004 Princeton Report). 
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(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, 
abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, 
including providing the means for its commission; 
(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted 
commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common 
purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either: 
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal 
purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission 
of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or 
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the 
crime: 
(e) In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others 
to commit genocide; 
(f) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its 
execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime doe not occur because 
of circumstances independent of the person's intentions. However, a person 
who abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevents the 
completion of the crime shall not be liable for punishment under this Statute 
for the attempt to commit that crime if that person completely and voluntarily 
gave up the criminal purpose. 
I) Subparagraphs (a) -(d) of Article 25(3) - Decrees of Participation: 
Article 25(3)(a) - (d) deals in quite complex detail with what is often called 
396 
'accomplice' or 'secondary' liability. Its clash with the crime of aggression arises' 
over the fact that the suggested definition already uses its own set of verbs detailing 
397 
the conduct of the individual - "orders" or "participates". Accordingly, "trying to 
398 
mesh the two would only be a recipe for confusion". 
396 
See generally: Werle, supra note 154, Part 2; Cassese, supra notel 15, Chap.9; Cryer et al., supra 
note276, Chap. 15. 
397 
Paragraph 1 of the 2002 Coordinator's Paper. 
398 
Clark, supra note247, p884, advocates for Article 25(3)(a)-(d) to be excluded from the remit of the 
crime of aggression. 
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The 2002 Coordinator's Paper, by advocating for the removal of Article 25(3), 
399 
adopted what has been termed the monistic approach to the crime of aggression. In 
following the Nuremberg precedent, the Coordinator's Paper adopted a straight 
forward approach to defining the individual conduct giving rise to international 
criminal responsibility for the crime of aggression, and consequently usurped the 
default rules of participation contained in Article 25(3). Whilst the 2004 inter-
sessional in Washington saw a discussion of the relationship between Article 25(3) 
400 
and the crime of aggression, it was not until the 2005 inter-sessional that serious 
401 
debate on this point occurred. 
A number of suggestions were made supporting the application of Article 25 to the 
crime of aggression. In particular, proponents of the idea felt that by doing so, the 
crime of aggression would be brought into line with the other crimes under the 
402 
Statute. Whilst the suggestion that the issue should be left to the 'Elements' was 
403 
rejected, it was generally acknowledged that by not accepting the applicability of 
404 
Article 25(3), one could potentially risk excluding a certain group of perpetrators. 
The meeting ended with the general agreement that instead of including the conditions 
for individual criminal responsibility within the definition itself, it might be preferable 
405 
to keep the definition of the crime rather narrow. As a result, a proposal was 
introduced that amended the 2002 Coordinator's Paper to reflect the inclusion of the 
406 
applicability of Article 25(3)(a)-(d). This proposal acknowledged that there were 
three principle components to what is called for convenience sake, the differentiated 
407 
approach. The first component is the recognition that Article 25(3)(a)-(d) applies to 
399 
This approach has been termed the monistic approach because it doesn't distinguish between the 
commission of the crime on the one hand (25(3)(a)) and ordering etc (25(3)(b)) or aiding etc (25(3)(c)) 
such a commission on the other hand. 
400 
2004 Princeton Report, para(37)-(53). 
401 
2005 Princeton Report, para(18)-(32). 
402 
2006 Princeton Report, para(84). 
403 
Ibid, para(28). It was felt that it was crucial to seek a solution in the primary text and not to leave it 
to the Elements. 
404 
Ibid, para(22). See also: 2005 Princeton Report, para(22). 
Ibid, para(3l). 
406 
Annex I, 2005 Princeton Report. 
7 
2005 Princeton Report, para{19). 
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the crime of aggression, whilst the second qualifies this with a proposed new sub-
408 
paragraph (e) bis to be inserted into Article 25(3), which would read: 
In respect of the crime of aggression, only persons being in a position 
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action 
409 
of the State shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment. 
The third component of the differentiated approach identifies the fact that the 
description of the conduct element of the crime in the crime's definition would have 
to be clarified. 
Prior to the fourth session of the ASP, a Discussion Paper was published that 
attempted to explore these issues and highlighted the areas that needed further 
410 
discussion. Whilst this Paper begins by acknowledging the tendency at the 2005 
inter-sessional to move away from the monistic approach, it makes it explicitly clear 
411 
that debate has not yet reached the point where it could be abandoned. 
The first problem that the Discussion Paper addresses is that of the differentiated 
approach's third component, clarifying that " i f Article 25, paragraph 3 (a) to (d) of the 
Statute is to apply to the crime of aggression, it must be defined what it means that an 
412 
individual commits such a crime", and suggesting that once the notion of 
commission is defined, it will be possible to ascertain what it means when a person 
413 414 
has ordered or has aidedin the commission of such a crime. The person who 
commits a crime is often called the principal perpetrator. Therefore, to complete the 
differentiated approach, the definition of what a principal perpetrator of the crime of 
aggression actually does needs to be established. However, any definition of such 
conduct must take into account two aspects of the crime of aggression. Firstly, the 
Modelled on sub-paragraph (e), which refers to the specific crime of inciting genocide. 
409 
Annex I of the 2005 Report, pi9 . 
410 
Discussion Paper 1. 
411 
See: 2006 Princeton Report, para(84). 
412 
Discussion Paper I , Part A(III)( l)(a) , relating to the use of the term "commits" in Article 25(3)(a). 
Article 25(3)(b) 
Article 25(3)(c) 
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underlying collective act is not broken down in a list of possible individual types of 
conducts, as is the case with the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity. No 
individual perpetrator can commit an act of aggression without making use of other 
individuals belonging to the State apparatus, (the most obvious example being 
members of a country's armed forces). Following this understanding, the Discussion 
Paper proposes, "a principal perpetrator of the crime of aggression would be an 
individual who, in respect of the actual use of armed force, acts through many other 
415 
persons under his/her control". Secondly, due to the leadership characteristic of the 
crime of aggression every participant in the crime must "be in a position effectively to 
exercise control over or to direct the military action of a State" to incur criminal 
responsibility. The differentiated approach must therefore formulate a criterion to 
distinguish between two types of leaders: those who commit the crime (the principal 
perpetrator) and those who participate in the crime in one of the other forms of 
416 
participation listed in Article 25(3)(b)-(d). 
Incorporated into the 2005 proposal were two suggestions for describing the conduct 
of the principal perpetrator in the definition of the crime of aggression: 
Proposal A: 
For the purpose of the present Statute, a person commits a 'crime of 
aggression' when, being in a position effectively to exercise control over or to 
direct the political or military action of a State, that person participates 
• , • r . 4 1 7 
actively m an act of aggression ... 
Proposal B: 
415 
Discussion Paper 1, Part A(III)(] )(a). It is noted that this type of principal perpetrator is not 
unknown to Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute. 
416 
Ibid. 
417 
An updated Proposal Paper was submitted at the 2006 inter-sessional meeting, (Annex 1, 2006 
Princeton Report). Proposal A of the updated version contained a variety of alternative words and 
phrases for describing the conduct of the principal perpetrator such as "leads", "directs", "organizes 
and/or directs" and "engages in". 
For the purpose of this Statute, 'crime of aggression' means engaging a State, 
when being in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the 
418 
political or military action of that State, in ... 
Both terms attempt to capture the specificity of the principle perpetrator of the crime 
of aggression, and although there is little difference in substance between the two of 
them, it is submitted here that the term 'directs' is preferential to 'engages'. This is 
simply for the fact that 'directs' captures the essence of what the principal perpetrator 
419 
does slightly more so than the notion of 'engages'. Debate at the 2006 inter-
sessional also suggested that the conduct verb 'lead' be introduced, to underline the 
leadership role of the principal perpetrator. It was argued that this would be the most 
accurate description of the conduct of the leader, and that the verb 'leads' could 
ideally be combined with the existing phrase "the planning, preparation, initiation or 
420 
execution of an act of aggression". However, it was also noted that this option 
might be too narrow and only include a head of State or Government as principal 
perpetrator. Whilst 'leads' is still a better suggestion than 'engages', this author feels 
that 'directs' is still the most appropriate term, as it fully encompasses the conduct of 
the principal perpetrator in the crime of aggression. 
There was also a discussion at the 2006 inter-sessional as to whether the phrase 
"planning, preparation, initiation or execution" should be retained or deleted. Those in 
favor of deletion put forward the argument that they are essentially contained in the 
forms of participation under Article 25(3), and retaining them might blur the 
418 
Proposal B of the updated proposal suggested "directing", "organizing and/or directing" and 
"engaging a State/the armed forces of other organs of a State in" as alternatives for the definition of the 
conduct element. During debate at the 2006 meeting it was argued that the terms "organize and direct", 
"direct" and "order" were preferable, as it was language commonly found in counter-terrorism 
conventions, and therefore might be more established in the context of criminal law, over the less 
common term "engage", (para(89)). Furthermore, Proposal B departed from the model adopted in the 
2002 Coordinator's Paper and the 2007 Chairman's Paper in an attempt to bring the definition of the 
crime of aggression in line with the other crimes under the I C C Statute. Instead of using the phrase 
"For the purposes of the present Statute, a person commits a 'crime of aggression' . . .", Proposal B 
suggested that the definition of the crime of aggression should be "For the purposes of the present 
Statute, 'crime of aggression' means..." Although this is an interesting modification, for the purposes 
of conformity with the proposals put forward, the 'traditional' model is preferred by this author. 
419 
The concern was raised at the S W G C that the phrase "engages" is not commonly used in 
international law adds further weight to this argument. 
420 
2006 Princeton Report, para(91). Although there was initial support for this proposal, it was 
suggested that it needed being explored further. 
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distinction between the primary and other perpetrators. However, other participants 
preferred to retain the phrase. It was noted that this phrase reflected the typical 
features of aggression as a leadership crime, and its retention in the text would 
highlight the criminalized conduct, respecting the principle of nullum crimen sine 
lege. In addition, the phrase is part of the recognized customary international law on 
the crime of aggression. Whilst it is clear that this is an area which requires greater 
422 
attention and further debate in the SWGCA, the lack of agreement about whether to 
423 
retain or abandon the provision means that at the moment it should not be removed. 
The above discussion clearly shows that the crime of aggression can f i t into the 
regime provided by the Rome Statute with regards to Article 25(3). Although this is 
an area that would benefit from further deliberation, the proposed differentiated 
approach can and should be applied in the definition of the crime of aggression. The 
proposal also has an immediate appeal because it supports that aim of equal treatment 
between all of the core crimes under the Court's jurisdiction. 
2) Subparagraph ( f ) of Article 25(3) - Attempt to Commit a Crime: 
As part of the debate over the applicability of Article 25(3), the question as to whether 
424 
an attempt to commit aggression is a criminal offence or not was also raised. In 
reality however, this involves two sub-questions: firstly, regarding the act of the 
individual, whether actual participation in the collective act was needed or whether an 
425 
attempt at participating could suffice, and secondly, in relation to the collective act, 
whether it was necessary for the collective act to have been completed or whether an 
426 
attempt could also classify. 
It has already been established that an attempt to commit the collective act is not a 
criminal offence, because the crime of aggression requires the completed act. The 
421 
2006 Princeton Report, para(92). 
Ibid, para(85)-(86). 
423 
The principle difference between the two revised proposals included in Annex I of the 2006 
Princeton Report was the inclusion of the phrase 'planning, preparation, initiation or execution' in 
proposal A and its deletion in proposal B . 
424 
2005 Princeton Report, paras(33)-(43). 
'^^ Ibid, para(35). 
426 
Ibid, para(34). 
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question of whether the individual act can be attempted, however, rests very much on 
one's choice of model for detailing the conduct of the individual. The exclusion of 
Article 25(3)(f) of the Statute is more appropriate with the 'monistic' approach due to 
the fact that litterae (b) to (d) of Article 25(3) all refer to the "attempted commission" 
of the crime, presupposing that the attempt to commit the crime is, in fact, 
criminalized. If Article 25(3)(a)-(d) are excluded from the Statute, Article 25(3)(f) 
would be without a point of reference. If the differentiated approach is adopted, 
however, then the question that has to be resolved is whether international law allows 
for an attempted individual act of participation in a completed collective act to be a 
criminal offence. Whilst such cases of attempt remain rather theoretical in nature, 
427 
there appears to be a general acceptance for the retention of Article 25(3)(f). Whilst 
this issue would benefit from further discussion, the 2007 Chairman's Paper proposes 
that the provision does not apply to the crime of aggression. 
(//") Article 28 - Responsibility of Commanders and Other Superiors: 
428 
Article 28 of the Rome Statute introduces the notion of command responsibility, 
connecting military and other superiors to the actions of those under their control. 
However, the crime of aggression, universally recognized as a leadership crime, 
contains its own structure for assessing the relationship between the accused and the 
429 
events in question in its very definition. Therefore, the general provisions of Article 
28 are not applicable to the crime of aggression as they are trumped by the specific 
430 
reference to such conduct in the crime's definition. Based on the debate within the 
SWGCA, the Chairman's Paper questions whether this needs to be explicitly referred 
to in the Court's definition. 
(///) Article 33 - Superior Orders and Prescription of Law: 
427 
Clark, supra note247, p884, notes that whilst such cases for prosecution would be unlikely, the kind 
of attempts that would be contemplated are those where the actor tries to contribute to the 'planning, 
preparation, initiation or waging' of an aggression that takes place, but he or she fails in the effort to 
contribute. It is worth noting here however, that the 2007 Chairman's Paper advocates for Article 
25(3)(f) not to be applicable to the crime of aggression. 
428 
See: Cassese, supra notel 15, Chap. 10.4; 2004 Princeton Report, para(58)-(63); 2005 Princeton 
Report, para(44)-(46). 
429 
Clark, supra note274, p885. 
430 
Article 28 is applicable to the other three crimes under the Court's jurisdiction because they do not 
contain such a provision in their definitions. 
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Article 33 of the Rome Statute relates to the defence of Superior Orders. 'Superior 
Orders' is a defence in situations where the accused was under a legal obligation to 
obey, did not know the order was unlawful, and the order was not manifestly 
432 
unlawful. However, this defence appears to be limited to war crimes, as paragraph 2 
states that "orders to commit genocide or crimes against humanity are manifestly 
unlawful". Clark argues that there is no policy reason for extending this defence to 
aggression and adds that in the case of a genuine mistake on the part of the defendant, 
433 
adequate protection is afforded under Article 32. Furthermore, the prevailing view 
434 
of the SWGCA deems Article 33 to be inapplicable to the crime of aggression, and 
therefore the suggestion made in paragraph 3 of the 2002 Coordinator's Paper should 
435 
be maintained. It is also worth noting that the revised version of the 2002 Paper 
removes the explicit reference to Article 33 in its new paragraph 3. 
2. Mental Elements of the Crime: 
(a) Article 30 - Mental Element: 
Customary international law makes it clear that the planning, preparation, initiation or 
436 
waging of an aggressive war must be committed intentionally. This is also satisfied 
where the perpetrator had knowledge of the collective intent to initiate or wage 
437 
aggressive war and continued to participate in the commission of the collective act. 
For proof of the mental element, the IMT relied primarily on the fact that the 
defendants had acted despite being thoroughly informed of Hitler's plans.^ ^^ 
431 
See: Cassese, supra notel 15, Chap. 13.1 
Article 33(l)(a)-(c). 
433 
Clark, supra note247, p885. 
434 
2005 Princeton Report, para(46). 
An alternative possibility is suggested by Dinstein, supra note9, pi26, in that Article 33(2) should 
be amended to exclude the defence of superior orders for the crime of aggression as well. Doubts about 
this suggestion have been raised in the S W G C A however (2004 Princeton Report, para(61), arguing 
that an order to "commit aggression" would rarely be given in practice, as well as the suggestion that 
such an order might not necessarily be "manifestly unlawful". 
436 
Dinstein, supra note9, pi24; The I L C in its commentary on Article 16 the Draft Code noted that: 
(3) The mere material fact of participating in an act of aggression is, however, not enough to 
establish the guilt of a leader or organizer. Such participation must have been intentional and 
have taken place knowingly as part of a plan or policy of aggression. 
437 
Cryer et al., supra note276, p274. 438 
Nuremberg Judgment, supra note96, pp425; 489; 491; 495; 499; 507; 523; 526. 
95 
Regarding the defendant Schacht who had at relevant periods been President to the 
Reichsbank and the central figure in Germany's rearmament program, the Tribunal 
stipulated that "the case against Schacht... depends on the inference that Schacht did 
439 
in fact know of the Nazi aggressive plans". The same was said in the case against 
Bormann, who held a great influence over Hitler. He was acquitted of the charge of 
crimes against peace because the Court could not show that he knew of the Nazi's 
aggressive plans and the fact that he had not attended the four crucial planning 
440 
meetings. 
Article 30(1) of the Rome Statute provides the default rule with respect to the mental 
element of crimes: 
Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable 
for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only i f the 
441 
material elements are committed with intent and knowledge. 
Commonly described as animus aggressionis, there is no substantive difference 
between the mens rea of the crime of aggression and that of the other crimes under the 
Rome Statute. Paragraph 1 of the 2002 Coordinator's Paper contained the phrase 
442 443 
"intentionally and knowingly", although this has now been deleted. There is no 
need to make an amendment here as it is generally felt that the default rule of Article 
444 
30 is enough to satisfy the mens rea requirements of the crime of aggression. 
Furthermore, this keeps to the preferred method of equal treatment for all the crimes 
under the Court's jurisdiction. Finally, lowering the threshold of the crime to the level 
439 
Ibid, p506. Schacht was acquitted because the Court could not find the evidence that he knew of the 
^vernment's political plans, (p501). See: Cassese, supra notel 15, pi 15. 
Ibid, p527. See Chapter 2(2)(b)(iii) 
441 
Article 31(2) and (3) clarify what 'intent' and 'knowledge' mean. See: Clark, R., 2001. The Mental 
Element in International Criminal Law: The Rome Statute of The International Criminal Court and the 
Elements of Offences. C L F . Vol. 12, pp291-334. 
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See: Clark, supra note247. 
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2004 Princeton Report, para(56). 
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Gaja, supra note270, p438. 
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445 
of recklessness would broaden the scope of the offence beyond that which is 
stipulated by customary international law. 
3. Elements: 
Resolution F of the Rome Conference instructed the PrepComm to "prepare proposals 
for a provision on aggression, including the definition and Elements of Crimes of 
aggression . . ." The Elements of Crimes is one of the least discussed aspects of this 
task by both the WGCA and the SWGCA. At the tenth session of the WGCA it 
occurred to the Samoan delegation that the question of the Elements should not pass 
entirely unnoticed with the impending demise of the PrepComm, and submitted a 
comprehensive proposal which included a list of suggested Elements plus 
446 
commentary. It was hoped that the proposal might shed some light on the technical 
aspects of the definition of the crime of aggression and the conditions for the exercise 
447 
of jurisdiction. Whilst the Elements of Crimes are not intended to introduce new 
aspects of the crime, they are intended to stipulate and clarify the basic elements of 
the offence. 
They are the building blocks of the 'crime'. A prosecutor who fails to establish 
any one of those elements has failed to overcome the 'presumption of 
448 
innocence'. 
The 2002 Coordinator's Paper contained a set of elements that were fundamentally 
449 
based on the suggestions contained in the Samoan document. Discussion of these 
Elements has not occurred during the SWGCA's deliberations, and therefore they 
450 
have been reproduced without any change in the 2007 Chairman's Paper. 
445 
As invoked by Horgan-Doran and Ginkel, supra note232, p337. See also: pp348-9. 
446 
"Elements of the Crime of Aggression, Proposal Submitted by Samoa", UN Doc. 
PCN1CC/2002AVGCA/DP.2 
447 
Ibid, para(l). 
448 
Clark, supra note435, p312. The 'presumption of innocence' is found in Article 66(2) Rome Statute. 
449 
Although a footnote to the provision made it clear that they had not been thoroughly discussed by 
the W G C A . See: Schuster, supra note5, p32. 
450 
Footnote 6 of the Chairman's Paper recognises the fact that these Elements have not been discussed 
and that reproducing them as they are leads to some obvious inconsistencies: "The Elements therefore 
mainly serve the purpose of a placeholder, at this juncture of the debate." 
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A final point to note is the inclusion of a 'Precondition' in the 2002 Coordinator's 
Paper, as replicated in the 2007 Chairman's Paper. This clearly reflects the common 
understanding that a prior determination of an act of aggression, however determined, 
is required for a prosecution of the crime of aggression to commence, something 
which is discussed further in the following Chapter. 
CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS; 
Based on the above discussion, this author proposes the following definition of the 
crime of aggression for the purposes of the Rome Statute: 
1. For the purpose of the present Statute, a person commits a "crime of 
aggression" when, being in a position effectively to exercise control over or to 
direct the political or military act of a State, that person directs the planning, 
preparation, initiation or execution of an act of aggression, such as, in 
particular, a war of aggression or an act which has the object or result of 
establishing a military occupation of, or annexing, the territory of another 
State or part thereof. 
2. For the puipose of paragraph 1, "act of aggression" means an act referred to 
in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 
December 1974. 
3. The provisions of Articles 25(3)(f), [28] and [33] of the Statute do not apply 
to the crime of aggression. 
The analysis undertaken in this Chapter explains in detail this author's reasons for 
deliberately choosing the exact terminology for the proposed definition above. As 
argued at section 2(b) of this Chapter, a generic definition is preferred over an 
enumerative one because it provides "an overall framework that will be applicable to 
varying circumstances". A generic definition provides the ICC, an organ designed to 
punish those acts which have not yet occurred, with the flexibility to effectively 
respond to new and as yet undetermined methods of war. 
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In recognizing the unique features of the crime of aggression, paragraph 1 of this 
author's proposed definition includes reference to both the collective act by the State 
and the actions of the individual. In accordance with both the 2007 updated 
Discussion Paper as well as clearly established customary international law (as 
detailed at section 2(e) of this Chapter), the correct formulation for the collective act 
of aggression by the State and the necessary threshold condition that must exist in any 
definition is that incorporated above, namely: 
"such as, in particular, a war of aggression or an act which has the object or 
result of establishing a military occupation of, or annexing, the territory of 
another State or part thereof. 
Furthermore, although unacceptable to some delegates, such a threshold condition has 
the legitimate result of excluding from the Court's consideration those acts of force 
which, although potentially regarded as technical violations of the prohibition on the 
use of force, are in fact designed and instigated in order to protect civilians or prevent 
grave atrocities, such as the notion of humanitarian intervention. They, by their very 
nature, lack the aggressive aim required for the collective act of the crime of 
aggression. 
In detailing the role that the individual is required to play in the commission of the 
collective act, paragraph 1 of this author's proposed definition uses the well 
established and uncontroversial phrase "planning, preparation, initiation or execution" 
to describe the actus reus elements of this offence (see section 3(1 )(a) of this 
Chapter). Furthermore, the generally accepted understanding that the crime of 
aggression is a leadership crime necessarily dictates that the ratione personae should 
be limited to those leaders and high-level policy makers who play an actual role in the 
direction and orchestration of the relevant acts. Therefore, the notion that a person's 
behavior is criminal if he or she was "in a position effectively to exercise control over 
or to direct the political or military act of a State", adequately represents the 
international understanding of this aspect to the crime (see section 3(1 )(b)). Finally, in 
accordance with Proposal A as well as the arguments made in support of this 
linguistic choice (see section 3(l)(c)(i)), this author prefers the use of the word 
'directs' when categorizing the manner in which an individual acts in the commission 
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of an act of aggression. This is because 'directs' captures the essence of what the 
principal perpetrator actually does more so that the other alternatives which have been 
suggested. 
Paragraph 2 of the proposed definition includes a generic reference to Resolution 
3314 for the purpose of understanding the reference to the term "act of aggression" in 
paragraph 1. Resolution 3314 contains the only universally acknowledged and 
accepted definition of the State act in international law, and is included here purely as 
a point of reference for the ICC when reviewing the existence of an act of aggression 
within a criminal prosecution for the crime (see section 2(e)(i)). 
At section 3(l)(c)( i ) - ( i i i ) of this Chapter, I have laid out the arguments regarding the 
application of certain provisions of the Rome State to the definition of the crime of 
aggression. Whilst I f i rmly believe that each of the suggestions made could benefit 
greatly f rom further discussion and debate, I have still (tentatively) made a series of 
conclusions as to how the relevant provisions should, or should not, interact with the 
crime of aggression. I have preferred to adopt the differentiated approach as put 
forward in the 2005 Princeton Report to Article 25(3)(a)-(d) of the Rome Statute. It is 
my belief that these sections of the Rome Statute can accommodate the crime of 
aggression, as long as a qualifier reconfirming that the forms of participation as 
described in Article 25(3)(a)-(d) apply only to persons who satisfy the strict ratione 
personae limitations. This qualifier should be inserted as a new Article 25{2)){&)bis 
and take the fol lowing formation: 
In respect of the crime of aggression, only persons being in a position 
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action 
of the State shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment. 
Finally, "attempt" as defined in Article 25(3)(f), the notion of command responsibility 
(Article 28) and the defence of superior orders (Article 33) are all, in this authors 
opinion, provisions in the Rome Statute that are incompatible with the present 
definition and understanding of the crime of aggression, and as such should not apply 
to any future case involving a charge of the crime of aggression. That being said, this 
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author also recognizes that these are definitely issues that would benefit f rom further 
discussion and debate. 
hi conclusion, the above analysis shows that even though it is a daunting task, a 
definition of the crime of aggression is possible. Like Roger Clark, " I do not arrive a 
451 
Schuster's drastic conclusion". However, I do caution that shortfalls in this 
definition at the drafting stage wi l l significantly hamper its effective application in the 
context of an international prosecution. By adhering to customary international law 
and working with the existing structures already provided in the Rome Statute a 
suitable definition of the crime of aggression is achievable. 
451 
Clark, supra note247. Schuster, supra noteS concludes "that it is favourable to completely remove 
the crime of aggression from the text of the Rome Statute". 
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CHAPTER 4: 
CONDITIONS FOR THE E X E R C I S E OF 
JURISDICTION OVER T H E C R I M E OF 
AGGRESSION: 
1. Introduction: 
By simply defining the crime that the individual commits, the task assigned to the 
WGCA, and by default the SWGCA, is not complete. Article 5(2) of the Rome Statute 
makes it clear that it is also necessary to establish the conditions under which the 
Court shall exercise its jurisdiction. However, this is an incredibly complex 
requirement that involves a detailed analysis of the controversial relationship between 
the political prerogatives of the Security Council and the judicial functions of the 
452 
Court. This inevitable relationship is the reason why some regard this requirement 
453 
as the most troubling obstacle to completing the work on aggression. 
Under Article 13 of the Statute the Court can currently acquire jurisdiction over a 
454 
'situation' in three separate ways: Article 13(a) stipulates that the Court can 
exercise jurisdiction where a situation is referred to it by a State Party, in accordance 
with Article 14; Article 13(b) provides that the Security Council, acting under Chapter 
V I I of the U N Charter, may refer a situation to the Prosecutor; and Article 13(c) 
allows the Prosecutor to initiate proceedings propria motu, in accordance with Article 
•'52 
Politi, M. , 2004. The Debate within the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal 
Court. In: Politi & NesI, The Crime of Aggression. p48. 
453 
Shuicri, M. , 2004. Will Aggressors Ever be Tried Before the ICC? In: Politi & Nesi, The Crime of 
Aggression, p41, states that "the real problem to establishing the crime of aggression within the 
jurisdiction of the I C C is not the definition to be applied, but is the relations between the I C C and the 
S C if the I C C ever wants to exercise its functions regarding the crime of aggression". 
454 
See: Schabas, supra note234, Chapters. 
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15. Under Article 16 however, the Security Council can temporarily suspend the 
455 
Court's jurisdiction in a particular case for a renewable period of 12 months. 
The unique nature of the crime of aggression means that it does not easily f i t within 
the alternative jurisdictional options under Article 13. This is because of the intrinsic 
relationship between the crime of aggression as perpetrated by the individual and the 
act of aggression as committed by the State. As made clear in Chapter 3, it is the State 
and not the individual that commits the act of aggression. It is widely acknowledged 
that to proceed with a case against an individual for the crime of aggression, it must 
first be established that an act of aggression has been committed by the State to which 
456 
the individual is affiliated. In the 2002 Coordinator's Paper, this need for a prior 
determination was regarded as a precondition that, in addition to those contained in 
Article 12 of the Rome Statute, had to be established before the Court could act. 
It is distinctly possible that this 'precondition' requirement has the potential to cause 
serious conflict between the Security Council and the Court. Article 39 of the U N 
Charter entrusts the Security Council with the responsibility of determining the 
existence of a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression" for the 
purposes of authorizing actions under Chapter V I I . In addition. Article 24 of the U N 
Charter makes it clear that " in order to ensure prompt and effective action by the 
United Nations" the Security Council has primary responsibility for making this 
determination. However, the Security Council, as a political body of the U N , is not 
455 
Although it was initially perceived that Article 16 would only be invoked in the rare situation where 
the Court's investigation or prosecution interfered in the SC's efforts to maintain international peace 
and security, (Wilmshurst, E . , 2001. The International Criminal Court: The Role of the Security 
Council. In: Politi & G . Nesi, ed. The Rome Statute of the ICC - A Challenge to hnpunir^>. Great 
Britain: Ashgate, p39 "cannot envisage that the Council will often be asked for a deferral under Article 
16") the provision has recently been used by opponents of the Court to protect their own nationals from 
international prosecution. See generally: Abass, A., 2005. The Competence of the Security Council to 
Terminate the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. T I L J . Vol.40, pp263-297; Zappala, S., 
2003. The Reaction of the US to the Entry into Force of the ICC Statute: Comments on UN SC 
Resolution 1422 (2002) and Article 98 Agreements. JICJ. Vol. 1, ppl 14-134; Zeidy, M . E . , 2002. The 
United States Dropped the Atomic Bomb of Article 16 of the ICC Statute: Security Council Power of 
Deferrals and Resolution 1422. V J T L . Vol. 35, ppl503-1544; Fleck, D., 2003. Are Foreign Military 
Personnel Exempt from International Criminal Jurisdiction under Status of Forces Agreements? JICJ. 
Vol. 1, pp651 -670; Jain, N., 2005. A Separate Law for Peacekeepers: The Clash Between the Security 
Council and the International Criminal Court. E J I L . Vol.16, No. 2, pp239-254; Zappala, S., 2003. Are 
Some Peacekeepers Better Than Others? UN Security Council Resolution 
1497 (2003) and the ICC. J I C J . Vol. I , pp671 -678. 
456 
Discussion Paper 3 notes that it is on this assumption that the S W G C A has based its discussion and 
that it never seems to have been challenged. 
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bound to take issues of law and evidence into consideration when making its 
decisions. On the other hand, the ICC as a court of law is required to apply strict legal 
criterion to all aspects of its work, including establishing the existence of the 
necessary precondition for the crime of aggression. Forcing the Court to be dependent 
upon the political w i l l of the Security Council would seriously impair the 
independence and impartiality of the Court, not to mention the detrimental effect that 
457 
it could have on rights of the accused. 
Obtaining a solution that respects both the prerogatives of the Security Council and 
the independence and impartiality of the Court is not an easy task. The division of 
458 
opinion in the SWGCA, and the improbability of a resolution being forged in the 
immediate future means that this issue has the potential to profoundly fmstrate efforts 
to incorporate the crime of aggression within the de/ac/o jurisdiction of the Court. 
The opinions expressed at Rome are clear examples of the conflicting views that 
persist with regards to this issue. Whilst permanent members of the Security Council 
were adamant that the crime could only be prosecuted once the Security Council had 
determined aggression had been committed, most Arab and developing countries 
argued that the Court had to act fu l ly independently "with regard to the ascertainment 
459 
of the presence of an act of aggression by a State". These opinions reflect the two 
schools of thought that currently exist on this issue.^^° On the one hand there are those 
that believe the Security Council is the only body capable of providing the Court with 
461 
jurisdiction for prosecutions of aggression, whilst, on the other hand there are those 
457 
Elaraby, N., 2001. The Role of the Security Council and the Independence of the International 
Criminal Court: Some Reflections. In: M. P O L I T I & G. N E S I , ed. The Rome Statute of the ICC - A 
Challenge to Impunity'. Great Britain: Ashgate, p43, is sceptical of involving the Security Council as a 
"powerful over-politicized organ with an established record of sidelining legal considerations" in the 
proceedings of the I C C , and instead argues that the wide-ranging involvement the Security Council is 
already afforded under the Statute "casts a shadow on the credibility of the I C C as an independent 
Court of Law". 
458 
2006 Princeton Report, para(52). 
459 
Leanza, supra note 174, pi4. 
460 
2005 Princeton Report, para(65) notes that there are two approaches apparent in the S W G C A 
debates: "one in favour of the exclusive competence of the Security Council and the other advocating 
such competence for other bodies as well". 
461 
Supporters of this view include Carpenter, supro note6, p234 and Muller-Schieke, siipvo note217, 
p423. See also: 2005 Princeton Report, para(66) & 2006 Princeton Report, para(57). 
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that feel that the Court, as an independent body separate f rom the U N system, can 
463 
make such a determination for itself. Whilst the compromise adopted at Rome was 
the deletion of an explicit requirement that the ICC should be subordinate to the 
Security Council, the inclusion of a rather ambiguous requirement that any 
464 
amendment adopted had to be "consistent with the relevant provisions" of the U N 
Charter has provided no reconciliation to these conflicting views. 
The focus of this Chapter is the issue of whether the Security Council solely and 
exclusively has the power to pronounce on the existence of aggression or whether the 
Court is able to exercise its jurisdiction independent of such a finding, or lack thereof. 
In an attempt to bridge the gap, the suggestion has also been made that other 
international bodies, such as the General Assembly and/or the ICJ are also capable of 
making the requisite determination and therefore satisfying the necessary 
465 
precondition. For a variety of reasons, which are addressed in due course, these are 
unhelpful suggestions. 
The structure of this Chapter is based on the Options provided in the 2002 
Coordinator's Paper under paragraphs 4 and 5. That being said, it is worth noting that 
although these complex issues deserve lengthy discussions, only introductory remarks 
to the problems are made here. Space limitations means that the fol lowing discussion 
focuses on the crucial factors involved, and only draws preliminary observations as to 
the jurisdictional options that the provision on the crime of aggression should adopt. 
2. The 2002 Coordinator's Discussion Paper; 
(a) Paragraph 4 of the Coordinator's Discussion Paper: 
462 
Preamble to the Rome Statute 
463 
It is clear that such a determination can only be made for the purposes of the Court's criminal 
proceedings. See: Chapter 4(20(b)(ii). 
464 
Article 5(2) Rome Statute. According to Zimmermann, supra note272 pl06. Article 5(2) implies 
that any amendment "must contain safeguards that the Court will not prosecute an individual for the 
crime of aggression without a prior determination by the S C under Chapter V I I of the Charter that the 
underlying action by the State concerned amounted to an act of aggression". This was also the 
understanding of the U K when the Statute was adopted, U N Doc. A / C O N F . 183/13, pi24. 
2006 Princeton Report, para(58). 
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The Coordinator's options for jurisdiction start with the one point upon which the 
majority of delegates seem to be in agreement on. That is, the requirement that a prior 
determination of an act of aggression has to exist before the Court can proceed with a 
466 
case involving aggression. In relation to this, paragraph 4 of the Coordinator's 
Paper respects the role that the Security Council has been awarded under the U N 
Charter by stating that where the Prosecutor intends to investigate a crime of 
aggression, "the Court shall first ascertain whether the Security Council has made a 
determination of an act of aggression committed by the State concerned". I f no such 
determination exists, then the "the Court shall notify the Security Council of the 
situation before the Court so that the Security Council may take action, as 
467 
appropriate". For the purposes of maintaining harmony between these two 
international organizations, as well as obtaining valuable political acceptance for a 
468 
prosecution of the crime of aggression, this is a positive suggestion. By allowing 
the Security Council the opportunity to make such a determination, the Court is 
(potentially) relieved of the burden of having to assess complex questions concerning, 
469 
more often than not, controversial instances of inter-State force. This would, in 
theory, allow the Court to proceed straight to questions of individual culpability of the 
defendant(s) that it may have in its custody. That being said, such a scenario generates 
further di f f icul t questions as to the nature and legal effects which such a determination 
may have upon the procedure of the Court, as well as the rights of the accused. These 
w i l l be addressed in due course. 
The likelihood however, of the Security Council actually making such a determination 
and consequently investing the Court with jurisdiction over a situation involving 
aggression, is remote. Its composition, political influences and history infer that 
limiting the Court's jurisdiction to instances of a positive determination by the 
Council would effectively render the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute 
466 
See generally: 2005 Princeton Report, Part D. 
467 
The Coordinator's Paper provides two alternative options to be added to the end of para(4): 
"Option I: under Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations" or 
"Option 2: in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations". 
468 
Escarameia, supra note217, ppl41-143, discusses the need for harmonization between these two 
institution. 
469 
Wilmshursl, supra note455, p96 stresses that including such a provision will avoid the need for the 
Court to deal with highly political matters, such as the aggressive nature of controversial uses of force. 
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redundant. Paragraph 5 of the Coordinator's Paper recognizes this and provides a 
variety of alternative suggestions in which the Court may proceed in the face of 
470 
inaction by the Security Council. For the sake of clarity and to assist in the 
understanding of the relevant arguments, I have chosen to analyse Option 2 first, as 
this w i l l clearly demonstrate why the Security Council cannot be the sole gatekeeper 
to international prosecutions of aggression. I w i l l then turn my attention to Options 1, 
3, 4 and 5. 
(b) Paragraph 5 of the Coordinator's Paper; 
(i) Option 2: The Court shall dismiss the Case: 
When the ILC included the crime of aggression within its Draft Statute, it predicted a 
problem with the proposed Court's ability to prosecute individuals in the absence of a 
471 
finding that an act of aggression had been committed. Consequently, Article 23 of 
the 1994 Draft declared that the Court could only proceed with a prosecution of 
472 
aggression i f and when the Security Council made such a determination. Although 
this proposal was not adopted at Rome, it is still clearly the preferred option of certain 
. 473 
States today. 
For a variety of reasons, making the Court's jurisdiction solely dependent upon 
474 
positive action by the Security Council would be grossly inappropriate. Firstly, the 
470 
Apart from reducing options 3, 4 and 5 into just options 3 and 4, the 2007 Chairman's Paper does 
not alter the suggestions made by the Coordinator. This reflects the lack of progress made by the 
S W G C A in reconciling the conflicting views in this area. 
471 
Crawford, supra note235, pl47. 
472 
See: Chapter 2(3)(d). See also: 2006 Princeton Report, para(63)-(69). 
473 
Delegates in the PrepCom declared that the "Security Council has the exclusive power to determme 
whether an act of aggression declared that the has been committed", U N Doc. A/51/22, at 32. In the 
W G C A , the Russian Federation proposed a definition of aggression that was made "subject to a prior 
determination by the United Nations Security Council", U N Doc. PCNICC/1999/DP. 12. A similar 
proposal was made by Germany, U N Doc. PCNICC/1999.DP. 13. For statements to this effect in the 
S W G C A , see: 2005 Princeton Report, para(67). 
474 
See: Gaja G . , 2004. The Respective Roles of the ICC and the Security Council in Determining the 
E.xistence of an Aggression. In: Politi & Nesi, The Crime of Aggression, ppl21-124. This is also 
supported by the opinions of the I C T Y Judges when they responded to the provisions on aggression in 
the Draft Statute: 
The provision that the Court cannot proceed against an individual for a crime of aggression 
unless the Security Council has first ascertained that a State has committed the act of 
aggression should, however, be omitted . . . it does not seem necessary to provide that the 
Court defer to the Security Council on the subject of aggression, the effect of which would be 
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composition of the Security Council with its f ive permanent members able to exercise 
475 
the veto, means that America, France, China, the U K and Russia, as well as their 
political allies, would effectively be immune f rom prosecutions for the crime of 
476 
aggression. This is unacceptable considering the fact that, as demonstrated by 
recent events, the majority of controversial instances of inter-State force are 
477 
committed by members of this group. Furthermore the political hostility of certain 
permanent five members, in particular America, to the Court, means that the 
likelihood of the Security Council positively assisting the Court with prosecutions of 
aggression would be rare."^ ^^ 
Secondly, the history of the Security Council's practice with regards to instances of 
aggression provides another clear example of why such determinations would, at the 
479 
very best, be "sporadic". In over 60 years of activity, the Security Council has been 
extremely reluctant to f ind that there has been an act of aggression, the sole exception 
being Resolution 387 of 1976 in which "South Africa 's aggression against the 
480 
People's Republic of Angola" was condemned. Even Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 
1990, which is generally regarded as an explicit act of aggression, was only defined as 
to give the Security Council, and in particular the permanent members, exclusive rights of 
definition over the term "aggression", making it the "mouth of the oracle" for this category of 
crimes. The Tribunal's judges respectfully suggest that this would be an undesirable outcome. 
Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Comments Received 
Pursuant to Paragraph 4 of General Assembly Resolution 49/53 on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, Report of the Secretary-General, 20 march 1995, UN Doc. A/AC.244/1, 
Part m, para(18). 
475 
Elaraby, supra note457 highlights that "the abuse of the veto has, for many years, frustrated all 
hopes to consider the Council as the custodian for the application of the rule of law". See also: 2005 
Princeton Report, para(71) 
476 
Cryer et a/., supra note276, p276 argues that such a requirement would give the P5 an "effective 
veto over prosecutions relating to themselves and their allies". 
477 
For example, the military campaign in Afghanistan in 2001, the intervention in Iraq in 2003 by the 
US and the U K , and the actions by Israel in Lebanon in 2006. 
478 
Politi, supra note452, p50, believes that this is likely unless the American policy towards the Court 
changes rather dramatically. See generally: Wald, P., 2004. Is the United States' Opposition to the ICC 
Intractable? J C I C , Vol.2, ppl9-25; Scheffer, D.J. , 1999. The United States and the International 
Criminal Court. A J I L , Vol.93, No. 1, pp 12-22; Schabas, W., 2004. United States Hostility to the 
International Criminal Court: It's All About the Security Council. E J I L . Vol. 15, No.4, pp701 -720: 
Conso, G . , 2005. The Basic Reasons for US Hostility to the ICC in Light of the Negotiating History of 
the Rome Statute. J I C J . Vol.3, pp314-322; Reisman, W., 2004. Learning to Deal with Rejection: The 
International Criminal Court and the United States. JICJ. Vol.2, pp 17-18. 
479 
Fernandez de Gurmendi, supra note247, p603. 
480 
Although preamble paragraphs in S C Resolutions 418(1977) and 527(1982) referred to South 
Africa's 'aggressive acts' on its neighbouring States and on Namibia, the S C still failed to find that 
there was more that just a 'threat to the peace'. 
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a "breach of the peace". The Security Council's tendency to understate is evaluation 
of the situation obviously finds its origin in the diff icul ty that it would otherwise have 
to reach the required majority for adopting such a resolution. Whilst downgrading the 
text of a resolution f rom an act of aggression to a breach of the peace or a threat to the 
peace does not affect the abilities of the Security Council to take action under Chapter 
V I I , such a decision would clearly prevent the Court, i f it were to be solely dependent 
482 
upon Security Council action, f rom ever being able to exercise jurisdiction. 
Thirdly, as previously mentioned, the Security Council is not a court of law. It is a 
political organ of the U N and as such, when making its decisions does not have to 
483 
follow the principles of due process. Judge Schwebel's dissenting opinion in the 
NicaraguaCase alluded to this fact: 
While the Security Council is invested with the authority to determine the 
existence of an act of aggression, it does not act as a court in making such a 
determination. It may arrive at a determination of aggression - or, as more 
often is the case, fail to arrive at a determination of aggression - for political 
rather than legal reasons . . . In short, the Security Council is a political organ, 
which acts for political reasons. It may take legal considerations into account, 
484 
but, unlike a court, it is not bound to apply them. 
481 
S C Resolution 661(1990). Gray, supra note9, ppl97-8, notes that the S C has been only slightly 
more pro-active with regards to 'a breach of the peace', and that the majority of its resolutions have 
been passed under the guise of a 'threat to the peace'. 
482 
Gaja, supra note270, p438. 
483 
Muller-Schieke, supra note27l, p421, highlights the fact that S C decisions "take into account 
aspects of a political, economic, moral and military nature". Furthermore, Escarameia supra nole2l7, 
pi 37, argues that because the "Charter does not take into account the issue of individual criminal 
responsibility" that therefore, the "structure and mechanisms it set up do not have the question of the 
criminal punishment of individuals in mind". Strong reservations have also been expressed in the 
S W G C A regarding the fact that such a necessary precondition to the crime is "going to be made by a 
body guided by political rather than legal considerations", (2005 Princeton Report, para(68)). 
Nicaragua case, supra note96, para(60) (emphasis added). This is also made clear in G A Resolution 
3314, Article 4, where the Definition argues that the Council should take its operative paragraphs into 
consideration when considering the existence of aggression, but that it is not bound to apply them: See: 
Chapter 2(3)(c) 
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It is therefore clear that as a political decision, any determination by the Secuirty 
485 
Council must not bind the Court. I f it did, it would seriously jeopardize the Court's 
independence and impartiality, and would effectively render the Court's role in 
prosecutions of aggression to a simple assessment of the participation and intention of 
486 
the defendant(s) in its custody. In order to respect the principles of due process and 
the independence of the Court, the ICC must be able to make such a determination for 
itself, based on the law and evidence before it. As suggested by Carpenter, the 
Security Council's decision, i f one were to be made, should solely be regarded as a 
487 
'procedural condition' that is capable of being reviewed, enabling the Court to 
establish for the purposes of the prosecution all the relevant aspects of the crime, 
including whether the commission of an act of aggression amounting to a war of 
488 
aggression has actually taken place. That being said, this does raise the potential for 
conflicting findings on aggression between the two bodies. Whilst the Council may 
have determined that an act of aggression had occurred, the Court could reach the 
conclusion that on the merits of the case, the act did not amount to a war of 
aggression, or that the individual involved did not participate at the necessary policy-
level or possess the requisite mens rea. Alternatively, the Court could determine the 
existence of aggression where the Council has failed to consider the situation amounts 
485 
This view is shared by Ntanda Nsereko, D.D., 2002. Aggression under the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. NJIL. Vol.71, pp497-521; Elaraby, supra note457. Yengejeh, S., 2004. 
Reflections on the Role of the Security Council in Determining an Act of Aggression. In: Politi & Nesi, 
The Crime of Aggression, pi 32, concludes that "it seems prudent to empower the Court to make a 
ruling in cases of failure of the S C in determining the aggressor". 
486 
Politi, supra note452, p49 states that "the Court would be left to decide only upon the degree of 
participation of the accused in the activity of the State. In this case, there would be no need for a 
definition of the crime of aggression, since aggression would simply be what the Security Council has 
determined as such". 
487 
In order to safeguard the defendant's right to due process, the Prosecutor must fulfil the burden of 
proof regarding all elements of the crime, including the existence of an act of aggression, (2006 
Princeton Report, para(71)). Furthermore, the point has been made that, should it emerge, the Court 
must be able to take new evidence into account, {ibid). However, one does need to be aware of the 
implications of a review by the Court of a S C determination that an act of aggression had occurred. 
See: Martenczuk, B . , 1999. The Security Council, the International Court of Justice and Judicial 
Review: What Lessons From Lockerbie? E J I L . Vol.10, No.3, pp517-547. 
488 
Carpenter, supra note6, p235. Schuster, supra note5, p40, argues this cannot happen however, for 
two reasons: firstly, S C determinations under Article 39 are materially binding on Members States and 
therefore, via the fact that State parties to the I C C are also U N Member States, cannot be procedurally, 
but are substantially, binding on the Court; and secondly, that the fallout from the Court finding that 
aggression had not taken place would seriously undermine the authority of the Security Council, with 
"drastic consequences for the integrity of the United Nations system as a whole". 
489 
to more than a breach or threat to the peace. Although it has been acknowledged 
490 
that such a situation would be unhelpful, it may have to "be the price [that needs to 
491 
be paid] for compliance with the requirements of a fair trial". 
A prior determination by the Security Council must not a fortiori bind a defendant 
492 
charged with a crime of aggression. As early as the proceedings of the Ad Hoc 
493 
Committee, fears have been raised that involving the Security Council in the 
substantive proceedings of the Court could seriously infringe the due process rights of 
494 
the accused - not only those guaranteed under the Rome Statute but also under 
495 
human rights law in general. It would essentially usurp one of the "elementary 
496 
procedural safeguards contained in the Rome Statute" - the presumption of 
innocence as detailed in Article 66. In essence, this principle stipulates that a criminal 
defendant cannot be required to prove his or her own innocence, but rather that it is 
the Prosecution that carries the burden of establishing the defendant's guilt. It is 
diff icul t to see how the Court can observe this right of the accused in the case of 
aggression when the Security Council has already made the determination that an act 
of aggression had occurred. As Schabas observes, "an accused could arrive before the 
Court with the central factual issue in the charge already determined and not subject to 
497 
change". This cannot occur. The Court has to be able to do more than simply decide 
upon the participation and intent of the particular accused. The prosecution has to 
assert that, on the basis of the evidence before the Court, the State to which the 
accused is affiliated actually perpetrated an act of aggression that amounted to a war 
of aggression. Even the delegates of the SWGCA have acknowledged the fact that the 
rights of the defendant as foreseen in the Statute must be safeguarded under all 
489 
This issue is addressed in (2)(b)(ii) of this Chapter. 
490 
2005 Princeton Report, para(62). 
Cryer et al, supra note276, p278. 
492 
Ntanda Nsereko, supra note479, p514. See: 2005 Princeton Report, para(64). 
493 
Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note474, para(70). 
494 
Article 67 Rome Statute 
495 
Article 14 I C C P R . 
496 
Schuster, supra note5, p46. 
497 
Schabas, W.,1999. The Follow-Up to Rome: Preparing for Entr}' Into Force of the International 
Criminal Court Statute. H R L J , Vol.20, ppl57-166. As Cryer et a/, supra note276, p279, concludes that 
to allow "a decision by a political organ [to] effectively constitute part of the judgment against the 
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circumstances, "including in connection with a prior determination made by a body 
498 
Other than the Court". 
Related to this issue is the question of whether the defendant can challenge such a 
499 
determination. It is clear that, as an individual, the accused would be unable to 
defend his or her position before the Security Council. Therefore, the Court must 
provide this opportunity to the defendant. Any defendant must be allowed to raise any 
500 
international law defences available with regard to the collective act. This is 
supported by the SWGCA who, f rom a procedural perspective, have acknowledged 
that there is nothing under the Statute to prevent the accused f rom raising or 
501 
challenging such a finding during the proceedings of the Court. 
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Once again, I do not agree with Schuster's conclusions. Security Council 
involvement in the proceedings of the Court is not the only possibility available to the 
SWGCA. The above discussion has clearly stated why Security Council involvement 
beyond a procedural fulf i l lment of the precondition would be unacceptable to the 
principles of due process and the independence of the Court. As Ntanda Nsereko 
notes, such a condition would effectively "subordinate law and justice to power and 
503 
politics". That being said, where the Security Council does make a determination, 
the Court must as a matter of courtesy accord it the utmost respect, as it comes f rom 
the organ of the U N trusted with primary responsibility for matters pertaining to the 
maintenance of international peace and security. 
( / / ) Option 1: The Court may proceed with the Case: 
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Option 1 of paragraph 5 provides the most acceptable solution to the problem of 
establishing jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. In connection with paragraph 4, 
this option essentially attempts to reconcile the prerogatives of the Security Council 
with the necessary action and independence of the Court. Based on the proposal 
504 
submitted by Cameroon to the Rome Conference, and the joint proposal put 
505 
forward by Greece and Portugal in the PrepComm, this option suggests that the 
Court is capable of making its own determination as to the existence of an act of 
506 
aggression i f the Council fails to do so. Although this directly challenges the 
assumption that the Security Council has exclusive competence to determine the 
existence of an act of aggression, it is asserted here that this is the most appropriate 
option available to the SWGCA with regards to the Court's exercise of jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression. To draw such a conclusion, however, analysis of the 
prerogatives afforded to the Security Council under Chapter V I I as well as the 
practice of other U N organs in this area is required. 
Under Chapter V I I the prerogative of the Security Council is confined to determining 
the existence of threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression for the 
507 
sole purpose of authorizing 'sanctions' or 'actions though sanctions'. It does not 
extend to making a judicial determination concerning aggression for the purposes of 
508 
individual criminal proceedings. Save for Israel and the permanent members of the 
Security Council, the majority of delegates that spoke at the sixth and seventh sessions 
509 
of the PrepComm affirmed this understanding. Furthermore, the fact that other U N 
bodies have considered themselves capable of drawing conclusions upon matters that 
the Security Council has primary responsibility for supports the proposition that the 
ICC can determine the existence of aggression for itself. In the Certain Expenses 
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Case^'^ the ICJ explicitly rejected the assumption that Article 24 of the U N Charter 
affords the Security Council exclusive responsibility over matters under Chapter V I I . 
The adoption of the 'Uniting for Peace' Resolution has enabled the General Assembly 
to seize itself of such matters in instances where the Security Council is prevented 
from discharging its duties under Chapter V I I . ^ ' When the Security Council failed to 
act during the Suez Canal crisis of 1956 (because of the British and French veto), the 
General Assembly was able to deal with the matter and implement peace-keeping 
forces accordingly.^'^ In addition, the ICJ has also considered itself capable of 
513 
adjudicating on the legal aspects of matters of concern to the Security Council. In 
514 
the recent case between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda, the ICJ 
reiterated a very important statement concerning the relationship between these two 
organs of the U N : 
While there is in the Charter a provision for clear demarcation of functions 
between the General Assembly and the Security Council . . . there is no similar 
provision anywhere in the Charter with respect to the Security Council and the 
Court. The Council has functions of a political nature assigned to it, whereas 
the Court exercises purely judicial functions. Both organs can therefore 
perform their separate but complementary functions with respect to the same 
515 
events. 
The fact that the ICJ as a judicial body has successfully addressed very political 
questions, often also involving issues of inter-State force, adds weight to the argument 
510 
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that the ICC can concern itself with aggressive acts of States for the purpose of 
establishing the precondition to the crime of aggression. It has been asserted that the 
ICJ is a "trailblazer" in matters involving the relationship between the Security 
Council and the judicial organs of the international community, and that in this respect 
516 
the jurisprudence of the ICJ is "valuable as a guide to the ICC". There is however, 
one major difference between these two judicial bodies that this assumption does not 
appear to acknowledge. The ICJ's jurisdiction is fundamentally different to the ICC's, 
in that whilst the ICJ is concerned with issues of State responsibility, the ICC is only 
mandated to evaluate the criminal responsibility of individuals. In this respect, the 
jurisprudence of the ICJ can only have a limited impact on the procedure of the ICC. 
I f any comparison is to be drawn, it should therefore be made f rom an institution that 
has a mandate similar to that of the Court. 
In this context, reference to the practice of the ICTY in the Tadic case^'^ is more 
appropriate. When asked to consider the nature of the conflict (whether it was of an 
internal or an international character) the Tribunal treated the issue of State 
responsibility as a preliminary question that had to be settled for the purposes of 
518 
establishing individual criminal responsibility in the case at hand. Based on this 
practice, there is an argument to suggest that criminal institutions are capable of 
pronouncing on the actions of a State for the sole purpose of facilitating their criminal 
proceedings. This argument is something that appears to be supported by academics 
519 
as well. Finally, the fact that there is nothing in international law (in theory) f rom 
preventing an individual State f rom making an independent determination on the 
existence of an act of aggression, either for the purposes of invoking the right to self-
defence or establishing criminal proceedings at the national level, adds weight to the 
argument that to subject the Court to the rare Security Council determination would 
appear to go against developing international practice. 
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(Hi) Option 3: The Court shall request that the General Assembly make a 
recommendation: 
Option 3 suggests that where the Security Council fails to make a determination 
concerning the existence of an act of aggression, the Court may request the General 
520 
Assembly make a 'recommendation'. If that does not occur within a set period (12 
months), then the Court may proceed with the case. Whilst this proposal recognizes 
the political nature of a determination on the existence of aggression and accordingly 
tries to include the UN's other political organ in the decision making process, it is not 
a helpful suggestion for a number of reasons. Firstly, although the 'Uniting for Peace' 
resolution enables the General Assembly to seize itself of matters where the Security 
Council is prevented from acting,^^' the UN Charter makes it clear that the General 
Assembly plays a subordinate role to the Security Council on matters concerning the 
maintenance of international peace and security. By virtue of Article 103 of the 
Charter, the ICC as a treaty-based institution cannot ask the General Assembly to act 
in conflict with the Security Council where it is not being frustrated by the exercise of 
a veto. This means that where the Security Council considers the situation to be a 
breach of the peace or threat to the peace, this suggestion would not be an option 
available to the Court. Secondly, the General Assembly, like the Security Council, is a 
political organ that makes its decisions for political reasons. Therefore, the arguments 
made above concerning the necessity to safeguard the independence and impartiality 
of the Court, as well as the rights of the accused, are also relevant here. Thirdly, there 
is also no guarantee that the General Assembly, with an even larger membership than 
the Security Council, would have more success in recognizing a situation as an act of 
aggression. Finally, the delay that would result if the General Assembly was to be 
involved in the process of establishing the Court's jurisdiction would allow potential 
defendants more time to continue their aggression, destroy crucial evidence or even 
escape capture. It is my conclusion therefore that the suggestion to involve the 
520 
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General Assembly in the process of establishing jurisdiction is not a helpful solution 
to this incredibly complex problem. 
(iv) Options 4 and 5: The Court may request the General Assembly/Security 
Council to Seek an Advisory Opinion from the ICJ: 
I have decided to address Options 4 and 5 together as they both refer to the suggestion 
of involving the ICJ in the proceedings of the Court. Option 4 stipulates that the Court 
may request that either the General Assembly or the Security Council seek an 
advisory opinion from the ICJ on "the legal question of whether or not an act of 
aggression has been committed by the State concerned", in accordance with Article 96 
of the Charter and Article 65 of the ICJ Statute. Option 5 provides that the Court may 
proceed once such a finding is made. This suggestion is based on the proposal 
submitted by Bosnia and Herzegovina, New Zealand and Romania to the WGCA.^"^ 
This proposal over-complicates matters however, and should not be considered as an 
option for the ICC. The fears raised in the SWGCA accurately reflect the reasons for 
rejecting this suggestion. Firstly, doubts have been expressed about whether it would 
be desirable, from the legal perspective, to involve the ICJ, since it would apply 
524 
different standards of proof than the Court. Secondly, questions have been raised 
about whether the ruling of the ICJ would bind the Court. As already explained, in the 
interests of the accused, a prior determination by an organ other than the Court cannot 
bind it. Thirdly, even though according to the jurisprudence of the ICJ^^^ a State's 
consent is not necessary in advisory opinions, one wonders whether proceedings 
involving scenarios as serious as aggression would not essentially be "contentious 
526 
proceedings against the named state". Fourthly, there would be no possibility for 
the individual accused to appear before the ICJ and bring evidence.^ ^^ 
The multitude of questions raised concerning the ICJ's involvement indicates just how 
complex this suggestion is. Although the proposal would benefit from further 
U N Doc. P C N I C C / 2 0 0 1 A V G C A / D P I . The use of the S C was not envisaged in this proposal 
however. 
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discussion, for the purposes of this thesis, it is considered to be an unhelpful 
suggestion. As a final point, it is worth noting that discussions in the SWGCA seem to 
suggest that the majority of delegates also favor the deleting of these options, although 
528 
for different reasons. 
CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS: 
The proposals concerning the manner in which the ICC will exercise jurisdiction over 
the crime of aggression are, in my opinion, the most troubling aspect of the SWGCA's 
task. Not only do the contrasting opinions appear to be irreconcilable, but also the 
dangerous possibility of involving the political motives of the Security Council in the 
judicial processes of the ICC has serious consequences for the independence of the 
Court and the application of fundamental due process principles. Although the above 
analysis is only a brief overview of the complex issues involved in this problem, a few 
initial observations can be made. Firstly, it is clear that the UN Charter affords the 
Security Council primary responsibility for determining the existence of acts of 
aggression with regards to measures under Chapter VII . However, the Security 
Council does not have the monopoly on making such determinations for the purposes 
of establishing criminal proceedings. The fact that paragraph 4 of the Coordinator's 
Paper accords the Security Council the due respect it deserves is a positive suggestion 
for the starting point for the proposals concerning the Court's jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression. However, it is clear that should the Security Council make such a 
determination, it cannot bind the Court. To do so would violate the principles of due 
process and the independence of the Court. The Court must be able to review any 
determination made during the course of its proceedings. Furthermore, where no 
Security Council determination is made, the Court must be able to take such a 
decision for itself. Developing practice in this area would suggest that the Court has 
the competence to take such action. Involving the General Assembly and/or the ICJ in 
the process would, however, not be a suitable alternative. On a final note, the 
suggestion has been made that should the Court be afforded the ability to make a 
determination as to the existence of an act of aggression independent of the Security 
Council, that the Security Council's efforts to maintain international peace and 
security could be jeopardized, enabling hostilities to continue and potentially get even 
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worse. This suggestion does not take account of the options already afforded to the 
Security Council under the Rome Statute. Should the Security Council feel that the 
Court's investigation is interfering with its ability to carry out its duties the Security 
Council can legitimately defer the Court's jurisdiction under Article 16. 
529 
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C H A P T E R 5: 
T H E WAY F O R W A R D : 
The mandate of the SWGCA, awarded by default from the WGCA, makes it clear that 
there are two principle aspects to the crime of aggression. In order to present the ASP 
with a properly drafted proposal based on substantive legal provisions capable of 
actually impacting upon the day to day workings of the Court and the cases it handles, 
both of these proposals have to be comprehensively addressed and defined. Whilst the 
definition of the crime of aggression needs to be completed, it is the opinion of this 
author (as demonstrated by the conclusions presented in Chapter 3 of this thesis) that 
this is something which can, with relative ease and a little compromise, be 
accomplished. Moreover, it can be accomplished in accordance with the fundamental 
and non-derivable principle of nullum crimen sine lege as well as clearly established 
customary international law. Secondly, the conditions under which the Court is to 
exercise jurisdiction need to be stipulated. This, as is argued in Chapter 4, is 
something that is not as easy nor as straightforward as defining the elements of the 
crime, and potentially may be the issue which derails the entire project. 
Whilst history might suggest that defining the substantive aspects of the crime of 
aggression would be the more disconcerting obstacle the SWGCA has to overcome. 
Chapter 3 has determined that this is not the case. A definition of the crime of 
aggression for the purposes of criminal prosecution under the Rome Statute is 
comprehensively attainable. Even though opinions amongst certain delegates may 
differ, the law in this area is clear. As long as the definition complies with stipulated 
customary international law and the stringent principle of legality, the elements of the 
crime of aggression are relatively effortless to identify. Other academics also share 
this conviction. Meron believes that "a definition of aggression that is tailored to 
reflect customary international law is not an impossible mission",^"'" whilst Fernandez 
de Gurmendi concludes that "every effort should be made not to depart from the 
principle of legality, which should be perceived not only as a safeguard for the rights 
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of the accused but the best protection for the credibility of the Court as well".^'^' 
Furthermore, a stringent definition has the potential to silence some of Court's more 
vocal critics, as well as strengthen the belief of both State Parties and non-State 
Parties alike, in the Court's impartiality, independence and effective functioning 
capabilities. To enter unchartered waters and start legislating new aspects of this 
already controversial and difficult crime would not only go against the views of many 
of the Parties to the debate, but would ultimately cause such division that actually 
presenting the ASP with a provision capable of being adopted would become a remote 
and unlikely possibility. 
The unique nature of the crime of aggression means that the definition must identify 
the underlying collective act that is committed by the State. It is generally recognized 
that the General Assembly's Definition of Aggression is the principle document of 
reference for ascertaining which particular acts by the State amount to an act of 
aggression. The SWGCA is not mandated to re-open this issue, and although caution 
is advised when one refers to Resolution 3314 in the context of criminal proceedings 
against an individual, it is the principle source of reference for the Court when 
clarification or review is needed of a determination that an act of aggression has in 
fact occuiTed. 
What the SWGCA is mandated to do is to prepare a definition of the crime of 
aggression that clearly identifies the instances in which an act of aggression when 
committed by the State can lead to the criminal prosecution of the leaders of that 
State. The only successful international prosecutions of aggression to have been 
conducted - namely those before the IMT, IMTFE and CCL No. 10 - are the only 
precedents available to the ICC, and whilst they should be approached with a degree 
of caution, attention should be given to the principles they established and the 
reasoning they provided. Of crucial importance is the fact that for an individual to be 
held accountable for his or her involvement in the illegal conduct of the State, the 
particular act of aggression must amount to a war of aggression or an action which, in 
its gravity and scale, reaches the same degree of intensity in order to qualify as a war 
of aggression. Whilst raising the bar to the magnitude of force witnessed during the 
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Second World War may be too restrictive, it is clear that instances such as cross-
border skirmishes constitute acts 'short of war', and as such, can only be the subject 
of political condemnation. Secondly, the action must also be accompanied by an 
aggressive aim, intention or objective. Based on the Nuremberg precedent, this 
aggressive conduct materializes as the total or partial annexation or occupation of the 
victim-State by the aggressor. In this author's proposed definition, the phraseology -
"which has the object or result of establishing a military occupation of, or annexing, 
the territory of another State or part thereof - has been chosen as it represents 
accepted customary international law on this aspect of the definition. 
Regarding the second component of the crime, namely the involvement of the 
individual, the jurisprudence of the IMT, IMTFE and the CCL No. 10 trials makes it 
clear that only a limited number of people can satisfy the strict ratione personae 
requirements. The crime of aggression is a leadership crime, and as such, only those 
individuals who are in a position to "effectively exercise control over or to direct the 
political or military action of a State" can be held responsible for the State's 
aggressive acts. Although it would seem to be obvious that high-ranking military 
individuals, heads of State that actively participate in the policy of their country and 
decision-making politicians will almost always satisfy this criteria, the Judgment of 
the IMT also emphasized the fact that individuals such as industrialists, business men 
and diplomats can be held responsible for the crime of aggression when they have 
actively influenced the policy of an aggressive State. As long as it can be 
demonstrated that they were actively involved in the "planning, preparation, initiation 
or execution" of a war of aggression, then they are capable of being held responsible 
for their actions. 
The conditions upon which the Court is to exercise jurisdiction, as detailed in Chapter 
4 of this thesis, are a much more complex matter that is going to be much harder for 
the SWGCA to resolve. The inevitable relationship that exists between the political 
organ that is the Security Council and the judicial organ that is the Court has the 
potential to be highly disruptive. Like Shukri concludes: 
The real problem to establishing the crime of aggression within the jurisdiction 
of the ICC is not the definition to be applied, but it is the relations between the 
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International Criminal Court and the Security Council if the International 
Criminal Court ever wants to exercise its functions regarding the crime of 
532 
aggression. 
By virtue of Article 39 of the UN Charter, the Security Council is responsible for 
determining the existence of a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of 
aggression". Furthermore, Article 5(2) of the Rome Statute states that any provision 
on the crime of aggression must be "consistent with the relevant provisions" of the 
UN Charter. Although some suggest that this means that the ICC is bound to abide by 
the actions (or non-actions) of the Security Council with regards to aggression, it is 
my belief and the argument of this thesis that this is not and should not be the case.^ ^^  
Firstly, it is proposed that the suggestion made at paragraph 4 of the 2002 
Coordinator's paper satisfies the conditions stipulated in Article 5(2), namely that 
should the Prosecutor wish to investigate an alleged crime of aggression, the Court 
should "first ascertain whether the Security Council has made a determination of an 
act of aggression committed by the State concerned" (and if no such determination 
exists, should "notify the Security Council of the situation before the Court so that the 
Security Council may take action, as appropriate"). 
Secondly, at section 2(b)(ii) of Chapter 4, this author argues that the ICC is capable of 
making its own determination as to the existence of an act of aggression, purely for 
the purpose of prosecuting an individual or several individuals for their role in the 
commission of an alleged crime of aggression. Both the ICJ and the ICTY have 
recognized their abilities to function as judicial organs alongside the political organ 
that is the Security Council in respect of the same events, so why should the ICC be 
prevented from doing the same? Whilst it may be argued that this is something which 
the ICC is capable of doing, the issue of whether this is something that members to 
the SWGCA will actually agree to allow the ICC to do is a totally different matter. 
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In particular, see: section 2(b)(i) of Chapter 4 of this thesis, where the arguments are made as to 
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Thirdly, although it is important to establish and develop good relations with the 
Security Council as the primary body responsible for the maintenance of international 
peace and security, the Court should not be bound to its political will . As this author 
concludes at page 104 of this thesis, "forcing the Court to be dependent upon the 
political will of the Security Council would seriously impair the independence and 
impartiality of the Court, not to mention the detrimental effect that it could have on 
the rights of the accused". Primarily, should the Security Council (or any other body 
for that matter) actually make a determination that an act of aggression has been 
committed - it is the strongly held belief of this author that such a determination 
should in no way bind the Court. In order to respect the principles of due process as 
well as the independence of the Court, the ICC must be able to make such a 
determination for itself, based on the law and evidence before it. Although this has the 
potential to give rise to the possibility of two bodies arriving at different and 
conflicting conclusions, this should not prevent the ICC from adhering to these 
fundamental principles. In conclusion, the Court has to be able to do more than simply 
decide upon the participation and intent of the particular accused and, as Cryer 
acknowledges, this might just have to "be the price [that needs to be paid] for 
534 
compliance with the requirements of a fair trial". 
Obtaining a solution that respects both the prerogatives of the Security Council and 
the independence and impartiality of the Court is not an easy task. The division of 
opinion within the SWGCA and the improbability of a resolution being forged in the 
immediate future means that this issue has the potential to profoundly frustrate efforts 
to incorporate the crime of aggression within the (ie/aero jurisdiction of the Court. 
The Security Council's composition, political influences and history infer that limiting 
the Court's jurisdiction to instances of a positive determination by it would effectively 
render the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute redundant. The composition of the 
Security Council, with its permanent members being able to exercise their veto 
unrestrained, would allow America, France, China, the UK and Russia, as well as 
their political allies, to become effectively immune from prosecutions for the crime of 
aggression. The SWGCA must remain loyal to the fundamental principles of due 
process and preserve the independence, impartiality and integrity of the Court. Any 
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evidential provision adopted must, in the words of Ntanda Nsereko, avoid paying 
"homage to power and politics" and instead must "endeavor to accord primacy to law 
535 
and justice". 
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Annex I 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX), 14 
December 1974. Definition of Aggression 
The General Assembly, 
Basing itself on the fact that one of the fundamental purposes of the United Nations is 
to maintain international peace and security and to take effective collective measures 
for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts 
of aggression and other breaches of the peace. 
Recalling that the Security Council, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter of 
the United Nations, shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. 
Recalling also the duty of States under the Charter to settle their international disputes 
by peaceful means in order not to endanger international peace, security and justice. 
Bearing in mind that nothing in this Definition shall be interpreted as in any way 
affecting the scope of the provisions of the Charter with respect to the functions and 
powers of the organs of the United Nations, 
Considering also that, since aggression is the most serious and dangerous form of the 
illegal use of force, being fraught, in the conditions created by the existence of all 
types of weapons of mass destruction, with the possible threat of a world conflict and 
all its catastrophic consequences, aggression should be defined at the present stage, 
Reaffirming the duty of States not to use armed force to deprive peoples of their right 
to self-determination, freedom and independence, or to disrupt territorial Integrity, 
Reaffirming also that the territory of a State shall not be violated by being the object, 
even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by 
another State in contravention of the Charter, and that it shall not be the object of 
acquisition by another State resulting from such measures or the threat thereof. 
Reaffirming also the provisions of the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, 
Convinced that the adoption of a definition of aggression ought to have the effect of 
detening a potential aggressor, would simplify the determination of acts of aggression 
and the implementation of measures to suppress them and would also facilitate the 
protection of the rights and lawful interests of, and the rendering of assistance to, the 
victim. 
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Believing that, although the question whether an act of aggression has been 
committed must be considered in the light of all the circumstances of each particular 
case, it is nevertheless desirable to formulate basic principles as guidance for such 
determination. 
Adopts the following Definition of Aggression: 
Article 1 
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition. 
Explanatory note: In this Definition the term "State": 
(a) Is used without prejudice to questions of recognition or to whether a 
State is a member of the United Nations: 
(b) Includes the concept of a "group of States" where appropriate. 
Article 2 
The First use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute 
prima facie evidence of an act of aggression although the Security Council may, in 
conformity with the Charter, conclude that a determination that an act of aggression 
has been committed would not be justified in the light of other relevant circumstances, 
including the fact that the acts concerned or their consequences are not of sufficient 
gravity. 
Article 3 
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject to and in 
accordance with the provisions of article 2, qualify as an act of aggression: 
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of 
another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from 
such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory 
of another State or part thereof; 
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of 
another State or the use of any weapon by a State against the territory of 
another State; 
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(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of 
another State; 
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, 
or marine and air fleets of another State; 
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of 
another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the 
conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in 
such territory beyond the termination of the agreement; 
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the 
disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act 
of aggression against a third State; 
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, 
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another 
State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial 
involvement therein. 
Article 4 
The acts enumerated above are not exhaustive and the Security Council may 
determine that other acts constitute aggression under the provisions of the Charter. 
Article 5 
1. No consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic, 
military or otherwise, may serve as a justification for aggression. 
2. A war of aggression is a crime against international peace. Aggression 
gives rise to international responsibility. 
3. No territorial acquisition or special advantage resulting from 
aggression is or shall be recognized as lawful. 
Article 6 
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Nothing in this Definition shall be construed as in any way enlarging or diminishing 
the scope of the Charter, including its provisions concerning cases in which the use of 
force is lawful. 
Article 7 
Nothing in this Definition, and in particular article 3, could in any way prejudice the 
right to self-determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the Charter, of 
peoples forcibly deprived of that right and referred to in the Declaration on Principles 
of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, particularly peoples under colonial 
and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination: nor the right of these peoples to 
struggle to that end and to seek and receive support, in accordance with the principles 
of the Charter and in conformity with the above-mentioned Declaration. 
Article 8 
In their interpretation and application the above provisions are interrelated and each 
provision should be construed in the context of the other provisions. 
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Annex II 
Discussion paper proposed by the Coordinator 
I . Definition of the crime of aggression and conditions for the exercise of 
jurisdiction 
1. For the purpose of the present Statute, a person commits a "crime of 
aggression" when, being in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct 
the political or military action of a State, that person intentionally and knowingly 
orders or participates actively in the plarming, preparation, initiation or execution of 
an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a flagrant 
violation of the Charter of the United Nations 
Option 1: Add "such as, in particular, a war of aggression or an act which has 
the object of result of establishing a military occupation of, or annexing, the 
territory of another State or part thereof. 
Option 2: Add "and amounts to a war of aggression or constitutes an act 
which ahs the object or the result of establishing a military occupation of, or 
annexing, the territory of another State or part thereof. 
Option 3: Neither of the above. 
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, "act of aggression" means an act referred to in 
the United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, 
which is determined to have been committed by the State concerned. 
Option 1: Add "in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5". 
Option 2: Add "subject to a prior determination by the Security Council of the 
United Nations". 
3. The provisions of articles 25, paragraphs 3, 28 and 33, of the Statute do not 
apply to the crime of aggression. 
4. Where the Prosecutor intends to proceed with an investigation in respect of a 
crime of aggression, the Court shall first ascertain whether the Security Council has 
made a determination of an act of aggression committed by the State concerned. If no 
Security Council determination exists, the Court shall notify the Security Council of 
the situation before the Court so that the Security Council may take action, as 
appropriate: 
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Option 1: under Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
Option 2: in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations. 
5. Where the Security Council does not make a determination as to the existence 
of an act of aggression by a State: 
Variant (a) or invoke article 16 of the Statute within six months from the date 
of notification. 
Variant (b) [Remove variant a.] 
Option 1: the Court may proceed with the case. 
Option 2: the Court shall dismiss the case. 
Option 3: the Court shall, with due regard to the provisions of Articles 12, 14 
and 24 of the Charter, request the General Assembly of the United Nations to 
make a recommendation within [12] months. In the absence of such a 
recommendation, the Court may proceed with the case. 
Option 4: the Court may request 
Variant (a) the General Assembly 
Variant (b) the Security Council, acting on the vote of any nine members, 
to seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice, in 
accordance with Article 96 of the Charter and article 65 of the Statute of the 
International Court, on the legal question of whether or not an act of 
aggression has been committed by the State concerned. The Court may 
proceed with the case if the International Court of Justice gives an advisory 
opinion that an act of aggression has been committed by the State concerned. 
Option 5: the Court may proceed if it ascertains that the International Court of 
Justice has made a finding in proceedings brought under Chapter II of its 
Statute that an act of aggression has been committed by the State concerned. 
II . Elements of the crime of aggression (as defined in the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court 
Precondition 
I 
The elements in part II are drawn from a proposal by Samoa and were not thoroughly discussed. 
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In addition to the general preconditions contained in article 12 of the present 
2 
Statute, it is a precondition that an appropriate organ has determined the existence of 
the act of aggression required by element 5 of the following Elements. 
Elements 
1: The perpetrator was in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct 
the political or military action of the State which committed an act of aggression as 
defined in element 5 of these Elements. 
2: The perpetrator was knowingly in that position. 
3: The perpetrator ordered or participated actively in the planning, preparation or 
execution of the act of aggression. 
4: The perpetrator committed element 3 with intent and knowledge. 
5: An "act of aggression", that is to say, an act referred to in the United Nations 
General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, was committed by 
a State. 
6: The perpetrator knew that the actions of the State amounted to an act of 
aggression. 
7: The act of aggression, by its character, gravity and scale, constituted a flagrant 
violation of the Charter of the United Nations, 
Option 1: Add "such as a war of aggression or an aggression which had the 
object or result of establishing a military occupation of, or annexing the 
territory of another State or part thereof. 
Option 2: Add "and amounts to a war of aggression or constitutes an act 
which has the object or the result of establishing a military occupation of, or 
annexing, the territory of another State or part thereof. 
Option 3: Neither of the above. 
8: The perpetrator had intent and knowledge with respect to element 7. 
Note: 
Elements 2, 4, 6 and 8 are included out of an abundance of caution. The "default rule" 
of article 30 of the Statute would supply them if nothing were said. The dogmatic 
requirement of some legal systems that there be both intent and knowledge is not 
meaningful in other systems. The drafting reflects these, perhaps insoluble, tensions. 
See options 1 and 2 of paragraph 2 of part I. The right of the accused should be considered in 
connection with this precondition. 
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Annex III 
Discussion paper on the crime of aggression proposed by the 
Chairman 
I. Definition of the crime of aggression and conditions for the exercise of 
jurisdiction 
Insert new article 8 bis (entitled "Crime of Aggression") into the Rome Statute: 
2 
Variant (a): 
1. For the purpose of the present Statute, a person commits a "crime of 
aggression" when, being in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct 
the political or military action of a State, that person (leads) (directs) (organizes and/or 
directs) engages in) the planning, preparation, initiation or execution of an act of 
aggression/armed attack 
Variant (b): 
1. For the purpose of the present Statute, a person commits a "crime of 
aggression" when, being in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct 
the political or military action of a State, that person orders or participates actively in 
the planning, preparation, initiation or execution of an act of aggression/armed attack 
continue under both variants: 
[which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of 
the Charter of the United Nations] [such as, in particular, a war of aggression or an act 
which has the object or result of establishing a military occupation of, or annexing, the 
territory of another State of part thereof]. 
' The question as to whether the amendments are adopted under article 121, paragraph 4 or 5, requires 
further discussion. 
Variant (a) reflects the "differentiated" approach, under which article 25, paragraph 3, does apply to 
the crime of aggression, with the exception of subparagraph(0. Further options for the wording of this 
paragraph under the differentiated approach are contained in the report of the 2006 Princeton meeting 
(see ICC-ASP/5/32 , annex II , appendix I). Variant (b) represents the "monistic" approach, under which 
article 25, paragraph 3, in its entirety does not apply to the crime of aggression. 
The proponents of the language "armed attack" (or alternatively "use of force") for paragraph 1 
advocate, along with this formulation, also the deletion of paragraph 2 as a whole. 
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2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, "act of aggression" means an act referred to in 
[articles 1 and 3 o f j United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 
December 1974. 
under variant (a) above: 
3. The provisions of articles 25, paragraph 3 (f), and [28] of the Statute do not 
4 
apply to the crime of aggression. 
under variant (b) above: 
3. The provisions of articles 25, paragraph 3, and [28] of the Statute do not apply 
to the crime of aggression. 
4. Where the Prosecutor intends to proceed with an investigation in respect of a 
crime of aggression, the Court shall first ascertain whether the Security Council has 
made a determination of an act of aggression committed by the State concerned. If no 
Security Council determination exists, the Court shall notify the Security Council of 
the situation before the Court. 
5. Where the Security Council does not make such a determination within [six] 
months after the date of notification, 
Option 1: the Court may proceed with the case. 
Option 2: the Court may not proceed with the case. 
Option 3: the Court may, with due regard to the provisions of articles 12, 14 
and 24 of the Charter, request the General Assembly of the United Nations to 
make such a determination within [12] months. In the absence of such a 
determination, the Court may proceed with the case. 
Option 4: the Court may proceed if it ascertains that the International Court of 
Justice has made a finding in proceedings brought under Chapter I I of its 
Statute that an act of aggression has been committed by the State concerned. 
4 
Under variant (a), which foresees that article 25, paragraph 3, does apply with the exception of 
subparagraph (f) ("attempt"), a new subparagraph could be added to article 25 which re-confirms that 
the forms of participation described in article 25, paragraph 3, subparagraphs (a) to (d), apply only to 
persons who are in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military 
action of a State. 
It is widely agreed that article 28 is not applicable by virtue both of the essence and the nature of the 
crime. However, there is not yet any agreement whether or not non-applicability needs to be specified. 
It has been suggested that paragraphs 4 and 5 should be redrafted in order to differentiate between the 
trigger mechanisms reflected in article 13. 
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I I . Elements of the crime of aggression (as defined in the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court) 
Precondition 
In addition to the general preconditions contained in article 12 of the present 
Statute, it is a precondition that an appropriate organ has determined the existence of 
the act of aggression required by element 5 of the following Elements. 
Elements 
1: The perpetrator was in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct 
the political or military action of the State which committed an act of aggression as 
defined in element 5 of these Elements. 
2: The perpetrator was knowingly in that position. 
3: The perpetrator ordered or participated actively in the planning, preparation or 
execution of the act of aggression. 
4: The perpetrator committed element 3 with intent and knowledge. 
5: An "act of aggression", that is to say, an act referred to in the United Nations 
General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, was committed by 
a State. 
6: The perpetrator knew that the actions of the State amounted to an act of 
aggression. 
7: The act of aggression, by its character, gravity and scale, constituted a flagrant 
violation of the Charter of the United Nations, 
Option 1: Add "such as a war of aggression or an aggression which had the 
object or result of establishing a military occupation of, or annexing the 
territory of another State or part thereof. 
6 
The Elements in part 11 were not thoroughly discussed and have therefore been reproduced without 
any change from the 2002 Coordinator's paper, even though this leads to some obvious inconsistencies. 
The Elements therefore mainly serve the purpose of a placeholder, at this juncture of the debate. 
See options 1 and 2 of paragraph 2 of part I. The right of the accused should be considered in 
connection with this precondition. 
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Option 2: Add "and amounts to a war of aggression or constitutes an act 
which has the object or the result of establishing a military occupation of, or 
annexing, the territory of another State or part thereof. 
Option 3: Neither of the above. 
8: The perpetrator had intent and knowledge with respect to element 7. 
Note: 
Elements 2, 4, 6 and 8 are included out of an abundance of caution. The "default rule" 
of article 30 of the Statute would supply them i f nothing were said. The dogmatic 
requirement of some legal systems that there be both intent and knowledge is not 
meaningful in other systems. The drafting reflects these, perhaps insoluble, tensions. 
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